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
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
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




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HERMES .

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OR
A PHILOSOPHICAL INQVIRY
CONCERNING
VNIVERSAL GRAMMAR
BY
JAMES HARRIS ESQ.


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To the Right Honourable

iii

PHILIP *Lord* HARDWICKE,

Lord High Chancellor of *Great-
Britain.**

My Lord,

AS no one has exercised the Powers of Speech with juster and more universal applause, than yourself; I have presumed to inscribe the following Treatise to your Lordship, its End being to investigate the Principles of those Powers. It has a farther claim to your Lordship's Patronage, by being connected in some degree with that politer Literature, which, in the most important scenes of Business, you
A 2 have

* The above Dedication is printed as it originally stood, the Author being desirous that what he intended as a real Respect to the noble Lord, when living, should now be considered, as a Testimony of Gratitude to his Memory.

have still found time to cultivate. With regard to myself, if what I have written be the fruits of that Security and Leisure, obtained by living under a mild and free Government; to whom for this am I more indebted, than to your Lordship, whether I consider you as a Legislator, or as a Magistrate, the first both in dignity and reputation? Permit me therefore thus publicly to assure your Lordship, that with the greatest gratitude and respect I am, My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obliged,

and most obedient humble Servant,

*Close of Salisbury,
Oct. 1, 1751.*

James Harri..

P R E F A C E.

THE chief End proposed by the Author of this Treatise in making it public, has been to excite his Readers to curiosity and inquiry; not to teach them himself by prolix and formal Lectures, (from the efficacy of which he has little expectation) but to induce them, if possible, to become Teachers to themselves, by an impartial use of their own understandings. He thinks nothing more absurd than the common notion of Instruction, as if Science were to be poured into the Mind, like water into a cistern, that passively waits to receive all that comes. The growth of Knowledge he rather thinks to resemble the growth of Fruit; however external causes may in some degree co-operate, it is the internal vigour, and vir-

tue of the tree, that must ripen the juices to their just maturity.

This then, namely, the exciting men to inquire for themselves into subjects worthy of their contemplation, this the Author declares to have been his first and principal motive for appearing in print. Next to that, as he has always been a lover of Letters, he would willingly approve his studies to the liberal and ingenuous. He has particularly named these, in distinction to others ; because, as his studies were never prosecuted with the least regard to lucre, so they are no way calculated for any lucrative End. The liberal therefore and ingenuous (whom he has mentioned already) are those, to whose perusal he offers what he has written. Should they judge favourably of his attempt, he may not perhaps hesitate to confess,

Hoc juvat et melli est.—

For

P R E F A C E.

vii

For tho' he hopes he cannot be charged with the foolish love of vain Praise, he has no desire to be thought indifferent, or insensible to honest Fame.

From the influence of these sentiments, he has endeavoured to treat his subject with as much order, correctness, and perspicuity as in his power; and if he has failed, he can safely say (according to the vulgar phrase) that the failure has been his misfortune, and not his fault. He scorns those trite and contemptible methods of anticipating pardon for a bad performance, that "it was the hasty fruits of a few idle hours; written merely for private amusement; never revised; published against consent, at the importunity of friends, copies (God knows how) having by stealth gotten abroad;" with other stale jargon of equal falsehood and inanity. May we not ask such Prefacers, If what they allege be true, what has the

world to do with them and their crudities.

As to the book itself, it can say this in its behalf, that it does not merely confine itself to what its title promises, but expatiates freely into whatever is collateral; aiming on every occasion to rise in its inquiries, and to pass, as far as possible, from small matters to the greatest. Nor is it formed merely upon sentiments that are now in fashion, or supported only by such authorities as are modern. Many Authors are quoted, that now-a-days are but little studied; and some perhaps, whose very names are hardly known.

The Fate indeed of ancient Authors (as we have happened to mention them) is not unworthy of our notice. A few of them survive in the Libraries of the learned, where some venerable Folio, that still goes by their name, just suffices to give them a kind of nominal existence.

The

P R E F A C E.

ix

The rest have long fallen into a deeper obscurity, their very names when mentioned, affecting us as little, as the names, when we read them, of those subordinate Heroes,

Alcandrumque, Haliumque, No-
emonaque, Prytanimque.

Now if an Author, not content with the more eminent of antient Writers, should venture to bring his reader into such company as these last, among people (in the fashionable phrase) that nobody knows; what usage, what quarter can he have reason to expect? Should the Author of these speculations have done this (and it is to be feared he has) what method had he best take in a circumstance so critical?—Let us suppose him to apologize in the best manner he can, and in consequence of this, to suggest as follows—

Ile

The Author of this Treatise would by no means detract from the just honour due to those of his Countrymen, who either in the present, or preceding age have so illustriously adorned it. But tho' he can with pleasure and sincerity join in celebrating their deserts, he would not have the admiration of these, or of any other few, to pass thro' blind excess into a contempt of all others. Were such Admiration to become universal, an odd event would follow; a few learned men, without any fault of their own, would contribute in a manner to the extinction of Letters.

A like evil to that of admiring only the authors of our own age, is that of admiring only the authors of one particular Science. There is indeed in this last prejudice something peculiarly unfortunate, and that is, the more excellent the Science, the more likely it will be found to produce this effect.

There

There are few Sciences more intrinsically valuable, than MATHEMATICS. It is hard indeed to say; to which they have more contributed, whether to the Utilities of Life, or to the sublimest parts of Science. They are the noblest Praxis of LOGIC, or UNIVERSAL REASONING. It is thro' them we may perceive, how the stated Forms of Syllogism are exemplified in one Subject, namely the Predicament of Quantity. By marking the force of these Forms, as they are applied here, we may be enabled to apply them of ourselves elsewhere. Nay farther still—by viewing the MIND, during its process in these syllogistic employments, we may come to know in part, what kind of Being it is; since MIND, like other Powers, can be only known from its Operations. Whoever therefore will study Mathematics in this view, will become not only by Mathematics a more expert Logician, and by Logic a more rational Mathematician, but
a wiser

a wiser Philosopher, and an acuter Reasoner, in all the possible subjects either of science or deliberation.

But when Mathematics, instead of being applied to this excellent purpose, are used not to exemplify Logic, but to supply its place; no wonder if Logic pass into contempt, and if Mathematics, instead of furthering science, become in fact an obstacle. For when men, knowing nothing of that Reasoning which is universal, come to attach themselves for years to a single Species, a species wholly involved in Lines and Numbers only; they grow insensibly to believe these last as inseparable from all Reasoning, as the poor Indians thought every horseman to be inseparable from his horse.

*And thus we see the use, nay the necessity of enlarging our literary views, lest even Knowledge itself should obstruct
its*

P R E F A C E.

IV

its own growth, and perform in some measure the part of ignorance and barbarity.

Such then is the Apology made by the Author of this Treatise, for the multiplicity of antient quotations, with which he has filled his Book. If he can excite in his readers a proper spirit of curiosity; if he can help in the least degree to enlarge the bounds of Science; to revive the decaying taste of antient Literature; to lessen the bigotted contempt of every thing not modern; and to assert to Authors of every age their just portion of esteem; if he can in the least degree contribute to these ends, he hopes it may be allowed, that he has done a service to mankind. Should this service be a reason for his Work to survive, he has confessed already, it would be no unpleasing event. Should the contrary happen, he must acquiesce in its fate, and let it peaceably pass to those destined regions, whi-

*ther the productions of modern Wit are
every day passing,*

——in vicum vendentem thus et
odores.

ADVERTISEMENT.

*The Reader is desired to take notice,
that as often as the author quotes V. I. p.
&c. he refers to Three Treatises publish-
ed first in one Volume, Octavo, in the
year 1744.*

THE

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HERMES

HERMES
OR
A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY
CONCERNING
UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

INTRODUCTION.

Design of the Whole.

IF Men by nature had been framed Ch. I.
for Solitude, they had never felt an Im-
pulse to converse one with another:
And if, like lower Animals, they had
been by nature irrational, they could
not have recognized the proper Subjects
of Discourse. Since SPEECH then is
the joint Energie of our best and noblest
Faculties,^(a) (that is to say, of our *Rea-*
B son

^(a) See V. I. p. 147 to 169. See also Note xv. p. 292,
and Note xix. p. 296, of the same Volume.

H E R M È S.

Ph. I. *son and our social Affection)* being with-
 al our *peculiar Ornament and Distinc-*
tion, as Men; those *Inquiries* may surely
 be deemed interesting as well as liberal,
 which either search how *SPEECH* may
 be naturally *resolved*; or how, when re-
 solved, it may be again *combined*.

HERE a large field for speculating
 opens before us. We may either behold
SPEECH, as divided into *its constituent*
Parts, as a Statue may be divided into
 its several Limbs; or else, as resolved
 into its *Matter and Form*, as the same
 Statue may be resolved into its Marble
 and Figure.

THESE different *Analysings* or *Resolu-*
tions constitute what we call^(b) PHILOSOPHICAL, or UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

W H E N

^(b) *Grammaticam etiam bipartitam ponemus, ut alia sit literaria, alia philosophica, &c. Bacon, de Augm. Scient. VI. 1. And soon after he adds—Verumtamen hâc ipsâ re moniti, cogitatione complexi sumus Grammaticam quandam, quæ non analogiam verborum ad intencem, sed analogiam inter verba et res sive rationem sedulo inquirit.*

WHEN we have viewed SPEECH thus Ch. I.
analysed, we may then consider it, as
compounded. And here in the first place
 we may contemplate that ^(c) *Synthesis*,
 which *by combining simple Terms* pro-
 duces a *Truth*; then *by combining two*
Truths produces a *third*; and thus
 others, and others, in continued De-
 monstration, till we are led, as by a
 road, into the regions of SCIENCE.

Now this is that *superior* and most ex-
 cellent *Synthesis*, which alone applies
 itself to our *Intellect* or *Reason*, and
 B 2 which

(c) Aristotle says—τῶν δὲ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγο-
 μένων ἢ δὲν ἔστι ἀληθὲς ἢ τε ψευδὲς ἴσιν· οἷον ἀνθρώπου, λευκοῦ, τρέ-
 χει, νικᾷ—Of those words which are spoken without con-
 nection, there is no one either true or false; as for in-
 stance, Man, white, runneth, conquereth. Cat. C. 4. So
 again in the beginning of his Treatise *De Interpretatione*,
 περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διάφασιν ἔστι τὸ ψευδὲς τε καὶ τὸ ἀληθές.
True and False are seen in Composition and Division.
 Composition makes affirmative Truth, Division makes
 negative, yet both alike bring terms together, and so far
 therefore may be called synthetical.

Ch. I. which to conduct according to Rule,
constitutes the Art of Logic.

AFTER this we may turn to those
(^d) *inferior* Compositions, which are
productive of the *Pathetic*, and the
Pleasant

(^d) *Ammonius* in his Comment on the Treatise *Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας*, p. 53, gives the following Extract from *Theophrastus*, which is here inserted at length, as well for the Excellence of the Matter, as because it is not (I believe) elsewhere extant.

Διτῆς γὰρ ἔσσης τῷ λόγῳ σχέσις, (καθ' ἣν διώρισιν ὁ φιλόσοφος Θεόφραστος) τῆς τε ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΚΡΟΩΜΕΝΟΥΣ, οἷς καὶ σημαίνει τι, καὶ τῆς ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ, ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ λέγων ποιῆσαι προτίθεται τὰς ἀκροωμένους, περὶ μὲν ἓν τὴν σχέσιν αὐτῇ τὴν ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΚΡΟΑΤΑΣ καὶ αἰσινούσας ποιητικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ, διότι ἔργον αὐταῖς ἐκλέγεσθαι τὰ σημαντικώτερα τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ δεδημιυμένα, καὶ ταῦτα ἰσαρμονίως συμπλέκειν ἀλλήλοις, ὥς διὰ τούτων καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἰσόμενων, οἷον σαφηνείας, γλυκύτητος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδιῶν, ἵτι τε μακρολογίας, καὶ βραχυλογίας, κατὰ καιρὸν πάντων παραλαβανομένων, οἷσαι τε τὸν ἀκροατὴν, καὶ ἐκπληξαι, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ποιῆθαι χειρωθέντα ἔχειν τῆς δὲ γι ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ τῆς λόγου σχέσεως ὁ φιλόσοφος προσηγμένως ἐπιμελήσεται, τό, τι ψευδὲς διελίγων, καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀποδεικνύς. *The Relation of Speech being twofold (as the Philosopher Theophrastus hath settled it) one to the HEARERS, to whom it explains*

Pleasant in all their kinds. These latter Ch. I.
 Compositions aspire not to the Intel-
 lect, but being addressed to the *Imagi-*
nation, the *Affections*, and the *Sense*,
 become

plains something, and one to the THINGS, concerning which the Speaker proposes to persuade his Hearers: With respect to the first Relation, that which regards the HEARERS, are employed Poetry and Rhetoric. Thus it becomes the business of these two, to select the most respectable Words, and not those that are common and of vulgar use, and to connect such Words harmoniously one with another, so as thro' these things and their consequences, such as Perspicuity, Delicacy, and the other Forms of Eloquence, together with Copiousness and Brevity, all employed in their proper season, to lead the Hearer, and strike him, and hold him vanquished by the power of Persuasion. On the contrary, as to the Relation of Speech to THINGS, here the Philosopher will be found to have a principal employ, as well in refuting the False, as in demonstrating the True.

Sanctius speaks elegantly on the same subject. Creavit Deus hominem rationis participem; cui, quia Sociabilem esse voluit, magno pro munere dedit Sermonem.— Sermoni autem perficiendo tres opifices adhibuit. Prima est Grammatica, quæ ab oratione solecismos & barbarismos expellit; secunda Dialectica, quæ in Sermonis veritate versatur; tertia Rhetorica, quæ ornatum Sermonis tantum exquirat. M. in. l. 1. c. 2.

Ch. I. become from their different heightnings
either RHETORIC or POETRY.

NOR need we necessarily view these Arts distinctly, and apart; we may observe, if we please, how perfectly they co-incide. GRAMMAR is equally requisite to every one of the rest. And though LOGIC may indeed subsist without RHETORIC or POETRY, yet so necessary to these last is a sound and correct LOGIC, that without it, they are no better than warbling Trifles.

Now all these Inquiries (as we have said already) and such others arising from them as are of still sublimer Contemplation, (of which in the Sequel there may be possibly not a few) may with justice be deemed Inquiries both interesting and liberal.

AT present we shall postpone the whole synthetical Part, (that is to say,
Logic

Logic and Rhetoric) and confine ourselves to the analytical, that is to say, UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR. In this we shall follow the Order, that we have above laid down, first dividing SPEECH, as a WHOLE, into its CONSTITUENT PARTS; then resolving it, as a COMPOSITE, into its MATTER and FORM; two Methods of Analysis very different in their kind, and which lead to a variety of very different Speculations.

SHOULD any one object, that in the course of our Inquiry we sometimes descend to things, which appear trivial and low; let him look upon the effects, to which those things contribute, then from the Dignity of the Consequences, let him honour the Principles.

THE following Story may not improperly be here inserted. “ When the “ Fame of *Heraclitus* was celebrated “ throughout *Greece*, there were cer-

Ch. II. in Matters of Art and human Creation, if we except a few Artists and critics

l. 2. c. 2. It leads us, when properly regarded, to a very important Distinction between Intelligence *Divine* and Intelligence *Human*. God may be said to view the First, as first; and the Last, as last; that is, he views *Effects* through *Causes* in their *natural Order*. MAN views the Last, as first; and the First, as last; that is, he views *Causes* through *Effects*, in an *inverse Order*, and hence the Meaning of that Passage in *Aristotle*: ὡς περὶ γὰρ τῶν περὶ οὐρανὸν ὁμαλῶς πρὸς τὸ φέγγος ἔχον τὸ μὲν ἡμῶν, καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ὁ Νῦς πρὸς τὰ τῇ φύσει φανερώτα πάντα. *As are the Eyes of Bats to the Light of the Day so is Man's Intelligence to those Objects, that are by Nature the brightest and most conspicuous of all things.* *Nicomachean Ethic.* l. 2. c. 1. See also l. 7. c. 4. and *Ethic.* *Nicomachean* l. 1. c. 4. *Ammonius*, reasoning in the same way, says very pertinently to the Subject of this Treatise—Ἀγαθὸν τὸν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, ἐκ τῶν ἀτελεστέων καὶ συνθέτων ἐπὶ ἀπλούτερά καὶ τελειότερα προΐεσθαι· τὰ γὰρ σύνθετα μᾶλλον συνήμῃν, καὶ γνωριμώτερα· Ὅντω γὰρ καὶ ὁ παῖς εἶραι μὲν λόγον, εἰπεῖν, Σωκράτους περιπαλεῖ, οἶδε· τούτων δὲ ἀναλύσαι εἰς ὄνομα βῆμα, καὶ ταῦτα εἰς συλλαβὰς, κάκεινα εἰς σοιχεῖα, ἐκίτε· *Human Nature may be well contented to advance from more imperfect and complex to the more simple and perfect; for the complex Subjects are more familiar to and better known. Thus therefore it is that even a Child knows how to put a Sentence together, and say, Socrates walketh; but how to resolve this Sentence into a Name.*

CHAP. II.

*Concerning the Analysing of Speech into
its smallest Parts.*

THOSE things which are *first to Na-* Ch. II.
ture, are not *first to Man*. *Nature* be-
gins from *Causes*, and thence descends
to *Effects*. *Human Perceptions* first
open upon *Effects*, and thence by slow
degrees ascend to *Causes*. Often had
Mankind seen the Sun in Eclipse, be-
fore they knew its Cause to be the Moon's
Interposition; much oftener had they
seen those unceasing Revolutions of
Summer and Winter, of Day and Night,
before they knew the Cause to be
the Earth's double Motion ^(a). Even
in

(a) This Distinction of *first to Man*, and *first to Nature*,
was greatly regarded in the Peripatetic Philosophy.—
See *Arist. Phys. Auscult.* 1. 1. c. 1. *Themistius's Com-*
ment on the same, Poster. Analyt. 1. 1. c. 2. *De Anima,*
1. 2. c. 2.

Ch. II. shall follow the Order consonant to *human* Perception, as being for that reason the more easy to be understood.

WE shall begin therefore first from a *Period* or *Sentence*, that combination in Speech, which is obvious to all; and thence pass, if possible, to those its *primary Parts*, which, however essential, are only obvious to a few.

WITH respect therefore to the different Species of Sentences, who is there so ignorant, as if we address him in his Mother-Tongue, not to know when 'tis we *assert*, and when we *question*; when 'tis we *command*, and when we *pray* or *wish*?

FOR example, when we read in *Shakespeare**,

*The Man that hath no music in himself,
And is not moved with concord of sweet
sounds,
Is fit for Treasons——*

Or

* Merchant of Venice.

Or in *Milton**,

Ch. II

*O Friends, I hear the tread of nimble
feet,*

Hasting this way—

'tis obvious that these are *assertive Sentences*, one founded upon Judgment, the other upon Sensation.

WHEN the Witch in *Macbeth* says to her Companions,

When shall we three meet again

In thunder, lightning, and in rain?

this 'tis evident is an *interrogative Sentence*.

WHEN *Macbeth* says to the Ghost of *Banquo*,

—*Hence, horrible Shadow,*

Unreal Mock'ry, hence !—

he speaks an *imperative Sentence*, founded upon the passion of hatred.

WHEN

Ch. II. WHEN *Milton* says in the character
 of his *Allegro*,

*Haste thee, Nymph, and bring with thee
 Jest and youthful Jollity,*

he too speaks an *imperative Sentence*,
 though founded on the passion, not of
 hatred but of love.

WHEN in the beginning of the *Para-*
dise Lost we read the following address,
*And chiefly thou, O Spirit, that dost
 prefer*

*Before all temples th' upright heart, and
 pure,*

Instruct me, for thou know'st—

this is not to be called an *imperative
 Sentence*, tho' perhaps it bear the same
 Form, but rather (if I may use the Word)
 'tis a *Sentence precativè or optativè*.

WHAT then shall we say? Are Sen-
 tences to be quoted in this manner with-
 out ceasing, all differing from each other
 in their stamp and character? Are they
 no way reducible to certain definite
 Classes?

Classes? If not, they can be no objects Ch. II.
of *rational* comprehension.—Let us how-
ever try.

'Tis a phrase often applied to a man, when speaking, that *he speaks his MIND*; as much as to say, that his Speech or Discourse is *a publishing of some Energie or Motion of his Soul*. So it indeed is in every one that speaks, excepting alone the Dissembler or Hypocrite; and he too, as far as possible, affects the appearance.

Now the POWERS OF THE SOUL (over and above the mere † nutritive) may be included all of them in those of PERCEPTION and those of VOLITION. By the Powers of PERCEPTION, I mean the *Senses* and the *Intellect*; by the Powers of VOLITION, I mean, in an extended sense, not only the *Will*, but the several *Passions* and *Appetites*; in short, *all that moves*

† Vid. Aristot. de An. II. 4.

Ch. II. *moves to Action, whether rational or irrational.*

IF then the leading Powers of the Soul be these two, 'tis plain that every Speech or Sentence, as far as it exhibits the Soul, must of course respect one or other of these.

IF we *assert*, then is it a Sentence which respects the Powers of PERCEPTION. For what indeed is to *assert*, if we consider the examples above alleged, but to *publish some Perception either of the Senses or the Intellect?*

AGAIN, if we *interrogate*, if we *command*, if we *pray*, or if we *wish*, (which in terms of Art is to speak Sentences *interrogative, imperative, precative, or optative*) what do we but publish so many different VOLITIONS?—For who is it that *questions?* He that has a *Desire* to be informed.—Who is it that *commands?* He that has a *Will*, which he would have obeyed.

obeyed.—What are those Beings, who either *wish* or *pray*? Those, who feel certain wants either for themselves, or others. Ch. II.

If then the *Soul's leading Powers* be the two above mentioned, and it be true that all Speech is a publication of these Powers, it will follow that EVERY SENTENCE WILL BE EITHER A SENTENCE OF ASSERTION, OR A SENTENCE OF VOLITION. And thus, by referring all of them to one of these two classes, have we found an expedient to reduce their infinitude^(b).

THE

(b) Παύλει ἐν ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας διτλῆς ἐχέσης δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν γνωστικὰς, τὰς δὲ ζυτικὰς, τὰς καὶ ὁρεκτικὰς λεγομένας (λέγω δὲ γνωστικὰς μὲν, καθ' ἃς γινώσκουμεν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, οἷον τῶν, διάνοιαν, δόξαν, φαντασίαν καὶ αἰσθησιν· ὁρεκτικὰς δὲ, καθ' ἃς ἐπιθυμῶμεθα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἢ τῶν ὄντων, ἢ τῶν δοκούντων, οἷον βίωσιν λέγω, περιείρισιν, θυμὸν, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν) τὰ ΜΕΝ τίτληται εἰς τὴν λέγον (τὰ παρὰ τὸν ἀποφαντικὸν) ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρεκτικῶν δυνάμειν ἐκτρέχονταί· τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐκ αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτὴν ἐκτρέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ

Ch. II.

THE Extensions of Speech are quite indefinite, as may be seen if we compare

ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀποτετιομένης (τὸν συμπάλλισθαι δοκῶντα πρὸς τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς ὀρέξεως) καὶ ἥτοι λόγον παρ' αὐτῆς ζητήσης, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῷ ΠΥΣΜΑΤΙΚΟΥ καὶ ΕΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΥ καλεμένῳ λόγῳ, ἢ πρᾶγμα, καὶ εἰ πρᾶγμα, ἥτοι αὐτῆς ἐκείνου τυχεῖν ἰφιεμένης, πρὸς ὃν ὁ λόγος, ὡς περ ἐπὶ τῷ ΚΛΗΤΙΚΟΥ, ἢ τινὸς παρ' αὐτῆς πρᾶξεως καὶ ταύτης, ἢ ὡς παρὰ κρείττονος, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ΕΥΧΗΣ, ἢ ὡς παρὰ χειρόν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ κυρίως καλεμένῳ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΞΕΩΣ· μόνον ΔΕ τὸ ΑΠΟΦΑΝΤΙΚΟΝ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωστικῶν, καὶ ἐστὶ τῷτο ἐξαγγελτικὸν τῆς γινομένης ἐν ἡμῖν γνώσεως τῶν πραγμάτων ἀληθῶς, ἢ φαινομένων, διὸ καὶ μόνον τῷτο δικηκὸν ἐστὶν ἀληθείας ἢ ψεύδους, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἕδῃν. The Meaning of the above passage being implied in the Text, we take its translation from the *Latin* Interpreter. *Dicendum igitur est, cum anima nostra duplicem potestatem habeat, cognitionis, & vitæ, quæ etiam appetitionis ac cupiditatis appellatur, quæ vero cognitionis est, ris est, quæ res singulas cognoscimus, ut mens, cogitatio, opinio, phantasia, sensus: appetitus vero facultas est, quæ bona, vel quæ sunt, vel quæ videntur, concupiscimus, ut sunt voluntas, consilium, ira, cupiditas: quatuor orationis species, præter enunciantem, a partibus animi proficiscuntur, quæ concupiscunt; non cum animus ipse per se agit, sed cum ad alium se convertit, qui ei ad consequendum id, quod cupit, conducere posse videatur; atque etiam vel rationem ab eo exquirat, ut in oratione, quam Percunctantem aut Interrogantem vocant; vel rem: sique rem, vel cum ipsum consequi cupit, quicum loquitur,*

pare the Æneid to an Epigram of *Martial*. But the *longest Extension*, with which Grammar has to do, is the *Extension* here considered, that is to say; a *SENTENCE*. The greater Extensions (such as Syllogisms, Paragraphs, Sections, and complete Works) belong not to Grammar, but to Arts of higher order; not to mention that all of them are but Sentences repeated.

Ch. II.

Now a *SENTENCE* ^(c) may be sketched in the following description—*a com pound*

loquitur, ut in optante oratione, vel aliquam ejus actionem atque in hac, vel ut a prastantiore, ut in Deprecatione; vel ut ab inferiore, ut in eo, qui proprie Jussus nominatur. Sola autem Enunciatio a cognoscendi facultate profiscitur: hæc nunciat rerum cognitionem, quæ in nobis est, aut veram, aut simulatam. Itaque Hæc sola verum falsumque capit: præterea vero nulla. Ammon. in Libr. de Interpretatione.

(c) Λόγος δὲ φωνῇ συνθετὸς σηματικὸς, ὃς ἢ ἅμα καὶ ἄντ' αὐτὰ σημαίνει τι. Arist. Poet. c. 20. See also de Interpret. c. 4.

Ch. II. *pound Quantity of Sound significant, of which certain Parts are themselves also significant.*

THUS when I say [*the Sun shineth*] not only the *whole quantity* of sound has a meaning, but *certain parts* also, such as [*Sun*] and [*shineth.*]

BUT what shall we say? Have these Parts again other Parts, which are in like manner significant, and so may the progress be pursued to infinite? Can we suppose all Meaning, like Body, to be divisible, and to include within itself other meanings without end? If this be absurd, then must we necessarily admit, that there is such a thing as a *Sound significant, of which no Part is of itself significant.* And this is what we call the proper character of a^(d) WORD.

For

(d) Φωνὴ σημαντικὴ, — ἥς μέρος ἔδεν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὸ σημαντικόν.
De Poetic. c. 20. De Interpret. c. 2 & 3. Priscian's
Definition of a Word (Lib. 2.) is as follows— *Dictio est*
pars

For thus, though the Words [*Sun*] and [*shineth*] have each a Meaning, yet is there certainly no Meaning in any of their Parts, neither in the Syllables of the one, nor in the Letters of the other. Ch. II.

IF therefore ALL SPEECH, whether in prose or verse, every Whole, every Section, every Paragraph, every Sentence, imply a certain *Meaning, divisible into other Meanings*, but WORDS imply a *Meaning, which is not so divisible* : it follows that WORDS *will be the smallest parts of Speech*, in as much as nothing less has any Meaning at all.

To

pars minima orationis constructa, id est, in ordine composita. Pars autem, quantum ad totum intelligendum, id est, ad totius sensus intellectum. Hoc autem ideo dictum est, ne quis conetur vires in duas partes dividere, hoc est, in vi & res; non enim ad totum intelligendum hæc fit divisio. To Priscian we may add Theodore Gaza.—Λίξιν δὲ μικρὰ ἰσχυροὺς κατὰ σύνταξιν λόγους. Introd. Gram. l. 4. Plato shewed them this characteristic of a Word—See Cratylus, p. 385. Edit. Serr.

Ch. II.

To know therefore the species of Words,
must needs contribute *to the knowledge*
of Speech, as it implies a knowledge of
its *minutest* Parts.

THIS therefore must become our next
Inquiry.

CHAP.

CHAP III.

*Concerning the species of Words, the
smallest Parts of Speech.*

LET us first search for the *Species* of Words among those Parts of Speech, commonly received by Grammarians. For Example, in one of the passages above cited.—

Ch. III.

*The Man that hath no music in himself,
And is not mov'd with concord of sweet
sounds,
Is fit for treasons—*

Here the Word [*The*] is an ARTICLE;—
[*Man*] [*No*] [*Music*] [*Concord*] [*Sweet*]
[*Sounds*] [*Fit*] [*Treasons*] are all NOUNS,
some *Substantive*, and some *Adjective*—
[*That*] and [*Himself*] are PRONOUNS—
[*Hath*] and [*is*] are VERBS—[*mov'd*] a
PARTICIPLE—[*Not*] an ADVERB—
[*And*] a CONJUNCTION—[*In*] [*With*]
C 4 and

Ch. III. and [*For*] are PREPOSITIONS. In sentence we have all those Parts of Speech, which the *Greek* Grammarians are found to acknowledge, The *Latin* only differ in having no Article, and separating the INTERJECTION, as a Part of itself, which the *Greeks* include among the Species of *Adverbs*.

WHAT then shall we determine? whether are there not more Species of Words, why so many? or if neither more nor fewer, why these and not others?

To resolve, if possible, these several Queries, let us examine any Sentence that comes in our way, and see what differences we can discover in its Parts. For example, the same Sentence about

The Man that hath no Music, &c.

ONE Difference soon occurs, that some Words are *variable*, and others are *invariable*. Thus the Word *Man* may be varied into *Man's* and *Men*; *Hath*, into

*Have, Hast, Had, &c. Sweet into Sweet-
er and Sweetest; Fit into Fitter and
Fittest.* On the contrary, the Words
The, In, And, and some others, remain
as they are, and *cannot be altered.* Ch. III.

AND yet it may be questioned[?], how far this Difference is essential. For in the first place, there are Variations, which can be hardly called necessary, because only some Languages have them, and others have them not. Thus the *Greeks* have the *dual* Variation, which is unknown both to the *Moderns*, and to the ancient *Latins*. Thus the *Greeks* and *Latins* vary their Adjectives by the *triple Variation* of Gender, Case, and Number; whereas the *English* never vary them in any of those ways, but through all kinds of Concord preserve them still the same. Nay even those very Variations, which appear most necessary, may have their places supplied by other methods; some by *Auxiliars*, as when for *Bruti* or *Bruto*,
we

Ch. III. we say, of Brutus, to Brutus; some by *meer Position*, as when for *Brutum amavit Cassius*, we say, *Cassius lov'd Brutus*. For here the *Accusative*, which in *Latin* is known *any where* from its *Variation*, is in *English* only known from its *Position* or place.

IF then the Distinction of Variable and Invariable will not answer our purpose, let us look farther for some other more essential.

SUPPOSE then we should dissolve the Sentence above cited, and view its several *Parts* as they stand *separate* and detached. Some 'tis plain *still preserve a Meaning* (such as *Man, Music, Sweet, &c.*) others on the contrary *immediately lose it* (such as, *And, The, With, &c.*) Not that these last have no meaning at all, but in fact they never have it, but when *in company*, or *associated*.

Now

Now it should seem that this Dis-
 tinction, if any, was essential. For all
 Words are significant, or else they would
 not be Words; and if every thing not
absolute, is of course *relative*, then will
 all Words be significant either *absolutely*
 or *relatively*.

WITH respect therefore to this Dis-
 tinction, the first sort of Words may be
 call'd *significant by themselves*; the latter
 may be call'd *significant by relation*; or
 if we like it better, the first sort may be
 call'd *Principals*, the latter *Accessories*.
 The first are like those stones in the ba-
 sis of an Arch, which are able to support
 themselves, even when the Arch is de-
 stroyed; the latter are like those stones
 in its Summit or Curve, which can no
 longer stand, than while the whole sub-
 sists^(e).

§ THIS

^(e) *Apollonius of Alexandria* (one of the acutest Au-
 thors that ever wrote on the Subject of Grammar) illus-
 trates the different power of Words, by the different
 power

h. III. § THIS Distinction being admitted,
we thus pursue our Speculations. All
things

power of Letters. "Ετι, ὁν τρόπον τῶν στοιχείων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φωνήεντα, ἃ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ φωνὴν ἀποτελεῖ· τὰ δὲ σύμφωνα, ἅπερ ἄνευ τῶν φωνηέντων ἔχει ῥητὴν τὴν ἐκφώνησιν. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐστὶν ἐκποθεῖναι καὶ τῶν λέξεων. αἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν, τρόποι τινὰ τῶν φωνηέντων ῥηταὶ ἴσιν· καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ῥημάτων, ὀνομάτων, αἰτωνυμιῶν, ἐπιρρημάτων—αἱ δὲ, ὥσπερ εἰς σύμφωνα, ἀγαμίνουσι τὰ φωνήεντα, ὃ δυνάμει κατ' ἰδίαν ῥητὰ εἶναι—καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν προθέσεων, τῶν ἄρθρων, τῶν συνδέσμων· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα αἰεὶ τῶν μορίων συσσημαίνουσι. In the same manner, as of the Elements or Letters, some are Vowels, which of themselves complete a Sound; others are Consonants, which without the help of Vowels have no express Vocality; so likewise may we conceive as to the nature of Words. Some of them, like Vowels, are of themselves expressive, as is the case of Verbs, Nouns, Pronouns, and Adverbs; others, like Consonants, wait for their Vowels, being unable to become expressive by their own proper strength, as is the case of Prepositions, Articles, and Conjunctions; for these parts of Speech are always Consignificant, that is, are only significant, when associated to something else. Apollon. de Syntaxi. L. 1. c. 3. Itaque quibusdam philosophis placuit NOMEN & VERBUM SOLAS ESSE PARTES ORATIONIS; cetera vero, ADMINICULA vel JUNCTURAS earum: quomodo navium partes sunt tabulae & traves, cetera autem (id est, cera, stappa, & clavi & similia) vincula & conglutinationes

things whatever either *exist as the Ener-* Ch. III.
gies, or Affections, of some other thing, or
without being the Energies or Affections
of some other thing. If they exist as the
Energies or Affections of something else,
 then are they called ATTRIBUTES.—
 Thus *to think* is the attribute of a Man;
to be white, of a Swan; *to fly,* of an
 Eagle; *to be four-footed,* of a Horse.—
 If they exist *not after this manner,* then
 are they call'd SUBSTANCES*. Thus
 Man, Swan, Eagle, and Horse, are
 none of them Attributes, but all Sub-
 stances, because however they may
 exist in Time and Place, yet neither of
 these, nor of any thing else, do they
 exist as Energies or Affections.

AND

tiones partium navis (hoc est, tabularum & trabium) non partes navis dicuntur. Prisc. L. XI. 913.

* SUBSTANCES.] Thus Aristotle. Νῦν μὲν ἐν τούτῳ ἔστι-
 ται, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία, ὅτι τὸ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένην, ἀλλὰ καθ'
 ἑαυτὰ ἄλλα. Metaph. Z. γ. p. 106. Ed. Sylb.

HERMES.

AND thus all things whatsoever, being either ^(S) *Substances* or *Attributes*, it follows of course that all Words, *which are significant as Principals*, must needs be significant of either the one or the other. If they are *significant of Substances*, they are call'd *Substantives*; if of *Attributes*, they are call'd *Attributives*. So that ALL WORDS *whatever, significant as Principals, are either SUBSTANTIVES or ATTRIBUTIVES*.

AGAIN, as to Words, which are only significant as *Accessories*, they acquire a Signification either from being associated to one Word, or else to many. If to one Word alone, then as they can do no more than in some manner *define* or *determine*, they may justly for that reason

(S) This division of things into *Substance* and *Attribute* seems to have been admitted by Philosophers of all Sects and ages. See *Catagor.* c. 2, *Metaphys.* L. VII. c. 1. *De Cælo*, L. III. c. 1.

Ch. III. *Definitives*, ARTICLES; and the *Connectives*, CONJUNCTIONS.

SHOU'D it be ask'd, what then becomes of *Pronouns*, *Adverbs*, *Prepositions*, and *Interjections*; the answer is, either they must be found included within the *Species* above-mentioned, or else must be admitted for so many *Species* by themselves.

§ THERE were various opinions in ancient Days, as to the *number* of these Parts or Elements of Speech.

Plato in his * *Sophist* mentions only two, the *Noun* and the *Verb*. *Aristotle* mentions no more, where he treats of † *Prepositions*. Not that those acute Philosophers were ignorant of the other Parts, but they spoke with reference to
Logic

* Tom. I. p. 261. Edit. Ser.

† De Interpr. c. 2 & 3.

Logic or *Dialectic(s)*, considering the Ch. III.
 Essence of Speech as contained in these two, because *these alone* combined make a perfect *assertive* Sentence, which none of the rest without them are able to effect. Hence therefore *Aristotle* in his **treatise of Poetry* (where he was to lay down the elements of a more varie-

gated

(*) *Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum Dialecticos duæ, NOMEN & VERBUM; quia hæ solæ etiam per se conjunctæ plenam faciunt orationem; alias autem partes εναντιωγενήματα, hoc est, consignificantia appellabant.* Priscian. l. 2. p. 574. Edit. Putschii. *Existit hic quædam questio, cur duo tantum, NOMEN & VERBUM, se (Aristoteles sc.) determinare promittat, cum plures partes orationis esse videantur. Quibus hoc dicendum est, tantum Aristotelem hoc libro diffinisse, quantum illi ad id, quod instituerat tractare, suffecit. Tractat namque de simplici enuntiativa oratione, quæ scilicet hujusmodi est, ut junctis tantum Verbis et Nominibus componatur.—Quare superfluum est querere, cur alias quoque, quæ videntur orationis partes, non proposuerit, qui non totius simpliciter orationis, sed tantum simplicis orationis instituit elementa parti. Boetius in Libr. de Interpretat. p. 295. Apollonius from the above principles elegantly calls the NOUN and VERB τὰ ἐμψυχότατα μέρη τοῦ λόγου, the most animated parts of Speech. De Syntaxi, l. 1. c. 3. p. 24. See also Plutarch. Quest. Platon. p. 1009.*

* *Poet. Cap. 20.*

D

Ch. III. gated speech) adds the *Article* and *Conjunction* to the Noun and Verb, and so adopts the same Parts, with those established in this Treatise. To *Aristotle's* authority (if indeed better can be required) may be added that also of the elder *Stoics* ^(h).

THE latter *Stoics* instead of four Parts made five, by dividing the Noun into the *Appellative* and *Proper*. Others increased the number, by detaching the *Pronoun* from the Noun; the *Participle* and *Adverb* from the Verb; and the *Preposition* from the Conjunction. The *Latin Grammarians* went farther, and detached the *Interjection* from the Adverb, within which by the *Greeks* it was always included, as a Species.

WE

^(h) For this we have the authority of *Dionysius*, of *Halicarnassus*, *De Struct. Orat. Sect. 2.* whom *Quintilian* follows, *Inst. l. 1. c. 4.* *Diogenes Laertius* and *Priscian* make them always to have admitted five Parts. See *Priscian*, as before, and *Laertius*, *Lib. VII. Segm. 57.*

WE are told indeed by ⁽ⁱ⁾ *Dionysius* Ch. III. of *Halicarnassus* and *Quintilian*, that *Aristotle*, with *Theodectes*, and the more early writers, held but *three* Parts of speech, the *Noun*, the *Verb*, and the *Conjunction*. This, it must be owned, accords with the oriental Tongues, whose Grammars (we are ^(k) told) admit no other. But as to *Aristotle*, we have his own authority to assert the contrary, who not only enumerates the *four* Species which we have adopted, but ascertains them each by a proper Definition.*

D 2

To

⁽ⁱ⁾ See the places quoted in the note immediately preceding.

^(k) *Antiquissima eorum est opinio, qui tres classes faciunt. Estque hæc Arabum quoque sententia—Hebræi quoque (qui, cum Arabes Grammaticam scribere desinerent, artem eam demum scribere cæperunt, quod ante annos contigit circiter quadringentos) Hebræi, inquam, hac in re secuti sunt magistros suos Arabes.—Immo vero trium classium numerum aliæ etiam Orientis linguæ retinent.—Dubium, utrum eâ in re Orientales imitati sunt antiquos Græcorum, an hi potius secuti sunt Orientalium exemplum. Utut est, etiam veteres Græcos tres tantum partes agnovisse, non solum autor est Dionysius, &c. Voss. de Anagog. l. 1. c. 1. See also Sanctii Minerv. l. 1. c. 2.*

* Sup. p. 34.

Ch. III. To conclude—the Subject of the following Chapters will be a distinct and separate consideration of the **NOUN**, the **VERB**, the **ARTICLE**, and the **CONJUNCTION**; which four, the better (as we apprehend) to express their respective natures, we chuse to call **SUBSTANTIVES**, **ATTRIBUTIVES**, **DEFINITIVES**, and **CONNECTIVES**.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning Substantives, properly so called.

SUBSTANTIVES are *all those principal Words, which are significant of Substances, considered as Substances.* Ch. IV.

THE first sort of *Substances* are the NATURAL, such as Animal, Vegetable, Man, Oak.

THERE are other *Substances of our own making.* Thus by giving a Figure *not natural* to *natural* Materials, we create such Substances, as House, Ship, Watch, Telescope, &c.

AGAIN, by a *more refined operation of our Mind alone*, we abstract any *Attribute* from its necessary subject, and consider it *apart*, devoid of its dependence.

h. IV. dence. For example, from Body we abstract to *Fly*; from Surface, *the being White*; from Soul, *the being Temperate*.

AND thus it is we convert even *Attributes into Substances*, denoting them on this occasion by proper *Substantives*, such as *Flight, Whiteness, Temperance*; or else by others more general, such as *Motion, Colour, Virtue*. These we call **ABSTRACT SUBSTANCES**; the second sort we call **ARTIFICIAL**.

Now all those several Substances have their Genus, their Species, and their Individuals. For example, in *natural* Substances, *Animal* is a Genus; *Man*, a Species; *Alexander*, an Individual. In *artificial* Substances, *Edifice* is a Genus; *Palace*, a Species; *the Vatican*, an Individual. In *abstract* Substances, *Motion* is a Genus; *Flight*, a Species; *this Flight* or *that Flight* are Individuals.

As

As therefore every ^(a) GENUS may be found *whole and intire in each one of its Species*; (for thus Man, Horse, and Dog, are each of them distinctly a complete and intire Animal) and as every SPECIES may be found *whole and intire in each one of its Individuals*; (for thus Socrates, Plato, and Xenophon, are each of them completely and distinctly a Man) hence it is, that every Genus, though ONE, is multiplied into MANY; and every Species, though ONE, is also multiplied into MANY, by reference to those beings which are their proper subordinates. Since then no individual has any such subordinates, it can never in strictness be considered as MANY, and so is truly an INDIVIDUAL as well in Nature as in Name.

D 4

FROM

(a) This is what Plato seems to have expressed in a manner somewhat mysterious, when he talks of *μίαν ἰδίαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἰνὸς ἑκάστου κινῆναι χωρὶς, πᾶν δὲ διατεταμένον—ἐν πολλὰς, ἰτίρας ἀλλήλων, ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν πειραρχίας.*—*Sophist.* p. 253. *Edit. Serrani.* For the common definition of Genus and Species, see the *Isagoge* or Introduction of Porphyry to Aristotle's Logic.

CA. IV. FROM these Principles it is, that Words following the nature and genius of *Things*, such *Substantives* admit of **NUMBER** as denote *Genera* or *Species*, while those, which denote ^(b) *Individuals*, in strictness admit it not.

BESIDES

^(b) Yet sometimes *Individuals* have plurality or *Number*, from the causes following. In the first place the *Individuals* of the human race are so large a multitude, even in the smallest nation, that it would be difficult to invent a new Name for every new-born *Individual*.—Hence then instead of *one* only being call'd *Marcus*, and *one* only *Antonius*, it happens that *many* are called *Marcus* and many called *Antonius*; and thus 'tis the Romans had their Plurals, *Marci* and *Antonii*, as we in later days have our *Marks* and our *Anthronics*. Now the Plurals of this sort may be well called *accidental*, because it is merely by chance that the Names coincide.

There seems more reason for such Plurals, as the *Ptolemies*, *Scipios*, *Catus*, or (to instance in modern names) the *Howards*, *Pelham's*, and *Montagues*; because a *Race* or *Family* is like a *smaller sort of Species*; so that the *family Name* extends to the Kindred, as the specific Name extends to the *Individuals*.

A third cause which contributed to make proper Names become Plural, was the *high Character* or *Eminence* of some one *Individual*, whose Name became afterwards a kind of common *Appellative*, to denote all those, who

BESIDES *Number*, another character- Ch. IV.
 istic, visible in Substances, is that of
 SEX. Every Substance is either *Male*
 or *Female*; or *both Male and Female*;
 or *neither one nor the other*. So that
 with respect to *Seres* and their *Negation*,
all Substances conceivable are compre-
 hended under this *fourfold* considera-
 tion.

Now the existence of *Hermaphrodites*
 being rare, if not doubtful; hence Lan-
 guage,

who had pretensions to merit in the same way. Thus
 every great *Critic* was call'd an *Aristarchus*; every great
Warrior, an *Alexander*; every great *Beauty*, a *Helen*, &c.

A DANIEL come to judgment! yea a DANIEL,

cries *Shylock* in the Play, when he would express the
 wisdom of the young Lawyer.


So *Martial* in that well known verse,

Sint MECENATES, non deerunt, Flacce, MARONES.

So *Lucilius*,

ΑΙΓΙΑΙΠΟΙ montes, ἘΤΗΕ omnes, ἀπερι ΑΘΗΝΕΣ.

οἷον ΦΑΘΟΝΤΕΣ, ἢ ΔΕΥΚΑΛΙΟΝΕΣ. *Lucian in Timon.*
 T. I. p. 108.

Ch. IV.  guage, only regarding those distinctions which are more obvious, considers *Words denoting Substances* to be either **MASCULINE, FEMININE, or NEUTER***.

As to our own Species, and all those animal Species, *which have reference to common Life*, or of which the Male and the Female, by their size, form, colour, &c. are *eminently distinguished*, most Languages have different Substantives, to denote the Male and the Female.— But as to those animal Species, which either *less frequently occur*, or of which one Sex is *less apparently distinguished* from the other, in these a single Substantive commonly serves for both Sexes.

IN

* After this manner they are distinguished by *Aristotle*. Τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα, τὰ δὲ θήλια, τὰ δὲ μετὰξὺ. Poet. cap. 21. *Protagoras* before him had established the same Distinction, calling them ἄρρενα, θήλια, καὶ σκίον.— *Aristot. Rhet. L. III. c. 5*. Where mark what were afterwards called ἐπίτετρα, or Neuters, were by these called τὰ μετὰξὺ καὶ σκίον.

†IN the *English* Tongue it seems a general rule (except only when infringed by a figure of Speech) that no Substantive is *Masculine*, but what denotes a *Male animal Substance*; none *Feminine*, but what denotes a *Female animal Substance*; and that where the Substance has no Sex, the Substantive is always *Neuter*. Ch. IV.

BUT 'tis not so in *Greek*, *Latin*, and many of the *modern* Tongues. These all of them have Words, some masculine, some feminine (and those too in great multitudes) which have reference to Substances, where Sex never had existence. To give one instance for many. MIND is surely neither male, nor female; yet is ΝΟΥΣ, in *Greek*, masculine, and MENS, in *Latin*, feminine.

IN

† *Nam quicquid per Naturam Sexui non adsignatur, neutrum haberi oporteret, sed id Ars, &c.* Consent. apud Putsch. p. 2023, 2024.

The whole Passage from *Genera Hominum, quæ naturalia sunt, &c.* is worth perusing.

Ch. IV.

IN some Words these distinctions seem owing to nothing else, than to the mere casual structure of the Word itself: It is of such a Gender, from having such a Termination; or from belonging perhaps to such a Declension. In others we may imagine a more subtle kind of reasoning, a reasoning which discerns, even *in things without Sex*, a distant analogy to that great NATURAL DISTINCTION, *which* (according to *Milton*) *animates the World.*†

IN this view we may conceive such SUBSTANTIVES to have been considered as MASCULINE, which were “conspicuous for the Attributes of imparting
“or communicating; or which were by
“nature active, strong, and efficacious,
“and that indiscriminately whether to
“good or to ill; or which had claim to
Eminence,

† Mr. *Linnaeus*, the celebrated Botanist, has traced the *Distinction of Sexes* throughout the whole *Vegetable World*, and made it the Basis of his Botanic Method.

“Eminence, either laudable or other- Ch. IV.
 “wise.”

THE FEMININE on the contrary were
 “such, as were conspicuous for the At-
 “tributes either of receiving, of con-
 “taining, or of producing and bringing
 “forth ; or which had more of the pas-
 “sive in their nature, than of the ac-
 “tive ; or which were peculiarly beau-
 “tiful and amiable ; or which had re-
 “spect to such excesses, as were rather
 “Feminine, than Masculine.”

UPON these Principles the two great-
 er Luminaries were considered, one as
 Masculine, the other as Feminine ; the
 SUN (Ἡλιός, *Sol*) as *Masculine*, from com-
 municating Light, which was native and
 original, as well as from the vigorous
 warmth and efficacy of his Rays ; the
 MOON (Σελήνη, *Luna*) as *Feminine*, from
 being the Receptacle only of another's
 Light, and from shining with rays more
 delicate and soft.

THUS

Ch. IV. *THUS Milton,*

*First in HIS East the glorious Lamp was
seen,*

*Regent of Day, and all th' Horizon round
Invested with bright rays ; jocund to run
HIS longitude thro' Heav'n's high road :
the gray*

*Dawn, and the Pleiades before HIM danc'd,
Shedding sweet influence. Less bright the
Moon*

*But opposite, in levell'd West was set,
HIS mirrour, with full face borrowing
HER Light*

*From HIM ; for other light SHE needed
none.* P. L. VII. 370.

By *Virgil* they were considered as
Brother and Sister, which still preserves
the same distinction.

*Nec FRATRIS radiis obnoxia surgere
LUNA.* G. I. 396.

THE SKY or ETHER is in *Greek* and
Latin Masculine, as being the source of
those showers, which impregnate the
Earth.

Earth. *The EARTH on the contrary Ch.IV.
 is universally *Feminine*, from being the
 grand *Receiver*, the grand *Container*,
 but above all from being the *Mother*
 (either mediately or immediately) of
 every sublunary Substance, whether
 animal or vegetable.

Thus *Virgil*,
 Tum PATER OMNIPOTENS fœcundis im-
 bribus ÆTHER
 CONJUGIS in gremium LÆTÆ descendit,
 & omnes
 Magnus alit magno commixtus corpore
 fœtus. G. II. 325.

Thus *Shakespear*,
 —† COMMON MOTHER, *Thou*
Whose Womb unmeasurable, and infinite
breast
Teems and feeds all—Tim. of Athens.

So *Milton*,
Whatever Earth, ALL-BEARING MO-
 THER, yields, P. L. V.
So

* Senecæ Nat. Quæst. III. 14.

† Παμμήτωρ γῆ χαίτης—Græc. Anth. p. 281.

HERMES.

IV. So *Virgil*,

*Non jam MATER alit TELLUS, viresque
ministrat (c).*

Æn. XI. 71.

AMONG *artificial* Substances the SHIP (*Nāūs, Navis*) is *feminine*, as being so eminently a *Receiver* and *Container* of various things, of Men, Arms, Provisions, Goods, &c. Hence Sailors, speaking of their Vessel, say always, “*sHE rides at anchor,*” “*sHE is under sail.*”

A CITY (*Πόλις, Civitas*) and a COUNTRY, (*Πάτρις, Patria*) are *feminine* also, by being (like the Ship) *Containers* and *Receivers*, and farther by being as it were the *Mothers* and *Nurses* of their respective Inhabitants.

THUS

(c)—διὸ καὶ ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ τῇ ΓΗΣ φύσει, ὡς ΘΗΛΥ καὶ ΜΗΤΕΡΑ νομίζουσιν· ΟΥΡΑΝΟΝ δὲ καὶ ΗΛΙΟΝ, καὶ εἰ τι τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ΓΕΝΩΝΤΑΣ καὶ ΠΑΤΕΡΑΣ προσαγορεύουσι. Arist. de Gener. Anim. 1. c. 2.

THUS *Virgil*,
Salve, MAGNA PARENS FRUGUM, Sa-
turnia Tellus,
 MAGNA VIRUM—— Geor. II. 173.

Ch. IV.

So, in that Heroic Epigram on those
 brave *Greeks*, who fell at *Chæroneæ*,

Γαῖα δὲ Πάτρις ἔχει κόλποις τῶν πλεῖστα κα-
 μόντων
 Σώματα—

Their PARENT COUNTRY in HER bosom
 holds
Their wearied bodies.—*

So *Milton*,
The City, which Thou seest, no other deem
Than great and glorious Rome, QUEEN
of the Earth. Par. Reg. L. IV.

As to the OCEAN, tho' from its being
 the *Receiver* of all Rivers, as well as the
Container and *Productress* of so many
 Vegetables

* Demost. in Orat. de Coronâ.

Ch. IV. Vegetables and Animals, it might justly have been made (like the Earth) *Feminine*; yet its *deep Voice* and *boisterous Nature* have, in spite of these reasons, prevailed to make it *Male*. Indeed the very sound of *Homer's*

—μέγα σθένος Ὀκεανοῖο,

would suggest to a hearer, even ignorant of its meaning, that the Subject was incompatible with *female* delicacy and softness.

TIME (Χρόνος) from his mighty *Efficacy* upon every thing around us, is by the *Greeks* and *English* justly considered as *Masculine*. Thus in that elegant distich, spoken by a decrepit old Man,

* Ὁ γὰρ Χρόνος μ' ἔκαμψε, τέκτων ἐσοφός,

Ἄπαντα δ' ἐργαζόμενος ἀσθενέζετα.†

Me TIME hath bent, that sorry Artist, HE
That surely makes, whate'er he handles,
worse.

So

* Ὁ Χρόνος, πάντων Σητῶν πανεπίσκοπος Δαίμων. Græc. Anth. p. 290.

† Stob. Ecl. p. 591.

So too *Shakespeare*, speaking likewise Ch. IV.
 of TIME, ~

Orl. *Whom doth HE gallop withal?*

Ros. *With a thief to the gallows.—*

As you like it.

THE Greek Θάνατος or Αἴδης, and the *English* DEATH, seem from the same irresistible Power to have been considered as *Masculine*. Even the vulgar with us are so accustomed to this notion, that a FEMALE DEATH they would treat as ridiculous^(d).

TAKE a few examples of the masculine Death.

E 2

Calli-

(d) Well therefore did *Milton* in his *Paradise Lost* not only adopt DEATH as a *Person*, but consider him as *Masculine*: in which he was so far from introducing a Phantom of his own, or from giving it a *Gender* not supported by Custom, that perhaps he had as much the Sanction of national Opinion for his *Masculine Death*, as the ancient Poets had for many of their Deities.

Ch. IV. *Callimachus* upon the Elegies of his
Friend *Heracitus*—

‘Αἰ δὲ τεαὶ ζῶουσιν ἀήδονες, ἤτιν ὁ πάντων

‘Αρπᾶκτῆρ ‘Αΐδης ἐκ ἐπὶ χεῖρα βαλεῖ.

—yet thy sweet warbling strains

Still live immortal, nor on them shall

DEATH

His hand e’er lay, tho’ Ravager of all

IN the *Alcestis* of *Euripides*, Θάνατος or DEATH is one of the Persons of the drama; the beginning of the play is made up of dialogue between *Him* and *Apollo*; and towards its end, there is a fight between *Him* and *Hercules*, in which *Hercules* is conqueror, and rescues *Alcestis* from his hands.

IT is well known too, that SLEEP and DEATH are made *Brothers* by *Homer*. It was to this old *Gorgias* elegantly alluded, when at the extremity of a long life he lay slumbering on his Death-bed. A Friend asked him, “*How he did?*”—

SLEEP.

"SLEEP (replied the old Man) *is just* Ch.IV.
"upon delivering me over to the care of
"his BROTHER^(c)."

THUS *Shakespear*, speaking of Life,
 —merely *Thou art Death's Fool* ;
'For HIM Thou labour'st by thy flight to
shun,
And yet run'st towards HIM still.
 Meas. for Meas.

So Milton.
Dire was the tossing, deep the groans ;
Despair
Tended the sick, busiest from couch to
couch :
And over them triumphant DEATH HIS
dart
Shook ; but delay'd to strike——

P. L. XI. 489(f).

E 3

THE

(c) Ἦδη μὲν ὁ ὕπνιος ἀρχεται παρακατατίθεσθαι τὸ
 ἀδελφῷ. Stob. Ecl. p. 600.

(f) Suppose in any one of these examples we introduce
 a female Death ; suppose we read,

And

Ch. IV. **THE** supreme Being (God, Θεός, *Deus, Dieu, &c.*) is in all languages *Masculine*, in as much as the masculine Sex is the superior and more excellent; and as He is the **C**reator of all, the Father of Gods and Men. Sometimes indeed we meet with such words as Τὸ Πρῶτον, Τὸ Θεῖον, *Numen, DEITY* (which last we *English* join to a neuter, saying *Deity itself*) sometimes I say we meet with these *Neuters*. The reason in these instances seems to be, that as **G**OD is prior to all things, both in dignity and in time, this Priority is better characterized and exprest by a *Negation*, than by any of those Distinctions which are *co-ordinate with some Opposite*, as
Male

*And over them triumphant Death HER dart
Shook, &c.*

What a falling off! How are the nerves and strength of
the whole sentiment weakened!

Male for example is co-ordinate with Ch. IV.
 Female, Right with Left, &c. &c.^(s)

VIRTUE (Ἀρετή, *Virtus*) as well as most of its Species, are all *Feminine*, perhaps from their Beauty and amiable Appearance, which are not without effect even upon the most reprobate and corrupt.

E 4

—abash'd

(s) Thus *Ammonius*, speaking on the same Subject—
 ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ λέγομεν, ἰφ' ᾧ μὴ δὲ τῶν διὰ μυθολογίας παρα-
 δόντων ἡμῖν τὰς θεολογίας ἐτόλμησέ τις ἢ ἄρβινωπον, ἢ θυληπερεπῆ
 (lege *θυληπερεπῆ*) διαμόρφωσιν φέρειν· καὶ τῆτο ἐικότως· τῷ μὲν
 γὰρ ἄρβινι τὸ θυλὺ σύτοιχον· τὸ (lege τῷ) δὲ ΠΑΝΘΙ ΑΠΑΝΣ
 ΑΙΤΙΩΙ σύτοιχον ἔδιν· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν ἀρσενικῶς ΤΟΝ ΘΕΟΝ
 ὀνομάζομεν, [πρὸς] τὸ σιμνότερον τῶν γενῶν τῷ ὑφαιμένῳ πρῶτι-
 μῶντι, ὅτως αὐτὸν προσαγορεύομεν. PRIMUM dicimus, quod
 nemo etiam eorum, qui theologiam nobis fabularum inte-
 gumentis obvolutum tradiderunt, vel maris vel fœminæ
 specie fingere ausus est: idque merito: conjugatum
 enim mari fœmininum est. CAUSÆ autem omnino ABSO-
 LUTÆ AC SIMPLICI nihil est conjugatum. Immo vero cum
 DEUM masculino genere appellamus, ita ipsum nominamus,
 genus præstantius submisso atque humili præferentes.—
Ammon. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 30. b.—ὃ γὰρ ἰναρτίον τῷ
 πρῶτῳ ἔδιν. *Aristot.* *Metaph.* A. p. 210. Sylb.

Ch. IV. — *abash'd the Devil stood,*
And felt how awful Goodness is, and saw
VIRTUE in her shape how lovely ; saw,
and pin'd
His loss——

P. L. IV. 846.

THIS being allowed, VICE (*Κακία*) becomes *Feminine* of course, as being, in the *συνοχία*, or Co-ordination of things, Virtue's natural Opposite^(h).

THE Fancies, Caprices, and fickle Changes of FORTUNE would appear but awkwardly under a Character that was Male : but taken together they make a
 very

(^h) They are both represented as *Females* by *Xenophon*, in the celebrated Story of *Hercules*, taken from *Prodicus*. See *Memorab.* L. II. c. 1. As to the *συνοχία* here mentioned, thus *Varro*—*Pythagoras Samius ait omnium rerum initia esse bina : ut finitum & infinitum, bonum & malum, vitam & mortem, diem & noctem.* De Ling. Lat. L. IV. See also *Arist. Metaph.* L. 1. c. 5. and *Ecclesiasticus*, Chap. lxii. ver. 24.

very natural *Female*, which has no small Ch. VI. resemblance to the Coquette of a modern Comedy, bestowing, withdrawing, and shifting her favours, as different Beaus succeed to her good graces.

*Transmutat incertos honores,
Nunc mihi, nunc alii benigna.* Hor.

WHY the FURIES were made *Female*, is not so easy to explain, unless it be that female Passions of all kinds were considered as susceptible of greater excess, than male Passions ; and that the *Furies* were to be represented, as Things superlatively outrageous.

*Talibus Alecto dictis exarsit in iras.
At Juveni oranti subitus tremor occupat
artus :*

*Diriguere oculi : tot Erinnyes sibilat Hy-
dris,*

*Tantaque se facies aperit : tum flammea
torquens*

Lumina

Ch. IV. *Lumina cunctantem & quærentem dicere*

plura

Repulit, & geminos erexit crinibus an-
gues,,

Verberaque insonuit, rabidoque hæc addi-
dit ore :

En ! Ego victa situ, &c.

Æn. VII. 455⁽ⁱ⁾.

HE

(i) The Words above mentioned *Time, Death, Fortune, Virtue, &c.* in *Greek, Latin, French,* and most modern Languages, though they are diversified with Genders in the manner described, yet never vary the Gender which they have once acquir'd, except in a few instances, where the Gender is doubtful. We cannot say *ἡ ἀρετή* or *ὁ ἀρετή*, *hæc Virtus* or *hic Virtus*, *la Virtu* or *le Virtu*, and so of the rest. But it is otherwise in *English*. We in our own language say, *Virtue* is *its* own reward, or *Virtue* is *her* own reward ; *Time* maintains *its* wonted Pace, or *Time* maintains *his* wonted Pace.

There is a singular advantage in this liberty, as it enables us to mark, with a peculiar force, the Distinction between the severe or *Logical Style*, and the ornamental or *Rhetorical*. For thus when we speak of the above Words,

He, that would see more on this Sub- Ch. IV.
ject, may consult *Ammonius* the Peripa-
tetic,

Words, and of all others naturally devoid of Sex, as *Neuters*, we speak of them *as they are*, and as becomes a *logical* Inquiry. When we give them *Sex*, by making them Masculine or Feminine, they are from thenceforth *personified*; are a kind of *intelligent Beings*, and become, as such, the proper ornaments either of *Rhetoric* or of *Poetry*.

Thus *Milton*,

—*The Thunder*,

Wing'd with red lightning and impetuous rage,
Perhaps hath spent HIS shafts—— P. Lost. I. 174.

The Poet, having just before called the *Hail*, and *Thunder*, God's *Ministers of Vengeance*, and so personified them, had he afterwards said *its* Shafts for *his* Shafts, would have destroyed his own Image, and approached withal so much nearer to Prose.

The following Passage is from the same Poem.

Should intermitted Vengeance arm again

His red right hand—— P. L. II. 174.

In this Place *His Hand* is clearly preferable either to *Her's* or *It's*, by immediately referring us to God himself, the Avenger.

I shall

Ch. IV. *tetic*, in his Commentary on the *Treatise de Interpretatione*, where the Subject is treated at large with respect to the Greek Tongue. We shall only observe, that as all such Speculations are at best but Conjectures, they should therefore be

I shall only give one instance more, and quit this Subject:

*At his command th' up-rooted Hills retir'd
Each to his place: they heard his voice and went
Obsequious: Heav'n his wonted face renew'd,
And with fresh flourets Hill and Valley smil'd.*

P. L. VI.

See also ver. 54, 55, of the same Book.

Here all things are personified; the Hills *hear*, the Valleys *smile*, and the *Face* of Heaven is renewed.—Suppose then the Poet had been necessitated by the laws of his Language to have said—*Each Hill retir'd to its Place—Heaven renew'd its wonted face*—how prosaic and lifeless would these Neuters have appeared; how detrimental to the *Prosopopeia*, which he was aiming to establish! In this therefore he was happy, that the Language, in which he wrote, imposed no such necessity; and he was too wise a Writer, to impose it on himself. It were to be wished, his correctors had been as wise on their parts.

be received with candour, rather than Ch. IV.
scrutinized with rigour. Varro's words
on a Subject near akin, are for their
aptness and elegance well worth at-
tending. *Non mediocres enim tenebræ in
silvâ, ubi hæc captanda; neque eò, quò
pervenire volumus, semitæ tritæ; neque
non in tramitibus quædam objecta, quæ
euentem retinere possunt.**

To conclude this Chapter. We may
collect from what has been said, that
both NUMBER and GENDER appertain
to WORDS, because in the first place
they appertain to THINGS; that is to
say, because Substances are Many, and
have either Sex, or no Sex; therefore Sub-
stantives have Number, and are Masculine,
Feminine, or Neuter. There is
however this difference between the two
Attributes: NUMBER in strictness de-
scends no lower, than to the last Rank
of

* De Ling. Lat. L. IV.

Ch. IV. *of Species*^(k): GENDER on the contrary stops not here, but descends to *every Individual*, however diversified. And so much for SUBSTANTIVES, PROPERLY SO CALLED.

(k) The reason why *Number* goes no lower, is that it does not naturally appertain to *Individuals*: the cause of which see before, p. 39.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Concerning Substantives of the Secondary Order.

WE are now to proceed to a SECONDARY RACE OF SUBSTANTIVES, a Race quite different from any already mentioned, and whose Nature may be explained in the following manner. Ch. V.

EVERY Object which presents itself to the Senses or the Intellect, is either then perceived for the *first time*, or else is recognized as having been perceived *before*. In the former case it is called an Object τῆς πρώτης γνώσεως, of the *first knowledge* or *acquaintance*^(a); in the latter

^(a) See *Apoll. de Syntaxi*, l. 1. c. 16. p. 49. l. 2. c. 3. p. 103. Thus *Priscian*—*Interest autem inter demonstrationem & relationem hoc; quod demonstratio, interrogationi reddita, Primam Cognitionem ostendit; Quis fecit?*

HERMES.

V. latter it is called an Object τῆς δεύτερας γνώσεως of the second knowledge or acquaintance.

Now as all Conversation passes between *Particulars* or *Individuals*, these will often happen to be reciprocally Objects τῆς πρώτης γνώσεως, that is to say, till that instant unacquainted with each other. What then is to be done? How shall the Speaker address the other, when he knows not his Name? or how explain himself by his own Name, of which the other is wholly ignorant? Nouns, as they have been described, cannot answer the purpose. The first expedient upon this occasion seems to have been δειξις, that is, *Pointing*, or *Indication by the Finger or Hand*, some traces of which are still to be observed, as a part of that Action, which naturally attends our speaking.

But

fecit? Ego: relatio vero Secundam Cognitionem significat, ut, Is, de quo jam dixi. Lib. XII. p. 936. Edit. Putschii.

But the Authors of Language were not content with this. They invented a race of *Words to supply this Pointing*; which Words, as they always stood for *Substantives or Nouns*, were characterized by the Name of Ἀντωνυμιαί, or PRONOUNS^(b). These also they distinguished into three several sorts, calling them *Pronouns of the First, the Second, and the Third Person*, with a view to certain distinctions, which may be explained as follows.

SUPPOSE the Parties conversing to be wholly unacquainted, neither Name nor Countenance on either side known, and
the

(b) Ἐκείνο ἐν Ἀντωνυμίᾳ, τὸ μετὰ ΔΕΙΞΕΩΣ ἢ ἀναφορᾶς ἈΝΤΟΝΟΜΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ. Apoll. de Synt. L. II. c. 5. p. 106. Priscian seems to consider them so peculiarly destined to the expression of *Individuals*, that he does not say they supply the place of *any* Noun, but that of the *proper* Name only. And this undoubtedly was their original, and still is their true and natural use. PRO-
NOMEN est pars orationis, quæ pro nomine proprio unusquisque accipitur. Prisc. L. XII. See also Apoll. L. II. c. 9. p. 117, 118.

Ch. V. the Subject of the Conversation to be *the Speaker himself*. Here, to supply the place of Pointing by a Word of equal Power, they furnished the Speaker with the *Pronoun, I*. *I write, I say, I desire, &c.* and as the Speaker is always principal with respect to his own discourse, this they called for that reason *the Pronoun of the First Person*.

AGAIN, suppose the Subject of the Conversation to be *the Party address*. Here for similar reasons they invented the *Pronoun, THOU*. *Thou writest, Thou walkest, &c.* and as the Party address is next in dignity to the Speaker, or at least comes next with reference to the discourse; this Pronoun they therefore called *the Pronoun of the Second Person*.

LASTLY, suppose the Subject of Conversation neither the Speaker, nor the Party address, but *some Third Object, different from both*. Here they provided another *Pronoun*. *HE, SHE, or IT*,
which

which in distinction to the two former was called *the Pronoun of the Third Person*. Ch. V.

AND thus it was that *Pronouns* came to be distinguished by their respective PERSONS^(c).

F 2

As

(c) The description of the different PERSONS here given is taken from *Priscian*, who took it from *Apollonius*. *Personæ Pronominum sunt tres; prima, secunda, tertia. Prima est, cum ipsa, quæ loquitur, de se pronuntiat; Secunda, cum de eâ pronuntiat, ad quam directo sermone loquitur; Tertia, cum de eâ, quæ nec loquitur, nec ad se directum accipit Sermonem. L. XII. p. 940. Theodoric Gaza* gives the same Distinctions. Πρῶτον (ωρόσωπον κ.) ὃ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ φεράζει, ὃ λίγων δέλιον, ὃ περὶ τῶ, πρὸς ὃν ὃ λίγος τρίτον, ὃ περὶ ἐτέρου. *Gaz. Gram. L. IV. p. 152.*

This account of *Persons* is far preferable to the common one, which makes the First the *Speaker*; the Second, the *Party address*; and the Third, the *Subject*. For tho' the First and Second be as commonly described, one the *Speaker*, the other the *Party address*; yet till they become *subjects of the discourse*, they have no existence. Again as to the Third Person's being the *subject*, this is a character, which it *shares in common* with both

Ch. V.

As to NUMBER, the Pronoun of each Person has it: (I) has the plural (we), because there may be many Speakers at once

both the other Persons, and which can never therefore be called a peculiarity of its own. To explain by an instance or two. When *Eneas* begins the narrative of his adventures, the *second Person* immediately appears, because he makes *Dido*, whom he addresses, the immediate subject of his Discourse.

Infandum, Regina, jubes, renovare dolorem.

From hence forward for 1500 Verses (tho' she be all that time the party address) we hear nothing farther of this *Second Person*, a variety of other Subjects filling up the Narrative.

In the mean time the *First Person* may be seen every where, because the *Speaker* every where is himself the *Subject*. They were indeed Events, as he says himself,

—*quaque ipse miserrima vidi,*
Et quorum pars magna fui—

Not that the *Second Person* does not often occur in the course of this Narrative; but then it is always by a Figure of Speech, when those, who by their absence are in fact so many *Third Persons*, are converted into *Second Persons*


once of the same Sentiment; as well as one, who, including himself, speaks the Sentiment of many. (THOU) has the plural (YOU), because a Speech may be spoken to many, as well as to one. (HE) has the plural (THEY), because the Subject of discourse is often many at once.

BUT tho' all these Pronouns have *Number*, it does not appear either in *Greek*, or *Latin*, or any modern Language, that those of the first and second Person carry the distinctions of *SEX*. The reason seems to be, that the

F 3 Speaker

Persons by being introduced as *present*. The *real* Second Person (*Dido*) is never once hinted.

Thus far as to *Virgil*. But when we read *Euclid*, we find neither *First* Person, nor *Second*, in any Part of the whole Work. The reason is, that neither Speaker nor Party address, (in which light we may always view the Writer and his reader) can possibly become the Subject of pure Mathematics, nor indeed can any thing else, except abstract Quantity, which neither speaks itself, nor is spoken to by another.

Ch. V.  Speaker and Hearer being generally present to each other, it would have been superfluous to have marked a distinction by Art, which from Nature and even Dress was commonly ^(d) apparent on both sides. But this does not hold with respect to the third Person, of whose Character and Distinctions, (including Sex among the rest) we often know no more, than what we learn from the discourse. And hence it is that in most Languages *the third Person* has its *Genders*, and that even *English* (which allows its Adjectives no Genders at all) has in this Pronoun the triple ^(e) distinction of *He*, *She*, and *It*.

HENCE

^(d) *Demonstratio ipsa secum genus ostendit.* Priscian. L. XII. p. 942. See *Apoll. de Syntax.* L. II. c. 7, p. 109.

^(e) The Utility of this Distinction may be better found in supposing it away. Suppose for example we should read in history these words—*He caused him to destroy him—*

HENCE too we see the reason why a *single Pronoun* (*s*) to each Person, an *I* to the *First*, and a *Thou* to the *Second*, are abundantly sufficient to all the purposes

F 4

poses

him—and that we were to be informed the [He], which is here thrice repeated, stood each time for something different, that is to say, for a Man, for a Woman, and for a City, whose Names were *Alexander*, *Thais*, and *Persepolis*. Taking the Pronoun in this manner, divested of its Genders, how would it appear, which was destroyed; which was the destroyer; and which the cause, that moved to the destruction? But there are not such doubts, when we hear the Genders distinguished; when instead of the ambiguous sentence, *He caused him to destroy him*, we are told with the proper distinctions, that *she caused him to destroy it*. Then we know with certainty, what before we could not: that the Promoter was the woman; that her Instrument was the Hero; and that the Subject of their Cruelty was the unfortunate City.

¶ *Quæritur tamen cur prima quidem Persona & secunda singula Pronomina habeant, tertiam vero sex diversæ indicent voces? Ad quod respondendum est, quod prima quidem & secunda Persona ideo non egent diversis vocibus, quod semper præsentibus inter se sunt, & demonstrativa; tertia vero Persona modo demonstrativa est, ut, Hic, Iste; modo relativa, ut Is, Ipse, &c. Priscian. L. XII. p. 933.*

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poses of Speech. But it is not so with respect to the *Third Person*. The various relations of the various Objects exhibited by this (I mean relations of near and distant, present and absent, same and different, definite and indefinite, &c.) made it necessary that here there should not be one, but *many* Pronouns, such as *He, This, That, Other, Any, Some, &c.*

It must be confessed indeed, that all these Words do not always appear as *Pronouns*. When they stand by themselves, and represent some Noun, (as when we say, *THIS is Virtue*, or *δεικτικῶς*, *Give me THAT*) then are they *Pronouns*. But when they are associated to some Noun (as when we say, *THIS Habit is Virtue*; or *δεικτικῶς*, *THAT Man* defrauded me) then as they supply not the place of a Noun, but only serve to ascertain one, they fall rather into the Species of *Definitives* or *Articles*. That there is indeed a near relation between
Pronouns

Pronouns and Articles, the old Grammarians have all acknowledged, and some words it has been doubtful to which Class to refer. The best rule to distinguish them is this—The genuine PRONOUN *always stands by itself*, assuming the *Power* of a Noun, and supplying its *place*—The genuine ARTICLE *never stands by itself*, but appears at all times associated to something else, requiring a Noun for its support, as much as *Attributives* or ^(s) *Adjectives*.

As

(s) Τὸ Ἄρθρον μὲν ὀνόματι, καὶ ἡ Ἀντωνυμία ἀντὶ ὀνόματι.
 THE ARTICLE *stands with a Noun*; but THE PRONOUN *stands for a Noun*. Apoll. L. I. c. 3. p. 22. Ἀντὶ τὰ ἄρθρα, τῆς πρὸς τὰ ὀνόματα συναρτησίως ἀποσάντα, εἰς τὴν ὑποταγμένην ἀντωνυμίαν μεταπίπτει. Now Articles themselves, when they quit their Connection with Nouns, pass into such Pronoun, as is proper upon the occasion. Ibid.
 Again—Ὅταν τὸ Ἄρθρον μὴ μετ' ὀνόματι παραλαμβάνεται, ποίησιν δὲ σύνταξιν ὀνόματι ἢ προσκλιθεῖν, ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης εἰς ἀντωνυμίαν μεταληφθήσεται, εἴτε ἐκ ἐγγινόμενοι μετ' ὀνόματι δυνάμει ἀντὶ ὀνόματι παραλήφθῃ. When the Article

cle

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7. As to the *Coalescence* of these Pronouns, it is, as follows. The First or Second will, either of them, by themselves

cle is assumed without the Noun, and has (as we explained before) the same Syntax, which the Noun has ; it must of absolute necessity be admitted for a Pronoun, because it appears without a Noun, and yet is in Power assumed for one. Ejusd. L. II. c. 8. p. 113. L. I. c. 45. p. 96.— Inter Pronomina & Articulos hoc Interest, quod Pronomina ea putantur, quæ, cum sola sint, vicem nominis complent, ut quis, ille, iste : Articuli vero cum Pronominibus, aut Nominibus, aut Participiis adjunguntur. Donat. Gram. p. 1753.

Priscian, speaking of the Stoics, says as follows: ARTICULIS autem PRONOMINA connumerantes, FINITOS ea ARTICULOS appellabant ; ipsos autem Articulos, quibus nos caremus, INFINITOS ARTICULOS dicebant. Vel, ut alii dicunt, Articulos connumerabant Pronominibus, & ARTICULARIA eos PRONOMINA vocabant, &c. Pris. L. I. p. 574. Varro, speaking of Quisque and Ille, calls them both ARTICLES, the first indefinite, the second definite. De Ling. Lat. L. VII. See also L. IX. p. 132. Vossius indeed in his Analogia (L. I. c. 1.) opposes this Doctrine, because Hic has not the same power with the Greek Article ὁ. But he did not enough attend to the ancient Writers

selves coalesce with the Third, but not with each other. For example, it is good sense, as well as good Grammar, to say in any Language—I AM HE—THOU ART HE—but we cannot say—I AM THOU—nor THOU ART I. The reason is, there is no absurdity for the *Speaker* to be the *Subject* also of the Discourse, as when we say, *I am He*; or for the *Person address*; as when we say, *Thou art He*. But for the same Person, in the same circumstances, to be at once the *Speaker*, and the *Party address*, this is impossible; and so therefore is the *Coalescence* of the First and Second Person.

AND now perhaps we have seen enough of *Pronouns*, to perceive how they

Writers on this Subject, who considered all Words, as ARTICLES, which *being associated to Nouns (and not standing in their place) served in any manner to ascertain, and determine their signification.*

Ch. V. they differ from other Substantives. The others are *Primary*, these are their *Substitutes*; a kind of secondary Race, which were taken in aid, when for reasons already ^(A) mentioned the others could not be used. It is moreover by means of these, and of *Articles*, which
are

(A) See these reasons at the beginning of this chapter, of which reasons the principal one is, that "no Noun, properly so called, implies its own Presence. It is therefore to ascertain such Presence, that the Pronoun is taken in aid; and hence it is it becomes equivalent to *δείξις*, that is, to *Pointing or Indication by the Finger.*" It is worth remarking in that Verse of *Persius*,

*Sed pulchrum est DIGITO MONSTRARI, & dicier,
HIC EST.*

how the *δείξις* and the *Pronoun* are introduced together, and made to co-operate to the same end.

Sometimes by virtue of *δείξις* the Pronoun of the *third Person* stands for the *first*.

Quod si militibus parces, erit HIC quoque Miles.
That is, *I also will be a Soldier.*

Tibul. L. II. El. 6. v. 7. See *Vulpius*.
It

are nearly allied to them, that “LAN- Ch. V.
 “GUAGE, tho’ in itself only significant
 “of *general Ideas*, is brought down to
 “denote *that infinitude of Particulars*,
 “which are for ever arising, and ceas-
 “ing to be.” But more of this here-
 after in a proper place.

As to the three orders of Pronouns already mentioned, they may be called *Prepositive*, as may indeed all Substantives, because they are capable of introducing or leading a Sentence, without having reference to any thing previous. But besides those there is ANO-

THER

It may be observed too, that even in Epistolary Correspondence, and indeed in all kinds of Writing, where the Pronouns I and You make their appearance, there is a sort of *implied Presence*, which they are supposed to indicate, though the parties are in fact at ever so great a distance. And hence the rise of that distinction in *Apollonius*, τὰς μὲν τῶν ὀφθαλμοῦν εἶναι διόξουσ, τὰς δὲ τῶν οὐ.
that some Indications are ocular, and some are mental.
De Syntaxi, L. II. c. 3. p. 104.

Ch. V. **THE PRONOUN** (in Greek ὅς, ὅςις⁽¹⁾; in Latin, *Qui*; in English, *Who, Which, That*) a Pronoun having a character peculiar to itself, the nature of which may be explained as follows.

SUPPOSE I was to say—*LIGHT is a Body, LIGHT moves with great celerity.* These would apparently be two distinct Sentences.

⁽¹⁾ The Greeks, it must be confessed, call this Pronoun ὑποτακτικὸν ἄρθρον, *the subjunctive Article*. Yet, as it should seem, this is but an improper Appellation. Apollonius, when he compares it to the προτακτικὸν or true *prepositive Article*, not only confesses it to differ, as being expressed by a different Word, and having a different place in every Sentence; but in Syntax he adds, *it is wholly different*. De Syntax. L. I. c. 43. p. 91. Theodore Gaza acknowledges the same, and therefore adds—ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἑλληνικὴν ταύτην—*for these reasons this (meaning the Subjunctive) cannot properly be an Article*. And just before he says, κατὰ τὴν ἑλληνικὴν—*however properly speaking it is the Prepositive is the Article*. Gram. Introd. L. IV. The Latins therefore have undoubtedly done better in ranging it with the Pronouns.

Sentences. Suppose, instead of the Second, *LIGHT*, I were to place the prepositive Pronoun, *IT*, and say—*LIGHT is a Body ; IT moves with great celerity*—the Sentences would still be distinct and two. But if I add a *Connective* (as for Example an *AND*) saying—*LIGHT is a Body, AND it moves with great celerity*—I then by Connection make the two into one, as by cementing many Stones I make one Wall.

Now it is *in the united Powers of a Connective, and another Pronoun*, that we may see the force, and character of the Pronoun here treated. Thus therefore, if in the place of *AND IT*, we substitute *THAT, or WHICH*, saying *LIGHT is a Body, WHICH moves with great celerity*—the Sentence still retains its *Unity and Perfection*, and becomes if possible more compact than before. We may with just reason therefore call this Pronoun the *SUBJUNCTIVE*, because

Ch. V. cause it cannot (like the Prepositive) introduce an original Sentence, but only serves to subjoin one to some other, which is previous^(k).

THE

(^k) Hence we see why the Pronoun here mentioned is always necessarily the Part of some complex Sentence, which Sentence contains, either exprest or understood, two Verbs, and two Nominatives.

Thus in that Verse of Horace,

Qui metuens vivit, liber mihi non erit unquam.

Ille non erit liber—is one Sentence; *qui metuens vivit*—is another. *Ille* and *Qui* are the two Nominatives; *Erit* and *Vivit*, the two Verbs; and so in all other instances.

The following passage from *Apollonius* (though somewhat corrupt in more places than one) will serve to shew, whence the above speculations are taken. Τὸ ὑποτακτικὸν ἄρθρον ἐπὶ ῥῆμα ἴδιον φέρεται, συνδεδεμένον διὰ τῆς ἀναφορᾶς τῷ προκειμένῳ ὀνόματι· καὶ ἐντιϋθεὶς ἅπλῶς λόγος ὁ παρῖσται κατὰ τὴν τῶν δύο ῥημάτων σύνταξιν (λέγω τὴν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι, καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἄρθρῳ) ὅπερ πάλιν παρτίπιτο τῷ ΚΑΙ συνδέσμῳ. Κοινὸν μὲν (lege TO ΚΑΙ γὰρ κοινὸν μὲν) παρτελάμεσθαι τὸ ὄνομα

THE Application of this SUBJUNCTIVE, like the other Pronouns, is universal. It may be the Substitute of all kinds

Ch. V.

ὄνομα τὸ προκείμενον, συμπλεκτοὶ δὲ ἕτερον λόγον πάντως καὶ ἕτερον ῥῆμα περιλάμβανει, καὶ ἔτι τὸ, ΠΑΡΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ Ο ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ, ΟΣ ΔΙΕΛΕΞΑΤΟ, δυνάμει τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποταλάει τῷ (for. τῷ) Ο ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ ΠΑΡΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ, ΚΑΙ ΔΙΕΛΕΞΑΤΟ. *The subjunctive Article, (that is, the Pronoun here mentioned) is applied to a Verb of its own, and yet is connected withal to the antecedent Noun. Hence it can never serve to constitute a simple Sentence, by reason of the Syntax of the two Verbs, I mean that which respects the Noun or Antecedent, and that which respects the Article or Relative. The same too follows as to the Conjunction, AND: This Copulative assumes the antecedent Noun, which is capable of being applied to many Subjects, and by connecting to it a new Sentence, of necessity assumes a new Verb also. And hence it is that the Words—the Grammarian came, who discoursed—form in power nearly the same sentence, as if we were to say—the Grammarian came, AND discoursed. Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 43. p. 92. See also an ingenious French Treatise, called Grammaire generale & raisonnée, Chap. IX.*

The *Latins*, in their Structure of this Subjunctive, seem to have well represented its *compound* Nature of part *Pronoun*, and part *Connective*, in forming their *qui* and *quis* from *que* and *is*, or (if we go with *Scaliger* to

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V. kinds of Substantives, natural, artificial, or abstract ; as well as general, special, or particular. We may say, the *Animal, Which*, &c. the *Man, Whom*, &c. the *Ship, Which*, &c. *Alexander, Who*, &c. *Bucephalus, That*, &c. *Virtue, Which*, &c. &c.

NAY, it may even be the Substitute of all the other Pronouns, and is of course therefore expressive of all three Persons. Thus we say, I, who *now read*, have near finished this Chapter ; THOU, who *now readest* ; HE, who *now readeth*, &c. &c.

AND thus is THIS SUBJUNCTIVE truly a *Pronoun* from its *Substitution*,
there

the Greek) from KAI and 'OZ and KAI and 'O. *Scal de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 127.*

HOMER also expresses the Force of this *Subjunctive*, *Pronoun* or *Article*, by help of the *Prepositive* and a *Connective*, exactly consonant to the Theory here established. See *Iliad*, A. ver. 270, 553. N. 571. Π. 54, 157, 158.

there being no Substantive existing, in Ch. V.
 whose place it may not stand. At the
 same time, it is *essentially distinguished*
 from the other Pronouns, by this pecu-
 liar, that it is not only a *Substitute*, but
 withal a *Connective* ⁽¹⁾.

G 2

AND

⁽¹⁾ Before we quit this Subject, it may not be improp-
 er to remark, that in the *Greek* and *Latin* Tongues the
 two principal Pronouns, that is to say, the First and Se-
 cond Person, the *Ego* and the *Tu*, are *implied* in the
 very Form of the Verb itself (*γράφω, γράφεις, scribo, scri-
 bis*) and are for that reason never *expressed*, unless it be to
 mark a Contradistinction; such as in *Virgil*,

*Nos patriam fugimus; Tu, Tityre, lentus in umbrâ
 Formosam resonare doces, &c.*

This however is true with respect only to the *Casus rec-
 tus*, or *Nominative* of these Pronouns, but not with res-
 pect to their *oblique Cases*, which must always be added,
 because tho' we see the *Ego* in *Amo*, and the *Tu* in *Amas*,
 we see not the *TE* or *ME* in *Amat*, or *Amant*.

Yet even these *oblique Cases* appear in a different man-
 ner, according as they mark Contradistinction, or not.
 If they contradistinguish, then are they *commonly* placed
 at the beginning of the Sentence, or at least before the
 Verb, or leading Substantive.

Ch. V.

AND now to conclude what we have said concerning Substantives. All SUB-
STANTIVES

Thus *Virgil*,

— *Quid Thesea, magnum*

Quid memorem Alciden? Et mi genus ab Jove summo.

Thus *Homer*,

ΤΜΙΝ μὲν ὅτι δόειν—

Παῖδα δὲ ΜΟΙ λύσασσι φίλην— IΛ. Α.

where the Τμῖν and the Μοὶ stand, as contradistinguished, and both have precedence of their respective Verbs, the Τμῖν even leading the whole Sentence. In other instances, these Pronouns commonly take their place behind the Verb, as may be seen in examples every where obvious. The *Greek* Language went farther still. When the oblique Case of these Pronouns happened to contradistinguish, they assumed a peculiar Accent of their own, which gave them the name of ὀρθοτονεμένοι, or *Pronouns uprightly accented*. When they marked no such opposition, they not only took their place behind the Verb, but even gave it their Accent, and (as it were) inclined themselves upon it. And hence they acquired the name of ἑγκλιτικά, that is, *Leaning or Inclining Pronouns*. The *Greeks* too had in the first person Ἐμῶ, Ἐμοί, Ἐμὶ for *Contradistinctives*, and Μῶ, Μοί, Μὲ for *Enclitics*. And hence it was that *Apollonius* contended, that in the passage above quoted from the first *Iliad*, we should read
παῖδα

STANTIVES are either *Primary*, or *Secondary*, that is to say, according to a Language more familiar and known, are either NOUNS or PRONOUNS. The NOUNS denote *Substances*, and those either *Natural*, *Artificial*, or *Abstract**. They moreover denote Things either *General*, or *Special*, or *Particular*. The PRONOUNS, their Substitutes, are either *Prepositive*, or *Subjunctive*. THE PRE-POSITIVE is distinguished into *three* Orders, called the *First*, the *Second*, and the

G 3

the

μαῖδα δ' ΕΜΟΙ, for *μαῖδα δι ΜΟΙ*, on account of the Contradistinction, which there occurs between the *Grecians* and *Chyres*. See *Apoll. de Syntaxi*, L. I. c. 3. p. 20. L. II. c. 2. p. 102, 103.

This Diversity between the Contradistinctive Pronouns, and the Enclitic, is not unknown even to the *English* Tongue. When we say, *Give me Content*, the (*Me*) in this case is a perfect Enclitic. But when we say, *Give Mé Content*, *Give Him his thousands*, the (*Me*) and (*Him*) are no Enclitics, but as they stand in opposition, assume an Accent of their own, and so become the true *ἰσθρο-
τυμῖαι*.

* See before, p. 37, 38.

Ch. V. *the Third Person.* THE SUBJUNCTIVE includes the powers of all those three, having *superadded*, as of its own, the peculiar force of a *Connective*.

HAVING done with SUBSTANTIVES,
we now proceed to ATTRIBUTIVES.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Concerning Attributives.

ATTIBUTIVES are *all those principal Words, that denote Attributes, considered as Attributes.* Such for example are the Words, *Black, White, Great, Little, Wise, Eloquent, Writeth, Wrote, Writing, &c.*^(a) Ch. VI.

G 4

How-

(a) In the above list of Words are included what Grammarians called *Adjectives, Verbs, and Participles*, in as much as *all of them equally* denote the *Attributes of Substance*. Hence it is, that as they are all from their very nature the *Predicates* in a Proposition (being all predicated of some Subject or Substance. *Snow is white, Cicero writeth, &c.*) hence I say the Appellation *PHMA* or *VERB* is employed by Logicians in an extended Sense to denote them all. Thus *Ammonius* explaining the reason, why *Aristotle* in his *Tract de Interpretatione* calls *λεπτός* a Verb, tells us *πᾶσι φωνῇ, κατηγορούμενοι ἴσιν ἐν πρῶτασι ποιῆσαι*, 'PHMA καλεῖσθαι, *that every Sound articulate,*

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VI. HOWEVER, previously to these, and to every other possible Attribute, whatever a thing may be, whether black or white, square or round, wise or eloquent, writing or thinking, it must *first* of necessity EXIST, before it can possibly be any thing else. For EXISTENCE may be considered as *an universal Genus*, to which all things of all kinds are at all times to be referred. The Verbs therefore, which denote it, claim precedence of all others, as being essential to the very being of every Proposition, in which they may still be found, either *expressed*, or by *implication*; expressed, as when we say, *The Sun is bright*; by implication, as when we say,
The

ticulate, that forms the Predicate in a Proposition, is called a VERB, p. 24. Edit. Ven. Priscian's observation, though made on another occasion, is very pertinent to the present. Non Declinatio, sed proprietates excutienda est significationis. L. II. p. 576. And in another place he says—non similitudo declinationis omnimodo conjungit vel discernit partes orationis inter se, sed vis ipsius significationis. L. XIII. p. 970.

The Sun rises, which means, when resolved, *The Sun is rising*^(b). Ch. VI.

THE Verbs, *Is, Groweth, Becometh, Est, Fit*, ὑπάρχει ἐς, πέλει, γίγνεται, are all of them used to express this *general Genus*. The *Latins* have called them *Verba Substantiva, Verbs Substantive*, but the *Greeks* ῥήματα ὑπαρκτικὰ *Verbs of Existence*, a Name more apt, as being of greater latitude, and comprehending equally as well *Attribute*, as *Substance*. The principal of those Verbs, and which we shall particularly here consider, is the Verb, ἔστι, *Est, Is*.

NOW all EXISTENCE is either absolute or qualified—*absolute*, as when we say, B IS; *qualified*, as when we say, B IS AN ANIMAL; B IS BLACK, IS ROUND, &c.

WITH

^(b) See *Metaphys. Aristot. L. V. c. 7. Edit. Du-Vall*.

Ch. VI. we say, TRUTH IS, or, GOD IS. The opposition is not of *Time present to other Times*, but of *necessary Existence to all temporary Existence whatever*^(c). And so much for *Verbs of Existence*, commonly called *Verbs Substantive*.

WE are now to descend to the common Herd of *Attributives*, such as *black and white, to write, to speak, to walk, &c.* among which, when compared and opposed to each other, one of the most eminent distinctions appears to be this. Some, by being joined to a proper Substantive *make without*

(c) *Cum enim dicimus, DEUS EST, non cum dicimus NUNC ESSE, sed tantum IN SUBSTANTIA ESSE, ut hoc ad immutabilitatem potius substantiæ, quam ad tempus aliquod referatur. Si autem dicimus, DIES EST, ad nullam dici substantiam pertinet, nisi tantum ad temporis constitutionem; hoc enim, quod significat, tale est, tanquam si dicamus, NUNC EST. Quare cum dicimus ESSE, ut substantiam designemus, simpliciter EST addimus; cum vero ita ut aliquid præsens significetur, secundum Tempus. Boeth. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 307. See also Plut. Tim. p. 37, 38. Edit. Serrani.*

out farther help a perfect assertive Sentence; while the rest, tho' otherwise perfect, are in this respect deficient. Ch. VI.

To explain by an example. When we say, *Cicero eloquent*, *Cicero wise*, these are imperfect Sentences, though they denote a Substance and an Attribute. The reason is, that they want an Assertion, to shew that such Attribute appertains to such Substance. We must therefore call in the help of an Assertion elsewhere, an (*is*) or a (*was*) to complete the Sentence, saying *Cicero is wise*, *Cicero was eloquent*. On the contrary, when we say, *Cicero writeth*, *Cicero walketh*, in instances like these there is no such occasion, because the words (*writeth*) and (*walketh*) imply in their own Form not an Attribute only, but an Assertion likewise. Hence it is they may be resolved, the one into *Is* and *Writing*, the other into *Is* and *Walking*.

Now

Ch. VI. Now all those Attributives, which have this complex Power of denoting both an Attribute and an Assertion, make that Species of Words, which Grammarians call VERBS. If we resolve this complex Power into its distinct Parts, and take *the Attribute alone*, without the Assertion, then have we PARTICIPLES. All other Attributives, besides the two Species before, are included together in the general Name of ADJECTIVES.

AND thus it is, that ALL ATTRIBUTIVES are either VERBS, PARTICIPLES, or ADJECTIVES.

BESIDES the Distinctions abovementioned, there are others, which deserve notice. Some Attributes have their Essence in *Motion*; such are *to walk, to fly, to strike, to live*. Others have it in the *privation of Motion*; such are *to stop, to rest, to cease, to die*. And lastly, others have it in subjects, *which have nothing*

nothing to do with either Motion or its Privation; such are the Attributes of, Ch. VI.
Great and Little, White and Black, Wise and Foolish, and in a word the several *Quantities and Qualities* of all Things. Now these last are ADJECTIVES; those which denote *Motions*, or their *Privation*, are either VERBS or PARTICIPLES.

AND this Circumstance leads to a farther Distinction, which may be explained as follows. That *all Motion is in Time*, and therefore, wherever it exists, implies *Time* as its concomitant, is evident to all, and requires no proving. But besides this, *all Rest or Privation of Motion implies Time likewise*. For how can a thing be said to rest or stop, by being in *one Place* for *one instant only*?—so too is that thing, which moves with the greatest velocity. †To stop therefore or rest,

† Thus Proclus in the Beginning of his Treatise concerning Motion. Ἡμεῖς ἐκ τῶ πρώτου καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἐν καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ μέγα.

Ch. VI. rest, is to be in *one* Place for *more than* *one* Instant, that is to say, *during an Extension between two Instants*, and *this* of course gives us the idea of TIME. As therefore *Motions* and their *Privation* imply *Time* as their concomitant, so *VERBS*, which denote them, come to denote *TIME* also^(d). And hence the origin and use of *TENSES*, “ which are so many
“ different forms, assigned to each Verb,
“ to shew, without altering its principal meaning, the various *TIMES* in
“ which such meaning may exist.”— Thus *Scribit*, *Scriptsit*, *Scripserat*, and *Scribet*, denote all equally the Attribute, *To Write*, while the difference between them, is, that they denote *Writing in different Times*.

SHOULD

(d) The ancient Authors of Dialectic or Logic have well described this Property. The following is part of their Definition of a Verb—ῥῆμα δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ προσσημαίνον χρόνον, a Verb is something, which signifies Time OVER AND ABOVE (for such is the force of the Preposition Πρὸς.) If it should be asked, *over and above what?* It may be answered, over and above its principal Signification, which is to denote some *moving* and *energizing* Attribute. See *Arist. de Interpret.* c. 3. together with his Commentators *Ammonius* and *Boethius*.

OB. VI. extended. Hence it is that in *universal Time past* we may assume many *particular Times past*; and in *universal Time future*, many *particular Times future*, some more, some less remote, and corresponding to each other under different relations. Even *present Time itself* is not exempt from these differences, and as necessarily implies *some degree of Extension*, as does every given line, however minute.

Hence then we are to seek for the reason, which first introduced into language that variety of Tenses. It was not it seems enough to denote *indefinitely* (or by Aorists) mere Present, Past, or Future, but it was necessary on many occasions to define with more precision, *what kind* of Past, Present, or Future. And hence the multiplicity of Futures, Præterits, and even Present Tenses, with which all languages are found to abound, and without which it would be difficult to ascertain our Ideas.

HOWEVER

BOOK THE FIRST.

99

HOWEVER as the knowledge of **TENSES** depends on the Theory of **TIME**, and this is a subject of no mean speculation, we shall reserve it by itself for the following chapter.

Ch. VI.

CHAP. VII.

Concerning Time, and Tenses.

C. VII. **T**IME and SPACE have this in common, that they are both of them by nature things *continuous*, and as such they both of them imply *Extension*. Thus between *London* and *Salisbury* there is the *Extension* of *Space*, and between *Yesterday* and *To-morrow*, the *Extension* of *Time*. But in this they differ, that all the parts of *Space* exist *at once* and *together*, while those of *Time* only exist *in Transition* or *Succession*^(a). Hence then we may gain some Idea of *TIME*, by considering it under

(a) See Vol. I. p. 275. Note XIII. To which we may add, what is said by *Ammonius*—ὁυδὲ γὰρ ὁ Χρόνος ἅμα ὑφίσταται, ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ μόνον τὸ ΝΥΝ· ἐν γὰρ τῇ γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει. *TIME* doth not subsist the whole at once, but only in a single *NOW* or *INSTANT*; for it hath its *Existence* in *becoming* and in *ceasing to be*. *Amm.* in *Predicam.* p. 82. b.

under the notion of *a transient Continuity*. Hence also, as far as the affections and properties of *Transition* go, Time is *different* from Space; but as to those of *Extension* and *Continuity*, they perfectly coincide.

LET us take, for example, such a part of Space, as a Line. In every given LINE we may assume any where *a Point*, and therefore in every given Line there may be assumed infinite Points. So in every given TIME we may assume any where *a Now* or *Instant*, and therefore in every given Time there may be assumed infinite *Nows* or *Instants*.

FARTHER still—A POINT is the Bound of every infinite Line; and A NOW or INSTANT, of every finite Time. But altho' they are Bounds, they are neither of them Parts, neither the Point of any Line, nor the Now or Instant of any Time. If this appear strange, we


C. VI.

may remember, that the *parts* of any thing *extended* are necessarily *extended* also, it being essential to their character, that they should measure their *Whole*. But if a *Point* or *Now* were *extended*, each of them would contain within itself *infinite* other *Points*, and *infinite* other *Nows* (for these may be assumed infinitely within the minutest *Extension*) and this, it is evident, would be absurd and impossible.

THESE assertions therefore being admitted, and both *Points* and *Nows* being taken as *Bounds*, but not as *Parts*^(b), it
will

(b) —φανερὸν ὅτι ὁδὶ μᾶλλον τὸ ΝΥΝ τῷ χρόνῳ, ὥστε δὲ αἱ στιγμαὶ τῆς γρημμῆς αἱ δὲ γρημμαι ὁδοὶ τῆς μίνας μέρη. It is evident that a *Now* or *Instant* is no more a part of *Time*, than *POINTS* are of a *Line*. The parts indeed of one *Line* are two other *Lines*. Natur. Ansc. L. IV. c. 17. And not long before—Τὸ δὲ ΝΥΝ ἐμὲ μέρη μετρεῖ τε γὰρ τὸ μέρη, καὶ σύγκειται δὲ τὸ ὅλον ἐν τῶν μερῶν ἐ δὲ ΧΡΟΝΟΣ ἐ δυνάμει σύγκειται ἐν τῶν ΝΥΝ. A *Now* is no *Part* of *Time*; for a *Part* is able to measure its *Whole*, and the *Whole* is necessarily made up of its *Parts*; but *True* doth not appear to be made up of *Nows*. Ibid. c. 14.

will follow, that in the same manner as *the same Point* may be the *End* of one Line, and the *Beginning* of another, so the *same Now* or *Instant* may be the *End* of one Time, and the *Beginning* of another. Let us suppose for example, the Lines, A B, B C.



I say that the Point B is the *End* of the Line A B, and the *Beginning* of the Line, B C. In the same manner let us suppose A B, B C to represent certain Times, and let B be a *Now* or *Instant*. In such case I say that the *Instant* B is the *End* of the Time A B, and the *Beginning* of the Time B C. I say likewise of these two Times, that with respect to the *Now* or *Instant*, which they include, the first of them is necessarily PAST TIME, as being *previous* to it;

C. VII. the other is necessarily FUTURE, as being *subsequent*. As therefore every NOW or INSTANT always exists in Time, and without being Time, is *Time's Bound*; the Bound of *Completion* to the *Past*, and the Bound of *Commencement* to the *Future*: from hence we may conceive its nature or end, which is *to be the Medium of Continuity between the Past and the Future, so as to render Time, thro' all its Parts, one Intire and Perfect Whole*^(c).

FROM the above speculations, there follow some conclusions, which may be perhaps called paradoxes, till they have been

(c) Τὸ δὲ ΝΥΝ ἐστὶ συνέχεια χρόνου. ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη. συνέχει γὰρ τὸν χρόνον, τὸν παρελθόντα καὶ ἰσόμενον, καὶ ὅλως πέραν χρόνον ἐς τὴν ἔτι γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἀρχὴν, τῷ δὲ τελειότη. A Now or Instant is (as was said before) the Continuity or holding together of Time; for it makes Time continuous, the past and the future, and is in general its boundary, as being the beginning of one Time and the ending of another. Natur. Auscult. L. IV. c. 19. Συνέχεια in this place means not Continuity, as standing for Extension, but rather that Junction or Holding together, by which Extension is imparted to other things.

been attentively considered. In the first C. VII.
 place *there cannot* (strictly speaking) *be*
any such Thing as Time present. For if
 all Time be *transient* as well as *continu-*
ous, it cannot like a Line be present all
 together, but part will necessarily be
 gone, and part be coming. If there-
 fore any portion of its continuity were
 to be present *at once*, it would so far
 quit its *transient* nature, and be *Time*
 no longer. But if no portion of its con-
 tinuity can be thus present, how can
Time possibly be *present*, to which such
 Continuity is essential,

FARTHER than this—If there be no
 such thing as *Time Present*, there can be
 no *Sensation of Time*, by any one of the
 senses. For ALL SENSATION is of the
 * *Present only*, the Past being preserved
 not by *Sense* but by *Memory*, and the
 Future being anticipated by *Prudence*
 only and wise *Foresight*.

BUT

* Ταυτῇ γὰρ (αισθήσει sc.) ὅτε τὸ μέλλον, ὅτε τὸ γιγνόμενον
 περιζόμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ παρὸν μόνον. Ἀριστ. περὶ Μνημ. Α. α.

C. VII.

BUT if *no Portion* of *Time* be the object of *any Sensation*; farther, if the *Present* *never* exist; if the *Past* be *no more*; if the *Future* be *not as yet*; and if these are all the parts, out of which *TIME* is compounded: how strange and shadowy a Being do we find it? How nearly approaching to a perfect Non-entity^(d)? Let us try however, since the senses fail us, if we have not faculties of higher power, to seize this fleeting Being.

THE World has been likened to a variety of Things, but it appears to resemble

(d) "Ὅτι μὲν ἔν ὅλῳς ἔκ ἐστιν, ἢ μόγις καὶ ἀμυδρῶς, ἐκ τῶν δὲ τις ἂν ὑποπτεύσει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἔκ ἐστι· τὸ δὲ μίλλαι, καὶ ἔκ ἐστιν ἐκ δὲ τέτων καὶ ὁ ἄπρητος καὶ ὁ αἰεὶ λαμβανόμενος χρόνος σύγκειται· τὸ δ' ἐκ μὴ ὄντων σύγκείμενον, ἀδύνατον ἂν δοξῆμεν κατίζειν ποτὲ ἕσσης. *That therefore TIME exists not at all, or at least has but a faint and obscure existence, one may suspect from hence. A part of it has been, and is no more; a part of it is coming, and is not as yet; and out of these is made that infinite Time, which is ever to be assumed still farther and farther. Now that which is made up of nothing but Non-entities, it should seem was impossible ever to participate of Entity.* Natural. Aus. L. IV. c. 14. See also Philop. M. S. Com. in Nicomach. p. 10.

ble no one more, than some moving C. VII.
spectacle (such as a procession or a triumph) that abounds in every part with splendid objects, some of which are still departing, as fast as others make their appearance. The Senses look on, while the sight passes, perceiving as much as is *immediately present*, which they report *with tolerable accuracy* to the Soul's superior powers. Having done this, they have done their duty, being concerned with nothing, save what is present and instantaneous. But to the *Memory*, to the *Imagination*, and above all to the *Intellect*, the several *Now's* or *Instant's* are not lost, as to the *Senses*, but are preserved and made objects of *steady* comprehension, however in their own nature they may be *transitory* and *passing*. "Now it is from contemplating two or more of these *Instant's* under one view, together with that Interval of Continuity, which subsists between them, that we acquire insensibly

C. VII. "sensibly the Idea of TIME^(c)." For example: *The Sun rises*; this I remember; *it rises again*; this too I remember. These Events are not together; there is an

(c) Τότε φαμέν γεγόνεσθαι χρόνον, ὅταν τῷ προτέρῳ καὶ ὑστέρῳ ἡ τῇ κινήσει αἰσθησιν λάβωμεν. Ὁρίζομεν δὲ τῷ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ἵππῳ λαβῶν αὐτὰ, καὶ μεταξὺ τι αὐτῶν ἕτερον ὅταν γὰρ τὰ ἄκρα ἕτερον τῷ μίσει νοήσωμεν, καὶ δύο ἵπποι ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ΝΤΝ, τὸ μὲν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τῷτο φαμέν εἶναι ΧΡΟΝΟΝ. *If it is then we say there has been TIME, when we can acquire a Sensation of prior and subsequent in Motion. But we distinguish and settle these two, by considering one first, then the other, together with an interval between them different from both. For as often as we conceive the Extremes to be different from the Mean, and the Soul talks of two Nows, one prior and the other subsequent, then it is we say there is TIME, and this it is we call TIME.* Natural. Auscult. L. IV. c. 16. Themistius's Comment upon this passage is to the same purpose. "Ὅταν γὰρ ὁ νῦν ἀναμνησθεῖς τῷ ΝΤΝ, ὁ χρόνος ἵππῳ, ἕτερον πάλιν ἵππῳ τὸ τήμερον, τότε καὶ χρόνον ἐνθὺς ἐνεόησεν, ὑπὸ τῶν δύο ΝΤΝ ὁρίζομενον, οἷον ὑπὸ περὶ αὐτῶν δυοῖν καὶ ἑτῷ λέγειν ἔχει, ὅτι πρὸς ἐς πεντεκάδεκα ὥρῶν, ἢ ἐκκαίδεκα, οἷον ἐξ ἀπείρου γεγραμμῆς πηχυαίαν δύο σημείοις ἀποτεμνόμενον." *For when the Mind, remembering the Now, which it talked of yesterday, talks again of another Now to-day, then it is it immediately has an idea of TIME, terminated by these two Nows, as by two Boundaries; and thus it is enabled to say, that the Quantity is of fifteen, or of sixteen hours, as if it were to sever a Cubit's length from an infinite Line by two Points.* Themist. Op. edit. Aldi. p. 45. b.

For an *Extension* between them—not however of *Space*, for we may suppose the place of rising the same, or at least to exhibit no sensible difference. Yet still we recognize *some* Extension between them. Now what is this Extension, *but a natural Day*? And what is that, *but pure Time*? It is after the same manner, by recognizing two new Moons, and the Extension between these: two vernal Equinoxes, and the Extension between these; that we gain Ideas of other Times, such as *Months* and *Years*, which are all so many Intervals, described as above; that is to say, *passing Intervals of Continuity between two Instants viewed together*.

AND thus it is THE MIND acquires the Idea of TIME. But this Time it must be remembered is PAST TIME ONLY, which is always the *first Species*, that occurs to the human intellect. How then do we acquire the Idea of TIME FUTURE? The answer is, we acquire it by *Anticipation*. Should it be

C. VII. *be demanded still farther, And what is Anticipation?* We answer, that in this case it is a kind of reasoning by analogy from similar to similar; from successions of events, that are past already, to similar successions, that are presumed hereafter. For example: I observe as far back as my memory can carry me, how every day has been succeeded by a night; that night, by another day; that day, by another night; and so downwards in order to the Day that is now. Hence then I *anticipate a similar succession* from the present Day, and thus gain the Idea of days and nights *in futurity*. After the same manner, by attending to the periodical returns of New and Full Moons; of Springs, Summers, Autumns and Winters, all of which in Time past I find never to have failed, I *anticipate a like orderly and diversified succession*, which makes Months, and Seasons, and Years, *in Time future*.

WE go farther than this, and not only thus anticipate in these *natural* Pe-
riods

periods, but even in matters of *human* and *civil* concern. For example: Having observed in many past instances how health had succeeded to exercise, and sickness to sloth; we anticipate *future* health to those, who, being *now* sickly, use exercise; and *future* sickness to those, who, being *now* healthy, are slothful. It is a variety of such observations, all respecting one subject, which when systematized by just reasoning, and made habitual by due practice, form the character of a Master-Artist, or Man of *practical* Wisdom. If they respect the human body (as above) they form the Physician; if matters military, the General; if matters national, the statesman; if matters of private life, the Moralist; and the same in other subjects. All these several characters in their respective ways may be said to possess a kind of prophetic discernment, which not only presents them the *barren prospect* of futurity (a prospect not hid from the meanest of men) but shews withal those events, which
are

C. VII. are likely to attend it, and thus enables
them to act with superior certainty and
rectitude. And hence it is, that (if we
except those, who have had diviner as-
sistances) we may justly say, as was
said of old,

*He's the best Prophet, who conjectures
 well.(f).*

FROM

(f) Μάρτυς δ' ἄριστος, ὅστις ἐκάζει καλῶς.

So Milton,

Till old Experience do attain

To something like Prophetic Strain:

*Et facile existimari potest, Prudentiam esse quodam-
 modo Divinationem.*

Corn. Nep. in Vit. Attici.

There is nothing appears so clearly an object of the
 MIND or INTELLECT only, as the *Future* does, since we
 can find no place for its existence any where else. Not
 but the same, if we consider, is equally true of the *Past*.
 For though it may have once had another kind of being,
 when (according to common Phrase) it *actually was*, yet
 was it then something *Present*, and not something *Past*.
As Past, it has no existence but in THE MIND or MEMORY,
 since had it in fact any other, it could not properly be
 called Past. It was this intimate connection between
 TIME, and the SOUL, that made some Philosophers doubt
 whether if there was no Soul, there could be any Time,
 since Time appears to have its being in no other region.
 Πότερον δὲ μὴ ὅστις ψυχῆς ἐστὶν αὖ ὁ χρόνος, ἀποξήσταν αὖ τις, κ.
 τ. λ.

FROM what has been reasoned it appears, that knowledge of *the Future* comes from knowledge of *the Past*; as does knowledge of *the Past* from knowledge of *the Present*, so that their Order to us is that of PRESENT, PAST, and FUTURE. C. VII.

OF these Species of knowledge, that of the *Present* is the lowest, not only as *first in perception*, but as far the more extensive, being necessarily common to all *animal* Beings, and reaching even to Zoophytes, as far as they possess *Sensation*. Knowledge of *the Past* comes next, which is superior to the *former*, as being confined to those animals, that have *Memory* as well as *Senses*. Knowledge of

τ. λ. Natur. Auscult. L. IV. c. 20. *Themistius*, who comments the above passage, expresses himself more positively. Εἰ τοίνυν διχῶς λέγεται τότε ἀριθμητὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριθμῆ-
 μινον, τὸ μὲν τὸ ἀριθμητὸν δηλαδὴ δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ενεργείᾳ, ταῦτα
 ἢ ἔκ ἀν' ὑποστάσεως, μὴ ὅντος τῆ ἀριθμῆσαντος μήτε δυνάμει μήτε
 ενεργείᾳ, φανερὸν ὡς οὐκ ἀν' ὁ χρόνος εἶναι, μὴ ὅσης ψυχῆς. Them.
 p. 48. Edit. Aldi. Vid. etiam ejusd. Comm. in Lib. de
 An. p. 94.

C. VII. of *the Future* comes last, as being derived from the other two, and which is for that reason *the most excellent* as well as *the most rare*, since Nature in her superadditions rises from worse always to better, and is never found to sink from better down to worse*.

Arist. de
An. II.
3. p. 28.


AND now having seen, how we acquire the knowledge of *Time past*, and *Time future*; which is first in perception, which first in dignity; which more common, which more rare; let us compare them both to the *present Now* or *Instant*, and examine what relations they maintain towards it.

IN the first place there may be *Times* both *past* and *future*, in which the *present Now* has no existence, as for example in *Yesterday*, and *To-morrow*.

AGAIN, *the present Now* may so far belong to *Time* of either sort, as to be *the*

* See below, Note (r) of this Chapter.

the End of the past, and *the Beginning* C. VII.
of the future ; but it cannot be included
within the limits of either. For if it
were possible, let us suppose C the *pre-*
sent Now included



within the limits of the *past Time* AD.
In such case CD, part of the *past Time*
AD, will be subsequent to C the *present*
Now, and so of course be *future*. But
by the Hypothesis it is *past*, and so will
be both Past and Future at once, which
is absurd. In the same manner we
prove that C cannot be included within
the limits of a *future Time*, such as BE.

WHAT then shall we say of such
Times, as *this Day*, *this Month*, *this*
Year, *this Century*, all which include
within them *the present Now* ? They


C. VII.

cannot be *past Times* or *future*, from what has been proved ; and *present Time* has no existence, as has been proved likewise*. Or shall we allow them to be present, from the present *Now*, which exists within them ; so that from the presence of that we call *these* also present, tho' the shortest among them has infinite parts always absent ? If so, and in conformity to custom we allow such *Times present*, as present Days, Months, Years, and Centuries, each must of necessity be a compound of the Past and the Future, divided from each other by some present Now, or Instant, and jointly called PRESENT, while that *Now* remains within them. Let us suppose for example the Time XY, which

$f \dots \underline{X \ A \ B \ C \ D \ E \ Y} \dots g$

let

* Sup. p. 104.

let us call a Day, or a Century ; and let C. VII.
the present *Now* or *Instant* exist at A. 
I say, in as much as A exists within
XY, that therefore XA is Time past,
and AY Time future, and the whole
XA,AY, *Time Present*. The same holds,
if we suppose the present Now to exist
at B, or C, or D, or E, or any where
before Y. When the present Now
exists at Y, then is the whole XY *Time*
past, and still more so, when the Now
gets to g, or onwards. In like manner
before the Present Now entered X, as
for example when it was at f, then was
the whole XY *Time future* ; it was the
same, when the present Now was at X.
When it had past that, then XY be-
came *Time present*. And thus it is that
TIME is PRESENT, while passing, in its
PRESENT NOW or INSTANT. It is the
same indeed here, as it is in *Space*. A
Sphere passing over a Plane, and being
for that reason present to it, is only pre-
sent to that Plane in a single Point at

H E R M E S.

Place, while during the whole progression its parts absent are *infinite(s)*.

FROM what has been said, we may perceive that ALL TIME, of every denomination

(s) PLACE, according to the antients, was either mediate or immediate. I am (for example) in *Europe*, because I am in *England*; in *England*, because in *Wiltshire*; in *Wiltshire*, because in *Salisbury*; in *Salisbury*, because in my own house; in my own house, because in my study. Thus far *MEDIATE PLACE*. And what is my *IMMEDIATE PLACE*? It is the internal Bound of that containing Body (whatever it be) which co-incides with the external Bound of my own Body. Τὸ ἐντὶ ἑαυτοῦ ὡς ἐστὶν, καὶ ὁ ὡς ἐστὶν τὸ ἐντὶ ἑαυτοῦ. Now as this immediate Place is included within the limits of all the former Places, it is from this relation that those mediate Places also are called each of them my Place, tho' the least among them so far exceed my magnitude. To apply this to TIME. The *Present Century* is present in the *present Year*; that, in the *present Month*; that, in the *present Day*; that, in the *present Hour*; that, in the *present Minute*. It is thus by circumscription within circumscription that we arrive at THAT REAL AND INDIVISIBLE INSTANT, which by being itself the very *Essence of the Present*, diffuses PRESENCE throughout all even the largest

mination, is divisible and extended. But C. VII.
 if so, then whenever we suppose a *de-*
finite Time, even though it be a *Time*
present, it must needs have a *Beginning*,
 a *Middle*, and an *End*. And so much
 for *TIME*.

Now from the above doctrine of
TIME, we propose by way of Hypo-
 thesis the following Theorie of *TENSES*.

THE TENSES are used to mark Pre-
 sent, Past, and Future Time, either
indefinitely without reference to any

I 4 Beginning,

largest of Times, which are found to include it within
 their respective limits. *Nicephorus Blommides* speaks
 much to the same purpose. Ἐπεὶ ὅς ἐστι χρόνος ἰσὺν ὁ ἐφ'
 ἐκάτερα παρεκκείμενος τῷ κυρίῳ ΝΥΝ· χρόνος μικρὸς, ἐκ παρε-
 λουθότος ἢ μίλλοντος συνεξῶς, ἢ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ κυρίῳ ΝΥΝ
 γαίησιν, ΝΥΝ λεγόμενος ἢ αὐτός. *PRESENT TIME therefore*
is that which adjoins to the REAL NOW or INSTANT on
either side, being a limited Time made up of Past and
Future, and from its vicinity to that REAL NOW said to
be Now also itself. Ἐπιφ. φυσικῆς Κεφ. θ'. See also *Arist.*
Physic. L. VI. c. 2, 3, &c.

C. VII. Beginning, Middle, or End ; or ~~else~~ definitely, in reference to such distinctions.

If *indefinitely*, then have we THREE TENSES, an Aorist of the Present, an Aorist of the Past, and an Aorist of the Future. If *definitely*, then have we three Tenses to mark the *Beginnings* of these three Times ; three, to denote their *Middles* ; and three to denote their *Ends* ; in all NINE.

THE three first of these Tenses we call the Inceptive Present, the Inceptive Past, and the Inceptive Future ; The three next, the Middle Present, the Middle Past, and the Middle Future. And the three last, the Compleitive Present, the Compleitive Past, and the Compleitive Future.

AND thus it is, that the TENSES in their natural number appear to be
TWELVE ;

TWELVE; *three* to denote *Time absolute*, C. VII, and *nine* to denote it *under its respective distinctions*.

Aorist of the Present.

Γράφω. *Scribo*. I write.

Aorist of the Past.

Ἐγγραψα. *Scriptsi*. I wrote.

Aorist of the Future.

Γράψω. *Scribam*. I shall write.

Inceptive Present.

Μέλλω γράφειν. *Scripturus sum*. I am going to write.

Middle or extended Present.

Τυγχάνω γράφων. *Scribo* or *Scribens sum*. I am writing.

Completive Present.

Ἐγγραφα. *Scriptsi*. I have written.

Inceptive Past.

Ἐμελλον γράφειν. *Scripturas eram*. I was beginning to write.

Middle

C. VII.

Middle or extended Past.

Ἐγραφον or ἐτύγγανον γράφω. *Scribe-*
bam. I was writing.

Completive Past.

Ἐγεγράφειν. *Scripseram.* I had done
writing.

Inceptive Future.

Μελλήσω γράφειν. *Scripturus ero.* I
shall be beginning to write.

Middle or extended Future.

Ἐσομαι γράφω. *Scribens ero.* I shall
be writing.

Completive Future.

Ἐσομαι γεγραφώς. *Scripsero.* I shall
have done writing.

It is not to be expected that the above
Hypothesis should be justified through
all instances in every language. It fares

with Tenses, as with other affections of speech; be the Language upon the whole ever so perfect, much must be left, in defiance of all analogy, to the harsh laws of mere authority and chance. C. VII.

It may not however be improper to inquire, what traces may be discovered in favour of this system, either in languages themselves, or in those authors who have written upon this part of Grammar, or lastly in the nature and reason of things.

IN the first place, as to AORISTS. *Aorists* are usually by Grammarians referred to the Past: such are ἦλθον, *I went*; ἔπεσον, *I fell*; &c. We seldom hear of them in the Future, and more rarely still in the Present. Yet it seems agreeable to reason, that wherever Time is signified without any farther circumscription, than that of Simple present, past, or future, the Tense is AN AORIST.

THUS

C. VII.

THUS Milton,

*Millions of spiritual creatures WALK the
earth*

*Unseen, both when we wake, and when we
sleep, P. L. IV. 277.*

Here the verb (WALK) means not that they were walking *at that instant only*, when Adam spoke, but ἀορίσως indefinitely, take any instant whatever. So when the same author calls *Hypocrisy*,

—*the only Evil, that WALKS
Invisible, except to God alone,*

the Verb (WALKS) hath the like *auristical* or *indefinite application*. The same may be said in general of all Sentences of the *Gnomologic* kind, such as

*Ad pœnitendum PROPERAT, cito qui
judicat.*

*Avarus, nisi cum moritur, nil recte
FACIT, &c.*

ALL

ALL these Tenses are so many C. VII.
AORISTS OF THE PRESENT.

Gnomologic Sentences after the same manner make likewise AORISTS OF THE FUTURE.

*Tu nihil ADMITTES in te, formidine
pænæ.* Hor.

So too *Legislative* Sentences, *Thou SHALT not kill, Thou SHALT not steal, &c.* for this means no one *particular* future Time, but is a prohibition extended *indefinitely* to every part of Time future^(A).

W_E

(A) The *Latin* Tongue appears to be more than ordinarily deficient, as to the article of *Aorists*. It has no peculiar form even for an *Aorist of the Past*, and therefore (as *Priscian* tells us) the *Præteritum* is forced to do the double duty both of *that Aorist*, and of the *perfect Present*, its application in particular instances being to be gathered from the Context. Thus it is that *FECI* means (as the same author informs us) both *ἔτελεκα* and *ἔποινα*, *I have done it*, and *I did it*; *VIDI* both

C. VII. WE pass from *Aorists*, to THE IN-
CEPTIVE TENSES.

THESE may be found in part supplied (like many other Tenses) by verbs auxiliar. ΜΕΛΛΩ γράφειν. *Scripturus sum*. I AM GOING *to write*. But the *Latins* go farther, and have a species of Verbs, derived from others, which do the duty of these Tenses, and are themselves for that reason called *Inchoatives* or *Inceptives*. Thus from *Caleo*, *I am warm*, comes *Calesco*, *I begin to grow warm*; from *Tumeo*, *I swell*, comes *Tumesco*, *I begin to swell*. These *Inchoative* Verbs are so peculiarly appropriated to the *Beginnings* of Time, that they are defective as to all Tenses, which denote it in its *Completion*, and therefore have neither *Perfectum*, *Plus quam-perfectum*, or *Perfect Future*.
There

both ἰδῆαται and ἰδὼν, *I have just seen it*, and *I saw it once*. *Prisc. Gram. L. VIII. p. 814, 838. Edit. Putsch.*

There is likewise a species of Verbs C. VII.
 called in *Greek* Ἐφ'ετικά, in *Latin* *Desiderativa*, the *Desideratives* or *Meditatives*, which if they are not strictly *Inceptives*, yet both in *Greek* and *Latin* have a near affinity with them. Such are πολεμῶ, *Bellaturio*, *I have a desire to make war*; βρωῶ, *Esurio*, *I long to eat*⁽ⁱ⁾. And so much for THE INCEPTIVE TENSES.

THE two last orders of Tenses which remain, are those we called^(k) THE MIDDLE TENSES (which express Time as extended and passing) and the PERFECT OR

⁽ⁱ⁾ As all *Beginnings* have reference to what is future, hence we see how properly these Verbs are formed, the *Greek* ones from a future Verb, the *Latin* from a future Participle. From πολεμήσω and βρώσω come πολεμῶ and βρωῶ; from *Bellaturus* and *Esurus* come *Bellaturio* and *Esurio*. See *Macrobius*, p. 691. Ed. Var. ὡς ἂν γὰρ ἐν δὲ ΓΕΛΑΣΣΕΙΟΝΤΑ ἐπύθησας γιλάσαι. Plato in *Phædone*.

^(k) Care must be taken not to confound these *middle* Tenses, with the Tenses of those Verbs, which bear the same name among *Grammarians*.

C. VII. or **COMPLETIVE**, which express its
Completion or End.

Now for these the authorities are many. They have been acknowledged already in the ingenious *Accidence* of Mr. *Hoadly*, and explained and confirmed by Dr. *Samuel Clarke*, in his rational edition of *Homer's Iliad*. Nay, long before either of these, we find the same scheme in *Scaliger*, and by him⁽¹⁾ ascribed to †*Grocinus*, as its author. The learned *Gaza*
 (who

⁽¹⁾ *Ex his percipimus Grocinum acutè admodum Tempora divisisse, sed minus commodè. Tria enim constituit, ut nos, sed quæ bifariam secat, Perfectum & Imperfectum: sic, Præteritum imperfectum, Amabam: Præteritum perfectum, Amaveram. Rectè sanè. Et Præsens imperfectum, Amo. Recte hæcenus; continuat enim amorem, neque absolvit. At Præsens perfectum, Amavi: quis hoc dicat?—De Futuro autem ut non malè sentit, ita contrarium est. Futurum, inquit, imperfectum, Amabo: Perfectum, Amavero. Non malè, inquam: significat enim Amavero, amorem futurum & absolutum iri: Amabo perfectionem nullam indicat. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 113.*


† His name was *William Grocin*, an *Englishman*, contemporary with *Erasmus*, and celebrated for his learning. He went to *Florence* to study under *Landin*, and was Professor at *Oxford*. *Spec. Lit. Flor.* p. 205.

(who was himself a *Greek*, and one of the ablest restorers of that language in the western world) characterizes the Tenses in nearly the same manner^(m). What *Apollonius* hints, is exactly consonant⁽ⁿ⁾. *Priscian* too advances the same

C. VII.

(m) THE PRESENT TENSE (as this author informs us in his excellent Grammar) denotes τὸ ἐνεσάμενον καὶ ἀτελὲς, *that which is now Instant and incomplete*; THE PERFECTUM, τὸ παρεληλυθὸς ἄρτι, καὶ ἐντελὲς τῷ ἐνεσῶτος, *that which is now immediately past, and is the Completion of the Present*; THE IMPERFECTUM, τὸ παρατεταμένον καὶ ἀτελὲς τῷ παρερχομένῳ, *the extended and incomplete part of the Past*; and THE PLUSQUAM-PERFECTUM, τὸ παρεληλυθὸς πάλαι, καὶ ἐντελὲς τῷ παρακειμένῳ, *that which is past long ago, and is the completion of the præteritum.* Gram. L. IV.

(n) Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πιθόμεθα, ὅτι ὁ παρερχομένῳ συντίλειαν σημαίνει ὁ παρακειμένος, τὴν γε μὴν ἐνεσῶσαν—Hence we are persuaded that the Perfectum doth not signify the completion of the Past, but PRESENT COMPLETION. *Apollon.* L. III. c. 6. The Reason, which persuaded him to this opinion, was the application and use of the Particle *ἄν*, of which he was then treating, and which, as it denoted *Potentiality* or *Contingence*, would assort (he says) with any of the passing, extended, and incomplete Tenses, but never with this PERFECTUM, because this implied such a complete and indefeasible existence, as never to be qualified into the nature of a *Contingent*.

C. VII.  same doctrine from the *Stoics*, whose authority we esteem greater than all the rest, not only from the more early age when they lived, but from their superior skill in Philosophy, and their peculiar attachment to *Dialectic*, which naturally led them to great accuracy in these *Grammatical Speculations*^(o).

BEFORE

(o) By these Philosophers the *vulgar present Tense* was called the IMPERFECT PRESENT, and the *vulgar Præteritum*, the PERFECT PRESENT, than which nothing can be more consonant to the system that we favour. But let us hear *Priscian*, from whom we learn these facts.—*PRÆSENS TEMPUS proprie dicitur, cujus pars jam præteriit, pars futura est. Cum enim Tempus, fluxu more, instabili volvatur cursu, vix punctum habere potest in præsentī, hoc est, in instanti. Maxima igitur pars ejus (sicut dictum est) vel præteriit vel futura est. Unde STOICI jure hoc TEMPUS PRÆSENS etiam IMPERFECTUM vocabant (ut dictum est) eo quod prior ejus pars, quæ præteriit, transacta est, deest autem sequens, id est, futura. Ut si in medio versu dicam scribo versum, priore ejus parte scriptā; cui adhuc deest extrema pars, præsentī ulor verbo, dicendo, scribo versum: sed IMPERFECTUM est, quod deest adhuc versui, quod scribatur—Ex eodem igitur Præsenti nascitur etiam Perfectum. Si enim ad finem perveniat inceptum, statim utimur PRÆTERITO PERFECTO; continuo enim, scripta*
** ad*

BEFORE we conclude, we shall add a few miscellaneous observations, which will be more easily intelligible from the hypothesis here advanced, and serve withal to confirm its truth. C. VII.

AND first, the *Latins* used their *Præteritum Perfectum* in some instances after a very peculiar manner, so as to imply the very reverse of the verb in its natural signification. Thus, *VIXIT*, signified, IS DEAD; *UIT*, signified, NOW IS NOT, IS NO MORE. It was in this sense that *Cicero* addressed the people of *Rome*, when he had put to death the leaders in the *Catalinarian* Conspiracy. He appeared in the Forum, and cried

K 2

out

ad finem versu, dico, scripsi versum.—And soon after speaking of the *Latin Perfectum*, he says—*sciendum tamen, quod Romani PRÆTERITO PERFECTO non solum in re modo completa utuntur, (in qua vim habet ejus, qui apud Græcos παρακείμενος vocatur, quem STŒICI ΤΕΛΕΙΟΝ ΕΝΕΣΤΟΤΑ nominaverunt) sed etiam pro Ἀορίστῳ accipitur,* &c. Lib. VIII. p. 812, 813, 814.

C. VII. out with a loud voice, *VIXERUNT.—
So VIRGIL,

— ||FUIMUS Troes, FUIT Ilium &
ingens

Gloria Dardanidum— Æn. II.
And

* So among the Romans, when in a Cause all the Pleaders had spoken, the Cryer used to proclaim DIXERUNT, i. e. they have done speaking. Ascon. Ped. in Verr. II.

|| So TULLUS speaking of certain Prodigies and evil Omens.

*Hæc fuerint olim. Sed tu, jam mittis, Apollo,
Prodigia indomitæ merge sub aquoribus.*

Eleg. II. 5. ver. 19.

*Let these Events HAVE BEEN in days of old;—by Implication therefore—But HENCEFORTH let them be no more.
So ENCEAS in Virgil prays to Phæbus.*

Hæc Trojana tenus fuerit fortuna secuta.

Let Trojan Fortune (that is, adverse, like that of Troy, and its inhabitants,) HAVE so far FOLLOWED us. By implication therefore, but let it follow us no farther, Here let it end, Hic sit Finis, as Servius well observes in the place.

In which instances, by the way, mark not only the force of the Tense, but of the Mood, the PRECATIVE or IMPERATIVE, not in the Future but in the PAST. See p. 154, 155, 156.

And again,

C. VII.

—*Locus Ardea quondam**Dictus avis, & nunc magnum manet
Ardea nomen,***Sed fortuna* FUIT— Æn. VII.

THE reason of these significations is derived from THE COMPLETIVE POWER of the Tense here mentioned. We see that the periods of Nature, and of human affairs, are maintained by the reciprocal succession of *Contraries*. It is thus with Calm and Tempest; with Day and Night; with Prosperity and Adversity; with Glory and Ignominy; with Life and Death. Hence then, in the instances above, the *completion* of one contrary is put for the *commencement* of the other, and to say, HATH LIVED, OR HATH BEEN, has the same meaning with, IS DEAD, or, IS NO MORE.

K 3

IT

* *Certus in hospitibus non est amor; errat, ut ipsi:**Cumque nihil speres firmitus esse, FUIT.*

Epist. Ovid. Helen. Paridi. ver. 190.

Sive erimus, seu nos Fata FUISSE volent.

Tibull. III. 5. 32

C. VII.

It is remarkable in **Virgil*, that he frequently joins in the same sentence this, *complete* and *perfect Present* with the *extended* and *passing Present*; which proves that he considered the two, as belonging to the same species of *Time*, and therefore naturally formed to co-incide, with each other.

—*Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens
Scorpius, & cœli justâ plus parte reliquit.*

G. I.

Terra tremit; fugere feræ—

G. I.

*Præsertim si tempestas a vertice sylvis
Incubuit, glomeratque ferens incendia
ventus.*

G. II.

—*illa noto citius, volucrique sagittâ,
Ad terram fugit, & portu se condidit
alto.*

Æn. V.

IN

* See also *Spenser's Fairy Queen*, B. I. C. 3. St. 19.
C. 3. St. 39. C. 8. St. 9.

*He hath his Shield redeem'd, and forth his sword he
draws.*

IN the same manner he joins the C. VII.
 same two modifications of *Time in the*
Past, that is to say, the *complete* and
perfect Past with the *extended* and *pas-*
sing.

—Inruerant *Danai*, & *tectum omne*
tenebant. Æn. II.

Tres imbris torti radios, tres nubis aquosæ,
Addiderant rutili tres ignis, & alitis
austri.

Fulgores nunc terrificos, sonitumque me-
tumque

Miscebant operi, flammisquæ sequacibus
iras (P). Æn. VIII.

K 4

As

(P) The intention of *Virgil* may be better seen, in ren-
 dering one or two of the above passages into *English*.

—*Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens*

Scorpius et cæli justâ plus parte reliquit.

For thee the scorpion IS NOW CONTRACTING *his claws*, and
 HATH ALREADY LEFT *thee more than a just portion of*
Heaven. The Poet, from a high strain of poetic adula-
 tion, supposes the scorpion so desirous of admitting *Au-*
gustus among the heavenly signs, that though he *has alrea-*
dy made him more than room enough, yet he *still continues*
 to

C. VII. As to the IMPERFECTUM, it is sometimes employed to denote what is *usual* and *customary*. Thus *surgebat* and *scribebat* signify not only, *he was rising, he was writing*, but upon occasion they signify, *he USED to rise, he USED to write*. The reason of this is, that whatever is *customary*, must be something which has been *frequently repeated*. But what has been *frequently repeated*, must needs require an *Extension of Time past*, and thus we fall insensibly into the TENSE here mentioned.

AGAIN,

to be making him more. Here then we have two acts, one *perfect*, the other *pending*, and hence the use of the two different Tenses. Some editions read *relinquit*; but *relinquit* has the authority of the celebrated *Medicean manuscript*.

—*Illa noto citius, volucrique sagittâ,
Ad terram fugit, & portu se condidit alto.*

The ship, quicker than the wind, or a swift arrow, CONTINUES FLYING to land, and is HID within the lofty harbour. We may suppose this Harbour, (like many others) to have been surrounded with high Land. Hence the Vessel, immediately on entering it, was completely hid from those spectators who had gone out to see the Ship-
race,

AGAIN, we are told by *Pliny* (whose authority likewise is confirmed by many gems and marbles still extant) that the ancient painters and sculptors, when they fixed their names to their works, did it *pendenti titulo, in a suspensive kind of Inscription*, and employed for that purpose the Tense here mentioned. It was Ἀπελλῆς ἐποίει, *Apelles faciebat*, Πολύκλειτος ἐποίει, *Polycletus faciebat*, and never ἐποίησε or *fecit*. By this they imagined that they avoided the shew of arrogance, and had in case of censure an apology (as it were) prepared, since it appeared from the work itself, that it was once indeed in hand, but no pretension that it was ever finished⁽¹⁾.

It

race, but yet might still continue sailing towards the shore within.

—Inruerant *Danai*, & tectum omne tenebant.

The Greeks HAD ENTERED and WERE THEN POSSESSING the whole house; as much as to say, they had entered, and that was over, but their Possession continued still.

⁽¹⁾ *Plin. Nat. Hist. L. I.* The first Printers (who were most of them Scholars and Critics) in imitation of the antient

C. VII.

It is remarkable that the very manner, in which the *Latins* derive these Tenses from one another, shews a plain reference to the system here advanced. From the *passing Present* come the *passing Past*, and *Future*. *Scribo, Scribesbam, Scribam*. From the *perfect Present* come the *perfect Past*, and *Future*. *Scripti, Scripseram, Scripsero*. And so in all instances, even where the verbs are irregular, as from *Fero* come *Ferebam* and *Feram*; from *Tuli* come *Tuloram* and *Tulero*.

We shall conclude by observing, that the ORDER of the Tenses, as they stand ranged by the old Grammarians, is not a fortuitous Order, but is consonant to our perceptions, in the recognition of Time, according to what we have explained

antient Artists used the same Tense. *Excudebat H. Stephanus. Excudebat Guil. Morelius. Absolvebat Joan. Benenatus*, which has been followed by Dr. Taylor in his late valuable edition of *Demosthenes*.

plained already^(r). Hence it is, that C. VII.
 the *Present Tense* stands first; then the
Past Tenses; and lastly the *Future*.

AND now, having seen what authorities there are for Aorists, or those Tenses, which denote Time *indefinitely*; and what for those Tenses, opposed to Aorists, which mark it definitely, (such as the Inceptive, the Middle, and the Compleitive) we here finish the subject of TIME and TENSES, and proceed to consider THE VERB IN OTHER ATTRIBUTES, which it will be necessary to deduce from other principles.

CHAP.

^(r) See before p. 109, 110, 111, 112, 113. Scaliger's observation upon this occasion is elegant.—*Ordo autem (Temporum scil.) aliter est, quam natura eorum. Quod enim præterit, prius est, quam quod est, itaque primo loco debere poni videbatur. Verum, quod primo quoque tempore offertur nobis, id creat primas species in animo: quamobrem Præsens Tempus primum locum occupavit; est enim commune omnibus animalibus. Præteritum autem iis tantum, quæ memoriâ prædita sunt. Futurum vero etiam paucioribus, quippe quibus datum est prudentiæ officium. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 113. See also Senecæ Epist. 124. Mutum animal sensu comprehendit præsentia; præteritorum, &c.*

CHAP. VIII.

Concerning Modes.

C. VIII. **W**E have observed already ^(a) that the Soul's leading powers are those of *Perception* and those of *Volition*, which words we have taken in their most comprehensive acceptation. We have observed also, that *all Speech or Discourse* is a *publishing* or exhibiting some part of our soul, either a certain *Perception*, or a certain *Volition*. Hence, then, according as we exhibit it either in a *different part*, or after a *different manner*, hence I say the variety of *MODES* or *MOODS*^(b).

IF

(a) See Chap. II.

(b) *Gaza* defines a Mode exactly consonant to this doctrine. He says it is—βέλημα, ἢ ἢ ἐν πάθημα ψυχῆς, διὰ φωνῆς σημαίνον—*a Volition or Affection of the Soul, signified through some Voice or Sound articulate*. Gram. L. IV. As therefore this is the nature of Modes, and Modes belong to Verbs, hence it is *Apollonius* observes—

ταῖς

IF we simply *declare*, or *indicate* something to be, or not to be, (whether a Perception or Volition it is equally the same) this constitutes that Mode called the DECLARATIVE OR INDICATIVE. C. VIII.

A Perception.


—*Nosco crines, incanaque menta
Regis Romani*—— Virg. *Æn.* VI.

A Volition.

*In nova fert animus mutatas dicere
formas*
Corpora—— Ovid. *Metam.* I.

IF we do not strictly assert, as of something absolute and certain, but as of something *possible* only, and in the number of *Contingents*, this makes that Mode, which Grammarians call the
POTEN-

τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἰξαιρίτως παρακίται ἡ ψυχικὴ διάθεσις—the
Soul's disposition is in an eminent degree attached to Verbs.
De Synt. L. III. c. 13. Thus too Priscian: *Modi sunt
diversæ INCLINATIONES ANIMI, quas varia consequitur
DECLINATIO VERBI.* L. VIII. p. 821.

C. VIII.  **POTENTIAL**; and which becomes on such occasions the leading Mode of the sentence.

Sed tacitus pasci si posset Corvus, HABERET
Plus dapis, &c. Hor.

YET sometimes it is not the leading Mode, but only *subjoined* to the Indicative. In such case, it is mostly used to denote the *End*, or *final Cause*; which End, as in human Life it is always a Contingent, and may never perhaps happen in despite of all our foresight, is therefore exprest most naturally by the Mode here mentioned. For example,

Ut JUGULENT homines, surgunt de nocte latrones. HOR.
Thieves rise by night, that they may cut mens throats.

HERE that they rise, is *positively asserted* in the *Declarative* or *Indicative* Mode;

Mode; but as to their *cutting mens throats*, this is only delivered *potentially*, because how truly soever it may be the *End* of their rising, it is still but a *Contingent*, that may never perhaps happen. This Mode, as often as it is in this manner subjoined, is called by Grammarians not the Potential, but the SUBJUNCTIVE.

BUT it so happens, in the constitution of human affairs, that it is not always sufficient merely *to declare ourselves* to others. We find it often expedient, from a consciousness of our inability, to address them after a manner more interesting to ourselves, whether to have *some Perception informed*, or *some Volition gratified*. Hence then new Modes of speaking; if we *interrogate*, it is the INTERROGATIVE MODE; if we *require*, it is the REQUISITIVE. Even the Requisite itself hath its *subordinate Species*: With respect to inferiors, it is an IMPERATIVE MODE; with respect to

C. VIII. to equals and superiors, it is a **PRECATIVE** or **OPTATIVE**.*

AND thus have we established a variety of Modes ; the **INDICATIVE** or **DECLARATIVE**, *to assert what we think certain* ; the **POTENTIAL**, *for the Purposes of whatever we think Contingent* ; the **INTERROGATIVE**, *when we are doubtful, to procure us Information* ; and the **REQUISITIVE**, *to assist us in the gratification of our Volitions*. The Requisite too appears under too distinct species, either as it is **IMPERATIVE** to inferiors, or **PRECATIVE** to superiors^(c).

As

* It was the confounding of this Distinction, that gave rise to a Sophism of *Protagoras*. *Homer* (says he) in beginning his *Iliad* with—*Sing, Muse, the Wrath,*—When he thinks to *pray*, in reality *commands*. *ἐυχεται λόγιμος, ἐπιτάττει*. *Aristot. Poet. c. 19*. The solution is evident from the Division here established, the Grammatical form being in both cases the same.

^(c) The Species of *Modes* in great measure depend on the Species of *Sentences*. The *Stoics* increased the number of *Sentences* far beyond the *Peripatetics*. Besides those mentioned in Chapter II. Note (b) they had many

As therefore all these several Modes C VIII.
 have their foundation in nature, so have
 certain

many more, as may be seen in *Ammonius de Interpret.* p. 4. and *Diogenes Laertius*, L. VII. 66. The Peripatetics (and it seems too with reason) considered all these additional Sentences as included within those, which they themselves acknowledged, and which they made to be five in number, the Vocative, the Imperative, the Interrogative, the Precative, and the Assertive.—There is no mention of a *Potential* Sentence, which may be supposed to co-incide with the Assertive or Indicative. The Vocative, (which the Peripatetics called the εἶδος κλητικόν, but the Stoics more properly προσηγορευτικόν) was nothing more than the Form of address in point of names, titles, and epithets, with which we apply ourselves one to another. As therefore it seldom included any Verb within it, it could hardly contribute to form a verbal Mode. *Ammonius* and *Boethius*, the one a *Greek* Peripatetic, the other a *Latin*, have illustrated the Species of Sentences from *Homer* and *Virgil*, after the following manner.

Ἄλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ πρὶν εἰδῶν, τῷ τε ΚΑΗΤΙΚΟΥ, ὥς
 τὸ, ὦ μάκαρ Ἀτρεΐδην—
 καὶ τῷ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΚΤΙΚΟΥ, ὥς τὸ,
 Βάσκειθι, Ἴρι, ταχέϊα—

L

καὶ

C. VIII.

certain marks or signs of them been introduced into languages, that we may be

καὶ τὸ ἙΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΝ, ὡς τὸ,
Τίς, ποῦθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν;—

καὶ τὸ ἙΚΤΙΚΟΝ, ὡς τὸ,

Ἄι γὰρ Ζεῦ τε πάτερ —

καὶ ἐπὶ τέτοις, τὸ ἈΠΟΦΑΝΤΙΚΟΝ, καθ' ὃν ἀποφαινόμεθα
περὶ ὁτιούτων τῶν πραγμάτων, οἷον

— Οἱοὶ δὲ τε πάντα ἴσασιν —

ὃ περὶ παντός, &c. Εἰς τὸ περὶ Ἑσμ. p. 4.

Boethius's Account is as follows. *Perfectarum vero
Orationum partes quinque sunt: DEPRECATIVA, ut,*

Jupiter omnipotens, precibus si flecteris ullis,

Da deinde auxilium, Pater, atque hæc omina firma.

IMPERATIVA, ut,

Vade age, Nate, voca Zephyros, & labere pennis.

INTERROGATIVA, ut,

Dic mihi, Damata, cijum pecus?—

VOCATIVA, ut,

O! Pater, O! hominum rerumque æterna potestas.

ENUNTIATIVA, in quâ Veritas vel Falsitas invenitur, ut,

Principio arboribus varia est natura creandis.

Boeth. in Lib. de Interp. p. 291.

la

be enabled by our discourse to signify C. VIII.
 them, one to another. And hence those
 various MODES or MOODS, of which we
 find in common Grammars so prolix a
 detail, and which are in fact no more
 than “so many *literal* Forms, intended to
 “express these *natural* Distinctions^(d).”

L 2

ALL

In *Milton* the same sentences may be found, as follows.

THE PRECATIVE,

— *Universal Lord! be bounteous still*
To give us only Good—

THE IMPERATIVE,

Go then, Thou mightiest, in thy Father's might.

THE INTERROGATIVE,

Whence and what art thou, execrable Shape?

THE VOCATIVE,

— *Adam, earth's hallow'd Mold,*
Of God inspir'd—

THE ASSERTIVE OR ENUNCIATIVE,

The conquer'd also and enslaved by war
Shall, with their Freedom lost, all virtue lose.

^(d) The *Greek* Language, which is of all the most elegant and complete, expresses these several Modes, and

all

C. VIII.

ALL these MODES have this in common, that they exhibit some way or other the

all distinctions of Time likewise, by an adequate number of Variations in each particular Verb. These Variations may be found, some at the beginning of the Verb, others at its ending, and consist for the most part either in *multiplying* or *diminishing* the number of Syllables, or else in *lengthening* or *shortening* their respective Quantities, which two methods are called by Grammarians the *Syllabic* and the *Temporal*. The *Latin*, which is but a species of *Greek* somewhat debased, admits in like manner a large portion of those variations, which are chiefly to be found at the Ending of its Verbs, and but rarely at their Beginning. Yet in its Deponents and Passives, it is so far defective, as to be forced to have recourse to the *Auxiliar, sum*. The modern Languages, which have still fewer of those Variations, have been necessitated all of them to assume two Auxiliars at least, that is to say, those which express in each Language the Verbs, *Have*, and *Am*. As to the *English* Tongue, it is so poor in this respect, as to admit no Variation for Modes, and only one for Time, which we apply to express an Aorist of the Past. Thus from *Write* cometh *Wrote*; from *Give*, *Gave*; from *Speak*, *Spake*, &c.—Hence to express Time, and Modes, we are compelled to employ no less than seven Auxiliars, viz. *Do*, *Am*, *Have*, *Shall*, *Will*, *May*, and *Can*; which we use sometimes singly, as when we say, *I am* writing, *I have* written;

the SOUL and its AFFECTIONS. Their ^{C. VIII.} Peculiarities and Distinctions are in part, as follows.

THE REQUISITIVE and INTERROGATIVE MODES are distinguished from *the Indicative* and *Potential*, that whereas these *last seldom call for a Return*, to the two *former it is always necessary*.

IF we compare THE REQUISITIVE MODE with THE INTERROGATIVE, we shall find these also distinguished, and that not only in the *Return*, but in other Peculiarities.

L 3

The

ten ; sometimes two together, as I *have been* writing, I *should have* written ; sometimes no less than three, as I *might have been* lost, he *could have been* preserved. But for these, and all other speculations, relative to the *Genius* of the *English Language*, we refer the reader, who wishes for the most authentic information, to that excellent Treatise of the learned Dr. *Lowth*, intitled, *A short Introduction to English Grammar*.

C. VIII. *The Return to the Requisitive is sometimes made in Words, sometimes in Deeds.*
 To the request of *Dido* to *Eneas*—

——*a primâ dic, hospes, origine nobis*
Insidias Dandum——

the *proper* Return was in *Words*, that is, in an historical Narrative. To the Request of the unfortunate Chief——*date obolum Belisario*——the *proper* Return was in a Deed, that is, in a charitable Relief. But with respect to *the Interrogative*, the Return is necessarily made in *Words* alone, in Words, which are called a *Response* or *Answer*, and which are always actually or by implication some *definitive assertive Sentence*. Take Examples. *Whose Verses are these?*——the Return is a Sentence——*These are Verses of Homer.* *Was Brutus a worthy Man?*——the Return is a Sentence——*Brutus was a worthy Man.*

AND hence (if we may be permitted to digress) we may perceive the near
 affinity

affinity of this *Interrogative* Mode with *C. VIII.* the *Indicative*, in which last its Response or Return is mostly made. So near indeed is this Affinity, that in these two Modes alone the Verb retains the same Form^(e), nor are they otherwise distinguished, than either by the Addition or Absence of some small particle, or by some minute change in the collocation of the words, or sometimes only by a change in the Tone, or Accent^(f).

L 4

BUT

(e) "Ἡ γὰρ ἐν προκειμένῃ ὁριστικῇ ἔγκλισις, τὴν ἐγκειμένην κατὰ φασιν ἀποβάλλουσα, μεθίσταται τῷ καλεῖσθαι ὁριστικῇ—ἀναπληρωθεῖσα δὲ τῆς καταφάσεως, ὑποσείφει εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὁριστικῇ. *The Indicative Mode, of which we speak, by laying aside that Assertion, which by its nature it implies, quits the name of Indicative—when it reassumes the Assertion, it returns again to its proper Character.* Apoll. de Synt. L. III. c. 21. *Theodore Gaza* says the same, *Introd. Gram.* L. IV.

(f) It may be observed of the INTERROGATIVE, that as often as the *Interrogation* is *simple* and *definite*, the Response may be made in almost the *same* Words, by converting

C. VIII. **BUT** to return to our comparison between the *Interrogative* Mode and the *Requisitive*.

THE

verting them into a sentence affirmative or negative, according as the truth is either one or the other. For example—*Are these Verses of Homer?*—Response—*These Verses are of Homer.* *Are those Verses of Virgil?*—Response—*Those are not Verses of Virgil.* And here the Artists of Language, for the sake of brevity and dispatch, have provided two Particles, to represent all such Responses; YEs, for all the affirmative; No, for all the negative.

But when the *Interrogation* is *complex*, as when we say—*Are these Verses of Homer, or of Virgil?*—much more, when it is *indefinite*, as when we say in general—*Whose are these Verses?*—We cannot then respond after the manner above mentioned. The Reason is, that no *Interrogation* can be answered by a simple *Yes*, or a simple *No*, except only those, which are themselves so simple, as of two possible answers to admit only one. Now the least complex *Interrogation* will admit of four Answers, two affirmative, two negative, if not, perhaps of more. The reason is, a complex *Interrogation* cannot subsist of less than two simple ones; each of which
may

THE INTERROGATIVE (in the language of Graminarians) has all *Persons* of both *Numbers*. The REQUISITIVE
or

C. VIII.

may be separately affirmed and separately denied. For instance—*Are these Verses* Homer's, or Virgil's? (1.) *They are Homer's*—(2.) *They are not Homer's*—(3.) *They are Virgil's*—(4.) *They are not Virgil's*—we may add, (5.) *They are of neither*. The indefinite Interrogations go still farther; for these may be answered by infinite affirmatives; and infinite negatives. For instance—*Whose are these Verses?* We may answer affirmatively—*They are Virgil's, They are Horace's, They are Ovid's, &c.*—or negatively—*They are not Virgil's, They are not Horace's, They are not Ovid's*, and so on, either way, to infinity. How then should we learn from a single *Yes*, or a single *No*, which particular is meant among infinite Possibles? These therefore are Interrogations which must be always answered by a *Sentence*. Yet even here Custom has consulted for Brevity, by returning for Answer only the *single essential characteristic Word*, and retrenching by an Ellipsis all the rest, which rest the Interrogator is left to supply from himself. Thus when we are asked—*How many right angles equal the angles of a triangle?*—we answer in the short monosyllable, *Two*; whereas, without the Ellipsis, the answer would have been—*Two right angles equal the angles of a triangle*.

Tho

C. VIII. or IMPERATIVE has no *first Person* of the *singular*, and that from this plain reason, that it is equally absurd in *Modes* for a person to *request* or *give commands to himself*, as it is in *Pronouns*, for the speaker to become *the subject of his own address**.

AGAIN, we may *interrogate as to all Times*, both Present, Past, and Future. *Who was Founder of Rome? Who is King of China? Who will discover the Longitude?*—But *Intreating* and *Commanding* (which are the Essence of
the

The Ancients distinguished these two Species of Interrogation by different names. The simple they called *Ἑρώτημα*, *Interrogatio*; the complex, *πρόσμα*, *Percontatio*. *Ammonius* calls the first of these *Ἑρώτησις διαλεκτικὴ*; the other, *Ἑρώτησις πνευματικὴ*. See *Am. in Lib. de Interpret.* p. 160. *Diog. Laert.* VII. 66. *Quintil. Inst.* IX. 2.

* Sup. p. 74, 75.

the *Requisitive Mode*) have a necessary C. VIII.
 respect to the *Future*^(s) only. For in-
 deed what have they to do with the
 present

(s) *Apollonius's Account of the Future*, implied in all Imperatives, is worth observing. Ἐπὶ γὰρ μὴ γινόμε-
 νοις ἢ μὴ γεγενημένοις ἡ ΠΡΟΞΕΤΑΙΣ τὰ δὲ μὴ γινόμενα ἢ μὴ γε-
 γενηότα, ἐπιταθείσθαι δὲ ἔχοντα εἰς τὸ εἶσθαι, ΜΕΛΛΟΝΤΟΣ
 ἔστι. A COMMAND has respect to those things which either
 are not doing, or have not yet been done. But those
 things, which being not now doing, or having not yet been
 done, have a natural aptitude to exist hereafter, may be
 properly said to appertain to THE FUTURE. De Syn-
 taxi, L. I. c. 36. Soon before this he says—Ἀπαντα τὰ
 προσηκόντα ἑαυτοῖς ἔχου τὴν τῷ μέλλοντι διάθεσιν—χρὸν γὰρ
 ἐν ἑστί, ἐν τῷ, Ὁ ΤΥΡΑΝΝΟΚΤΟΝΗΣΑΣ ΤΙΜΑΣΘΗ, τῷ,
 ΤΙΜΗΘΗΣΕΤΑΙ, κατὰ τὴν χρόνον ἑνοίαν τῇ ἐκκλίσει διαλλα-
 χὲς, καθὼς τὸ μὲν προσηκόν, τὸ δὲ ὀφειστικόν. All IMPERA-
 TIVES have a disposition within them, which respects THE
 FUTURE—with regard therefore to TIME, it is the same
 thing to say, LET HIM, THAT KILLS A TYRANT, BE
 HONOURED, or, HE, THAT KILLS ONE, SHALL BE
 HONOURED; the difference being only in the Mode, in as
 much as one is IMPERATIVE, the other INDICATIVE or
 Declarative. Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. 1. c. 35. Priscian
 seems to allow Imperatives a share of Present Time, as
 well as Future. But if we attend, we shall find his Pre-
 sent

C. VIII. present or the past, the natures of which
 are immutable and necessary?

IT

sent to be nothing else than an immediate Future, as opposed to a more distant one. *Imperativus vero Præsens & Futurum [Tempus] naturali quâdam necessitate videtur posse accipere. Ea etenim imperamus, quæ vel in præsentî statim volumus fieri sine aliquâ dilatione, vel in futuro.* Lib. VIII. p. 806.

It is true the *Greeks* in their Imperatives admit certain Tenses of the Past, such as those of the *Perfectum*, and of the two *Aorists*. But then these Tenses, when so applied, either totally lose their *temporary* Character, or else are used to insinuate such a *Speed of execution*, that the deed should be (as it were) done in the very instant when *commanded*. The same difference seems to subsist between our *English* Imperative, BE GONE, and those others of, Go, or BE GOING. The first (if we please) may be stiled the *Imperative of the Perfectum*, as calling in the very instant for the completion of our Commands: the others may be stiled *Imperatives of the Future*, as allowing a reasonable time to begin first, and finish afterwards.


It is thus *Apollonius*, in the Chapter first cited, distinguishes between *σκαπλῖτω τὰς ἀμπέλους*, Go to digging the Vines, and *σκαψάτω τὰς ἀμπέλους*, Get the Vines dug. The

IT is from this connection of *Futurity* C. VIII
 with *Commands*, that the *Future Indicative* is sometimes used for the *Imperative*, and that to say to any one, YOU SHALL DO THIS, has often the same force with the *Imperative*, DO THIS. So in the Decalogue—THOU SHALT NOT KILL—THOU SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESS

The first is spoken (as he calls it) *eis παρατασιν*, by way of *Extension*, or *allowance of Time for the work*; the second, *eis συντελείωσιν*, with a view to *immediate Completion*. And in another place, explaining the difference between the same Tenses, Σκάπτει and Σκάψον, he says of the last, εἰ μόνον τὸ μὴ γινόμενον προστάσσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν παρατάσει ἀπαγορεύει, that it not only commands something which has not been yet done, but forbids also that, which is now doing in an *Extension*, that is to say, in a *slow and lengthened progress*. Hence, if a man has been a long while writing, and we are willing to hasten him, it would be wrong to say in *Greek*, ΓΡΑΦΕ, WRITE (for that he is *now*, and has been *long* doing) but ΓΡΑΨΟΝ, GET YOUR WRITING DONE; MAKE NO DELAYS. See *Apoll. L. III. c. 24*. See also *Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Græc. & Lat. p. 680. Edit. Varior. Latini non æstimaverunt, &c.*

C. VIII. WITNESS—which denote (we know)
 the strictest and most authoritative
 Commands.

As to the POTENTIAL MODE, it is distinguished from all the rest, by its *subordinate* or *subjunctive* Nature. It is also farther distinguished from the *Requisitive* and *Interrogative*, by implying a kind of feeble and weak *Assertion*, and so becoming in some degree susceptible of Truth and Falshood. Thus, if it be said potentially, *This may be*, or, *This might have been*, we may remark without absurdity, *It is true*, or *It is false*. But if it be said, *Do this*, meaning, *Fly to Heaven*, or, *Can this be done?* meaning, *to square the Circle*, we cannot say in either case, *it is true* or *it is false*, though the Command and the Question are about things impossible. Yet still the *Potential* does not aspire to the Indicative, because it implies but a *dubious* and *conjectural* Assertion, whereas that
 of

of the Indicative is absolute, and with- C. VIII
out reserve. 

THIS therefore (the INDICATIVE I mean) is the Mode, which, as in all Grammars it is the first in order, so is truly first both in dignity and use. It is this, which publishes our sublimest perceptions; which exhibits the Soul in her purest Energies, superior to the Imperfections of desires and wants; which includes the whole of *Time*, and its minutest distinctions; which, in its various *Past* Tenses, is employed by History, to preserve to us the remembrance of former Events; in its *Futures* is used by Prophecy, or (in default of this) by wise Foresight, to instruct and forewarn us, as to that which is coming; but above all in its *Present* Tense serves Philosophy and the Sciences, by just Demonstrations to establish *necessary Truth*; THAT TRUTH, which from its nature *only exists in the Present*; which
knows

C. VIII. knows no distinctions either of Past or of Future, but is every where, and always invariably one^(h).

THROUGH

(h) See the quotation, Note (c) Chapter the Sixth. *Cum enim dicimus, DEUS EST, non eum dicimus nunc esse, sed, &c.*

Boethius, author of the sentiment there quoted, was by birth a *Roman* of the first quality; by religion, a Christian; and by philosophy, a Platonic and Peripatetic; which two Sects, as they sprang from the same Source, were in the latter ages of antiquity commonly adopted by the same Persons, such as *Themistius*, *Porphry*, *Iamblichus*, *Ammonius*, and others. [There were no Sects of Philosophy, that lay greater Stress on the distinction between things existing in Time and not in Time, than the two above-mentioned.] The Doctrine of the Peripatetics on this Subject (since it is these that *Boethius* here follows) may be partly understood from the following Sketch.

“THE THINGS, THAT EXIST IN TIME, are ~~those~~
 “whose Existence Time can measure. But if their
 “Existence may be measured by Time, then there
 “may be assumed a Time greater than the Existence
 “of any one of them, as there may be assumed a
 “number greater than the greatest multitude, that is
 “capable

THROUGH all the above Modes, with C. VIII.
 their respective Tenses, the Verb being
 con-

“capable of being numbered. And hence it is that
 “*things temporary* have their Existence, as it were *li-*
 “*mited* by Time; that they are confined within it, as
 “within some bound; and that in some degree or other
 “they all submit to its power, according to those com-
 “mon Phrases, that *Time is a destroyer*; that *things de-*
 “*cay through Time*; that *men forget in Time*, and lose
 “their abilities, and seldom that they improve, or grow
 “young, or beautiful. The truth indeed is, *Time always*
 “*attends Motion*. Now the natural effect of Motion is
 “to put something, which now is, out of that state, in
 “which it now is, and so far therefore to destroy that
 “state.

“The reverse of all this holds with THINGS THAT EXIST
 “ETERNALLY. These exist *not in Time*, because Time
 “is so far from being able to measure their Existence,
 “that no Time can be assumed, which their existence doth
 “not surpass. To which we may add, that they feel
 “none of its effects, being no way obnoxious either to
 “damage or dissolution.

“To instance in examples of either kind of Being.—
 “There are such things at this instant, as *Stonehenge*
 “and the *Pyramids*. It is likewise true at this instant,
 “that the *Diameter of the square is commensurable with*
 “its side. What then shall we say? Was there ever a
 M Time,

C. VIII. considered as denoting an ATTRIBUTE, has always reference to some Person, or SUBSTANCE. Thus if we say, *Went*, or, *Go*, or *Whither goeth*, or, *Might have gone*, we must add a Person or Substance, to make the Sentence complete. Cicero *went*; Cæsar *might have gone*; *whither goeth the Wind?* *Go!* *Thou Traitor!* But there is a Mode or Form, under which Verbs sometimes appear, where they have no reference at all to Persons or Substances. For example—*To eat is pleasant*;

“Time, when it was *not incommensurable*, as it is certain there was a Time, when there was no Stonehenge, or Pyramids? or is it *daily growing less incommensurable*, as we are assured of Decays in both those “massy Structures?” From these unchangeable Truths, we may pass to their Place, or Region; to the unceasing Intellection of the universal Mind, ever perfect, ever full, knowing no remissions, languors, &c. See *Nat. Ausc.* L. IV. c. 19. *Metaph.* L. XIV. c. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Edit. Du Val. and Vol. I. p. 262. Note VII. The following Passage may deserve Attention.

Τοῦ γὰρ Νοῦ ὁ μὲν νοῦν πείθει, καὶ μὴ νοῦν· ὁ δὲ καὶ πείθει, καὶ νοῦν. ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος ὁ πῶς τέλει, ἀνὰ μὴν προσέθης αὐτῷ τὸ καὶ νοῦν αὐτῷ, καὶ πάντα νοῦν καὶ μὴ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα. ἄγε εἴη ἀνὰ τελεῖστας ὁ νοῦν αὐτῷ καὶ πάντα, καὶ ἅμα. Max. Tyr. Diss. XVII. p. 201. Ed. Lond.

pleasant ; but to fast is wholesome. Here C. VIII.
the Verbs *To eat*, and, *To fast*, stand alone
by themselves, nor is it requisite or even
practicable to prefix a Person or Sub-
stance. Hence the *Latin* and modern
Grammarians have called Verbs under
this Mode, from this their indefinite na-
ture, INFINITIVES. *Sanctius* has given
them the name of *Impersonals* ; and the
Greeks that of Ἀπαρέμφατα, from the
same reason of their *not discovering* ei-
ther Person or Number.

THESE INFINITIVES go farther.—
They not only lay aside the character of
Attributives, but they also assume that
of *Substantives*, and as such themselves
become distinguished with their several
Attributes. Thus in the instance above,
Pleasant is the Attribute, attending the
Infinitive, *To Eat* ; *Wholesome* the attri-
bute attending the Infinitive, *To Fast*.
Examples in *Greek* and *Latin* of like
kind are innumerable.

C. VIII.

*Dulce & decorum est pro patria MORI.**SCIRE tuum nihil est—*

᾽Θυ κατθανεῖν γὰρ δεινὸν, ἀλλ' αἰσχυρῶς
θανεῖν⁽¹⁾.

THE *Stoics* in their grammatical inquiries had this Infinitive in such esteem, that

(1) It is from the INFINITIVE thus participating the nature of a Noun or Substantive, that the best Grammarians have called it sometimes "Ὄνομα ῥηματικόν, A VERBAL NOUN; sometimes "Ὄνομα ῥήματος, THE VERB'S NOUN.—The Reason of this Appellation is in *Greek* more evident, from its taking the prepositive Article before it in all cases; τὸ γράφειν, τῷ γράφειν, τῇ γράφειν. The same construction is not unknown in *English*.

Thus *Spenser*,

*For not to have been dipt in Lethe lake,
Could save the son of Thetis FROM TO DIE—*

ἀπὸ τῷ θανεῖν. In like manner we say, *He did it, to be rich*, where we must supply by an Ellipsis the Preposition, *FOR*. *He did it, for to be rich*, the same as if we had said, *He did it for gain*—ἐνεκα τῷ πλετεῖν, ἐνεκα τῷ κέρδους—in *French*, *pour s'enricher*. Even when we speak such Sentences, as the following, *I choose TO PHILOSOPHISE, rather than TO BE RICH*, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν βέλομαι, ἤπερ τὸ πλετεῖν, the Infinitives are in nature as much Accusatives, as if we were to say, *I choose PHILOSOPHY rather than*

that they held this alone to be the genuine PHMA or VERB, a name, which they denied to all the other Modes. Their reasoning was, they considered the true verbal character to be contained *simple and unmixed* in the *Infinitive only*. Thus the Infinitives Περιπατεῖν, *Ambulare*, *To walk*, mean *simply* that energy, and *nothing more*. The other Modes, besides expressing this energy, *superadd* certain *Affections*, which respect persons and circumstances. Thus *Ambulo* and *Ambula* mean not simply *To walk*, but mean, *I walk*, and, *Walk Thou*. And hence

C. VII.

than RICHES, τὴν φιλοσοφίαν βύλομαι, ἥπερ τὸν πλοῦτον. Thus too Priscian, speaking of *Infinitives*—CURRERE enim est CURSUS; & SCRIBERE, SCRIPTURA; & LEGERE, LECTIO. Itaque frequenter & Nominibus adjunguntur, & aliis casualibus, more Nominum; ut Persius,

Sed pulcrum est digito monstrari, & dici, hoc est.

And soon after—Cum enim dico, BONUM EST LEGERE, nihil aliud significo, nisi, BONA EST LECTIO. L. XVIII. p. 1130. See also *Apoll.* L. I. c. 8. *Gaza Gram.* L. IV. Τὸ δὲ ἀπαρίμφοτον, ὅτι μὴ ἐστὶ ῥήματος κ. τ. λ.

C. VIII. hence they are all of them resolvable into the *Infinitive*, as their *Prototype*, together with some sentence or word, expressive of their proper Character. *Ambulo*, I walk ; this is, *Indico me ambulare*, I declare myself to walk. . *Ambula*, Walk Thou ; that is, *Impero te ambulare*, I command thee to walk ; and so with the Modes of every other species. Take away therefore the *Assertion*, the *Command*, or whatever else gives a *Character* to any one of these Modes, and there remains nothing more than THE MERE INFINITIVE, which (as *Priscian* says) *significat ipsam rem, quam continet Verbum*^(k).

THE

^(k) See *Apollon. l. III. 13.* Καθόλε πᾶν παρηγμένον ἀπό τινος κ. τ. λ. See also *Gaza*, in the note before. *Igitur a Constructione quoque Vim rei Verborum (id est, Nominis, quod significat ipsam rem) habere INFINITIVUM possumus dignoscere; res autem in Personas distributa facit alios verbi motus.—Itaque omnes modi in hunc, id est, Infinitivum, transumuntur sive resolvuntur.* *Prisc. l. XVIII. p. 1131.* From these Principles *Apollonius* calls the Infinitive Ῥῆμα γενικώτατον, and *Priscian*, *Verbum generale*.

THE application of this infinitive is somewhat singular. It *naturally coalesces* with all those Verbs that denote any *Tendence, Desire, or Volition of the Soul*, but not readily with others. Thus it is sense as well as syntax, to say βέλομαι ζῆν, *Cupio vivere, I desire to live*; but not to say Ἐσθίω ζῆν, *Edo vivere*, or even in *English, I eat to live*, unless by an Ellipsis, instead of *I eat for to live*; as we say ἐνεκα τοῦ ζῆν, or *pour vivre*. The reason is, that though *different Actions* may unite in the *same Subject*, and therefore be coupled together (as when we say, *He walked and discoursed*) yet the *Actions* notwithstanding remain separate and distinct. But it is not so with respect to *Volitions*, and *Actions*. Here the coalescence is often so intimate, that the *Volition* is unintelligible, till the *Action* be exprest. *Cupio, Volo, Desidero—I desire, I am willing, I want—*What?—The sentences, we see, are defective and imperfect. We must help them then by *Infinitives*, which express

C. VIII. the proper actions to which they tend.
Cupio legere, Volo discere, Desidero videre, I desire to read, I am willing to live, I want to see. Thus is the whole rendered complete, as well in sentiment as in syntax ⁽¹⁾

AND so much for MODES, and their several SPECIES. We are to attempt to denominate them according to their most eminent characters; it may be done in the following manner. As every necessary truth, and every demonstrative syllogism (which last is no more than a combination of such truths) must always be exprest under positive assertions, and as positive assertions only belong to

⁽¹⁾ *Priscian* calls these Verbs, which naturally precede Infinitives, *Verba Voluntativa*; they are called in *Greek* *Προαιετινά*. See L. XVIII. 1129. but more particularly see *Apollonius*, L. III. c. 13. where this whole doctrine is explained with great Accuracy. See also *Macrobii de Diff. Verb. Gr. & Lat.* p. 685. Ed. Var.

—*Nec omne ἀπαξιωματόν cuiusunque Verbo, &c.*

to the *Indicative*, we may denominate it C. VIII.
 for that reason the *MODE OF SCIENCE*^(m). Again, as the *Potential* is only
 conversant about *Contingents*, of which
 we cannot say with certainty that they
 will happen or not, we may call this
 Mode *THE MODE OF CONJECTURE*.—
 Again, as those that are ignorant and
 would be informed, must ask of those
 that already know, this being the natu-
 ral way of becoming *Proficients*; hence
 we may call the *Interrogative*, *THE*
MODE OF PROFICIENCY.

Inter cuncta leges, & PERCONTABERE
doctos,

Quâ ratione queas traducere leniter ævum,
Quid purè tranquillet, &c. HOR.

Farther still, as the highest and most
 excellent use of the *Requisitive Mode* is
 legis-

^(m) *Ob nobilitatem prævit INDICATIVUS, solus Modus
 aptus Scientiis, solus Pater Veritatis. Scal. de Caus. L.
 Lat. c. 116.*

C. VIII. legislative command, we may stile it for this reason **THE MODE OF LEGISLATURE.** *Ad Divos adeunto castè*, says *Cicero* in the character of a *Roman* law-giver; *Be it therefore enacted*, say the laws of *England*; and in the same *Mode* speak the *laws* of every other nation, It is also in this *Mode* that the geometri-
cian, with the authority of a legislator, orders lines to be bisected, and circles described, as preparatives to that science, which he is about to establish.

THERE are other *supposed* affections of Verbs, such as *Number* and *Person*. But these surely cannot be called a part of their essence, nor indeed are they the essence of any other Attribute, being in fact the properties, not of Attributes, but of Substances. The most that can be said, is, that Verbs in the more elegant languages are provided with certain terminations, which respect the *Number* and *Person* of every *Substantive*,
that

that we may know with more precision, C. VIII.
 in a complex sentence, each particular
 substance, with its attendant verbal At-
 tributes. The same may be said of *Sex*,
 with respect to Adjectives. They have
 terminations which vary, as they respect
 Beings male or female, tho' *Substances*
 past dispute are alone susceptible of
 sex⁽ⁿ⁾. We therefore pass over these
 matters,

(n) It is somewhat extraordinary, that so acute and rational a Grammarian as *Sanctius*, should justly deny *Genders*, or the distinction of Sex to *Adjectives*, and yet make *Persons* appertain, not to *Substantives*, but to *Verbs*. His commentator *Perizonius* is much more consistent, who says—*At vero si rem rectè consideres, ipsis Nominibus & Pronominibus vel maxime, imò unicè inest ipsa Persona; & Verba se habent in Personarum ratione ad Nomina planè sicuti Adjectiva in ratione Generum ad Substantiva, quibus solis autor* (*Sanctius* scil. L. I. c. 7.) *& rectè Genus adscribit, exclusis Adjectivis.* *Sanct. Minerv. L. I. c. 12.* There is indeed an exact Analogy between the Accidents of *Sex* and *Person*. There are but two *Sexes*, that is to say, the Male and the Female; and but two *Persons* (or Characters essential to discourse) that is to say, the Speaker, and the Party addressed.—The third Sex and third Person are improperly so called, being in fact but Negations of the other two.

C. VIII. matters, and all of like kind, as being rather among the elegancies, than the essentials^(g) of language, which essentials are the subject of our present inquiry. The principal of these now remaining is **THE DIFFERENCE OF VERBS, AS TO THEIR SEVERAL SPECIES,** which we endeavour to explain in the following manner.

^(g) Whoever would see more upon a subject of importance, referred to in many parts of this treatise, and particularly in note (h) of this chapter, may consult *Letters concerning Mind*, an Octavo Volume published 1750, the Author Mr. *John Petvin*, Vicar of *Ilington in Devon*, a person who, though from his retired situation little known, was deeply skilled in the Philosophy both of the Antients and Moderns, and, more than this, was valued by all that knew him for his virtue and worth.

CHAP. IX.

*Concerning the Species of Verbs, and their
other remaining Properties.*

ALL Verbs, that are strictly so called Ch. IX.
denote ^(a) Energies. Now as all *Ener-*
gies are *Attributes*, they have reference
of course to certain *energizing Substances*.
Thus it is impossible there should be
such Energies, as *To love, to fly, to wound,*
&c. if there were not such beings as
Men, Birds, Swords, &c. Farther, every
Energy doth not only require an Ener-
gizer, but is necessarily conversant about
some *Subject*. For example, if we say,
Brutus loves—we must needs supply—
loves

(a) We use this word *ENERGY*, rather than *Motion*,
from its more comprehensive meaning ; it being a sort of
Genus, which includes within it both *Motion* and its *Pri-*
zation. See before, p. 94, 95.

Ch. IX. loves *Cato, Cassius, Portia*, or some one.

The Sword wounds—i. e. wounds *Hector, Sarpedon, Priam*, or some one. And thus is it, that every Energy is necessarily situate between two Substantives, an Energizer which is *active*, and a Subject which is *passive*. Hence then, if the Energizer lead the sentence, the Energy follows its character, and becomes what we call A VERB ACTIVE.—Thus we say *Brutus amat, Brutus loves*. On the contrary, if the passive Subject be principal, it follows the character of this too, and then becomes what we call A VERB PASSIVE. Thus we say, *Portia amatur, Portia is loved*. It is in like

manner that the *same Road* between the summit and foot of the same mountain, with respect to the summit is *Ascent*, with respect to the foot is *Descent*.—Since then every Energy respects an Energizer, or a passive Subject; hence the Reason why every Verb, whether active or passive, has in language a ne-

cessary reference to some *Noun* for its Ch. IX.
Nominative Case^(b).

BUT to proceed still farther from what has been already observed. *Brutus loved Portia*.—Here *Brutus* is the Energizer; *loved*, the *Energy*; and *Portia*, the *Subject*. But it might have been, *Brutus* loved *Cato*, or *Cassius*, or the *Roman Republic*; for the *Energy* is referable to *Subjects* infinite. Now among these infinite *Subjects*, when that happens to occur, which is the Energizer also, as when we say *Brutus* loved *himself*, slew *himself*, &c. in such *Case* the *Energy* hath to the *same* being a *double Relation*, both active and passive. And this it is which gave rise among the
Greeks

^(b) The doctrine of Impersonal Verbs has been justly rejected by the best Grammarians, both antient and modern. See *Sanct. Min.* L. I. c. 12. L. III. c. 1. L. IV. c. 3. *Priscian.* L. XVIII. p. 1134. *Apoll.* L. III. sub. fin. In which places the reader will see a proper *Nominative* supplied to all Verbs of this supposed character.

Ch. IX. *Greeks* to that species of Verbs, called VERBS MIDDLE^(c), and such was their true and original use, however in many instances they may have since happened to deviate. In other languages the Verb still retains its active Form, and the passive Subject (*se* or *himself*) is expressed like other accusatives.

AGAIN, in some Verbs it happens that the Energy *always keeps within* the Energizer, and *never passes out* to any foreign extraneous Subject. Thus when we say, *Cæsar walketh, Cæsar sitteth*, it is impossible *the Energy should pass out*

(c) Τὰ γὰρ καλέμενα μεσότητος χήματα συνίπλωσιν ἀντιδίχατο ενεργητικῆς καὶ παθητικῆς διαβάσεως. *The Verbs, called Verbs middle, admit a Coincidence of the active and passive Character.* Apollon. L. III. c. 7. He that would see this whole Doctrine concerning the power of the MIDDLE VERB explained and confirmed with great Ingenuity and Learning, may consult a small Treatise of that able Critic Kuster, entitled, *De Vero Usu Verborum Mediorum*. A neat edition of this scarce piece has been lately published.

out (as in the Case of those Verbs called Ch. IX.
by the Grammarians VERBS TRANSI-
TIVE) because both the *Energizer* and
the *Passive Subject* are united in the same
Person. For what is the cause of this
walking or sitting?—It is the *Will* and
Vital Powers belonging to *Cæsar*. And
what is the Subject, made so to move or
to sit?—It is the *Body* and *Limbs* belong-
ing also to the same *Cæsar*. It is this
then forms that species of Verbs, which
grammarians have thought fit to call
VERBS NEUTER, as if indeed they were
void both of *Action* and *Passion*, when
perhaps (like Verbs middle) they may
be rather said to imply both. Not how-
ever to dispute about Names, as these
Neuters in their *Energizer* always dis-
cover their passive Subject^(c), which other
Verbs

(c) This Character of Neuters the *Greeks* very happily
express by the Terms, 'Αυτοπάθεια and 'Ιδιοπάθεια, which
Priscian renders *quæ ex se in seipsâ fit intrinsecus Passio*.
L. VIII. 790. *Consentii Ars apud Putsch.* p. 2051.

Ch. IX. Verbs cannot, their passive Subjects being infinite ; hence the reason why it is as superfluous in these Neuters to have the Subject expressed, as in other Verbs it is necessary, and cannot be omitted. And thus it is that we are taught in common grammars that *Verbs Active require*

It may be here observed, that even these Verbs, called *Actives*, can upon occasion lay aside their transitive character ; that is to say, can drop their subsequent Accusative, and assume the *Form of Neuters*, so as to stand by themselves. This happens, when the Discourse respects the mere *Energy* or *Affection* only, and has no regard to the Subject, be it this thing or that. Thus we say, *ὁὗτος ἀναγινώσκων ἴσως*, *This Man knows not how to read*, speaking only of the Energy, in which we suppose him deficient. Had the Discourse been upon the Subjects of reading, we must have added them, *ὁὗτος ἀναγινώσκων τὰ Ὅμηρον*, *He knows not how to read Homer*, or *Virgil*, or *Cicero*, &c.

Thus *Horace*,

*Qui CUPIT aut METUIT, juvat illum sic domus aut res,
Ut lippum pictæ tabulæ——.*

He that DESIRES or FEARS (not this thing in particular nor that, but in general he within whose breast these affections

require an *Accusative*, while *Neuters* require none. Ch. IX.

OF the above species of Verbs, the *Middle* cannot be called necessary, because most languages have done without it. THE SPECIES OF VERBS therefore remaining are the ACTIVE, the PASSIVE and the NEUTER, and those seem essential to all languages whatever^(d).

N 2

THERE

affections prevail) *has the same joy in a House or Estate, as the Man with bad Eyes has in fine Pictures.* So *Cæsar* in his celebrated *Laconic Epistle* of, VENI, VIDI, VICI, where two Actives we see follow one Neuter in the same detached Form, as that Neuter itself. The Glory it seems was in the rapid Sequel of the Events. Conquest came as quick, as he could come himself, and look about him. Whom he saw, and whom he conquered, was not the thing, of which he boasted. See *Apoll. L. III. c. 31. p. 279.*

^(d) The *Stoics*, in their logical view of Verbs, as making part in Propositions, considered them under the four following Sorts.

When

Ch. IX.

THERE remains a remark or two farther, and then we quit the Subject of Verbs. It is true in general that the greater part of them denote Attributes of *Energy* and *Motion*. But there are some which appear to denote nothing more,

When a *Verb*, co-inciding with the *Nominative* of some *Noun*, made without farther help a perfect assertive Sentence, as Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ, *Socrates walketh*; then as the *Verb* in such case implied the Power of a perfect Predicate, they called it for that reason Κατηγορημα, a *Predicable*, or else, from its readiness συμβάσσειν, to co-incide with its *Noun* in completing the Sentence, they called it Σύμβασμα, a *Co-incider*.

When a *Verb* was able with a *Noun* to form a perfect assertive Sentence, yet could not associate with such *Noun*, but under some oblique Case, as Σωκράτει μετὰμύλει, *Socratem pœnitet*; Such a *Verb*, from its near approach to just Co-incidence, and Predication, they called Πρασύμ-
σμα or Παρακατηγόρημα.

When a *Verb*, though regularly co-inciding with a *Noun* in its *Nominative*, still required, to complete the Sentiment, some other *Noun* under an oblique Case, as Πλάτων φιλεῖ Δίον, *Plato loveth Dio* (where without *Dio* or some other, the *Verb loveth* would rest indefinite:) Such *Verb*,
from

more, than a *mere simple Adjective*, joined Ch. IX.
to an Assertion. Thus ἰσάζει in Greek,
and *Equalleth* in English, mean nothing
more than ἴσός ἐστι, *is equal*. So *Albeo*
in Latin is no more than *albus sum*.

N 3

—Cam—

from this Defect, they called ἥττον ἢ σύμμετρον, or ἡ κατηγόρημα, *something less than a Co-incider, or less than a Predicable*.


Lastly, when a Verb required *two Nouns in oblique Cases*, to render the Sentiment complete; as when we say Σωκράτει Ἀλκιβιάδης μίλει, *Tædet me Vile*, or the like: Such Verb they called ἥττον, or ἑλάττω ἢ παρασύμμετρον, or ἡ παρεκκατηγόρημα, *something less than an imperfect Co-incider, or an imperfect Predicable*.

These were the *Appellations* which they gave to Verbs, when employed along with Nouns, to the forming of Propositions. As to the Name of PHMA, or VERB, they denied it to them all, giving it only to the *Infinitive*, as we have shewn already. See page 164. See also Ammon. *in Lib. de Interpret.* p. 37. *Apollon. de Syntaxi*, L. 1. c. 8. L. III. c. 31. p. 279. c. 32. p. 295. *Theod. Gaz. Gram.* L. IV.

From the above Doctrine it appears, that all Verbs *Neuter* are Συμμέτρα; Verbs *Active*, ἥττωνα ἢ συμμέτρα.

CHAP. X.

*Concerning those other Attributes,
Participles and Adjectives.*

Ch. X.  THE nature of Verbs being understood, that of PARTICIPLES is no way difficult. Every complete Verb is expressive of an *Attribute*; of *Time*; and of an *Assertion*. Now if we take away the *Assertion*, and thus destroy the *Verb*, there will remain the *Attribute* and the *Time*, which make the essence of a PARTICIPLE. Thus take away the *Assertion* from the Verb, Γράφει, *Writeth*, and there remains the Participle, Γράφων, *Writing*, which (without the *Assertion*) denotes the same *Attribute*, and the same *Time*. After the same manner, by withdrawing the *Assertion*, we discover Γράφας in Ἐγγράφει, Γράφων in Γράφει, for we chuse to refer to the *Greek*, as being of

of all languages the most complete, as Ch. X.
 well in this respect, as in others.

AND so much for PARTICIPLES^(a).

THE

(a) The *Latins* are defective in this Article of Participles. Their Active Verbs, ending in *or*, (commonly called Deponents) have Active Participles of all Times (such as *Loquens*, *Locutus*, *Locuturus*) but none of the Passive. Their Actives ending in *O*, have Participles of the Present and Future (such as *Scribens*, and *Scripturus*) but none of the Past. On the contrary, their Passives have Participles of the Past (such as *Scriptus*) but none of the Present or Future, unless we admit such as *Scribendus* and *Docendus* for Futures, which Grammarians controvert. The want of these Participles they supply by a Periphrasis—for *γράφας* they say *cum scripsisset*—for *γράφομαι* *dum scribitur*, &c. In *English* we have sometimes recourse to the same Periphrasis; and sometimes we avail ourselves of the same Auxiliars, which form our Modes and Tenses.

The *English* Grammar lays down a good rule with respect to its Participles of the Past, that they all terminate in D, T, or N. This Analogy is perhaps liable to as few Exceptions as any. Considering therefore how little Analogy of any kind we have in our Language, it seems

Ch. X.

THE nature of *Verbs* and *Participles* being understood, that of *ADJECTIVES* becomes easy. A *Verb* implies (as we have said) both an *Attribute*, and *Time*, and an *Assertion*; a *Participle* only implies an *Attribute*, and *Time*, and an *ADJECTIVE* only implies an *Attribute*; that is to say, in other Words, an *ADJECTIVE* has no *Assertion*, and only denotes such an *Attribute*, as has not its essence either in *Motion* or its *Privation*.—Thus in general the Attributes of quantity, quality, and relation (such as *many* and *few*, *great* and *little*, *black* and *white*, *good* and *bad*, *double*, *treble*, *quadruple*,

seems wrong to annihilate the few *Traces*, that may be found. It would be well therefore, if all writers, who endeavour to be accurate, would be careful to avoid a corruption, at present so prevalent, of saying, *it was wrote*, for, *it was written*; *he was drove*, for, *he was driven*; *I have went*, for, *I have gone*, &c. in all which instances a Verb is absurdly used to supply the proper Participle, without any necessity from the want of such Word.

ple, &c.) are all denoted by ADJECTIVES. Ch. X.

IT must indeed be confessed, that sometimes even those Attributes, which are wholly foreign to the idea of *Motion*, assume an assertion, and appear as Verbs. Of such we gave instances before, in *albeo*, *tumeo*, ἰσάζω, and others. These however, compared to the rest of Verbs, are but few in number, and may be called, if thought proper, *Verbal Adjectives*. It is in like manner, that Participles insensibly pass too into Adjectives. Thus *doctus*, in *Latin*, and *learned* in *English*, lose their power, as *Participles*, and mean a Person possessed of an habitual Quality. Thus *Vir eloquens* means not *a man now speaking*, but a man *who possesses the habit of speaking*, whether he speak or no. So when we say in *English*, he is a *thinking Man*, an *understanding Man*, we mean not a person, whose mind is in
actual

Ch. X. *actual Energy*, but whose *mind is enriched with a larger portion of those powers*. It is indeed no wonder, as all *Attributives* are homogeneous, that at times the several species should appear to interfere, and the difference between them be scarcely perceptible. Even in *natural species*, which are congenial and of kin, the specific difference is not always to be discerned, and in appearance at least they seem to run into each other.

WE have shewn already ^(b) in the Instances of *Φιλιππίζειν*, *Syllaturire*, *Ἀποκαιοσαρωθήναι*, and others, how *Substantives* may be transformed into *Verbal Attributives*. We shall now shew, how they may be converted into *Adjectives*. When we say the party of *Rompey*, the stile of *Cicero*, the philosophy of *Socrates*,

erates, in these cases the party, the stile, and the philosophy spoken of, receive a stamp and character from the persons, whom they respect. Those persons therefore perform the part of *Attributes*, that is, stamp and characterize their respective Subjects. Hence then *they actually pass into Attributes*, and assume, as such, the form of *Adjectives*. And thus it is we say, the *Pompeian* party, the *Ciceronian* stile, and the *Socratic* philosophy. It is in like manner for a trumpet of *Brass*, we say, a *brazen* Trumpet; for a *Crown of Gold*, a *golden* Crown, &c. Even *Pronominal* Substantives admit the like mutation. Thus, instead of saying, the Book of *Me*, of *Thee*, and of *Him*, we say, *My* Book, *Thy* Book, and *His* Book; instead of saying the Country of *Us*, of *You*, and of *Them*, we say *Our* Country, *Your* Country, and *Their* Country, which Words may be called so many *Pronominal Adjectives*.

HERMES

It has been observed already, and must needs be obvious to all, that Adjectives, as marking Attributes, can have no sex^(c). And yet their having terminations conformable to the sex, number, and case of their Substantive, seems to have led grammarians into that strange absurdity of ranging them with Nouns, and separating them from Verbs, tho' with respect to these they are perfectly homogeneous; with respect to the others, quite contrary. They are homogeneous with respect to Verbs, as both sorts denote *Attributes*; they are heterogeneous with respect to Nouns, as *never properly denoting Substances*.— But of this we have spoken before^(d).

THE Attributives hitherto treated,
that is to say, VERBS, PARTICIPLES,
and

(c) Sup. p. 171.

(d) Sup. C. VI. Note (a). See also C. III. p. 28, &c.

and ADJECTIVES, may be called ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE FIRST ORDER. Ch. X. The reason of this name will be better understood, when we have more fully discussed ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND ORDER, to which we now proceed in the following chapter.

CHAP. XI.

Concerning Attributives of the second Order.

Ch. XI. **AS** the Attributives hitherto mentioned denote *the Attributes of Substances*, so there is an inferior class of them, which denote *the Attributes only of Attributives*.

To explain by examples in either kind—when we say, *Cicero and Pliny were both of them eloquent; Statius and Virgil both of them wrote*; in these instances the Attributives *eloquent*, and *wrote*, are immediately referable to the substantives, *Cicero, Virgil, &c.* As therefore denoting **THE ATTRIBUTES OF SUBSTANCES**, we call them **ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE FIRST ORDER**. But when we say *Pliny was moderately eloquent, but Cicero exceedingly eloquent; Statius wrote indifferently, but Virgil wrote*

wrote admirably ; in these instances, the Ch. XI.
Attributives, Moderately, Exceedingly, Indifferently, Admirably, are not referable to *Substantives*, but to other *Attributives*, that is, to the words, *Eloquent* and *Wrote*. As therefore denoting *Attributes of Attributes*, we call them **ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND ORDER**.

GRAMMARIANS have given them the Name of Ἐπιρρήματα, **ADVERBIA**, **ADVERBS**. And indeed if we take the word Ῥῆμα, or *Verb*, in its most *comprehensive Signification*, as including not only *Verbs properly so called*, but also *Participles* and *Adjectives* [an usage, which may be justified by the best authorities^(a)] we shall find the name, Ἐπιρρήμα,

(a) Thus Aristotle in his *Treatise de Interpretatione*, instances Ἄνθρωπος as a *Noun*, and Λέω as a *Verb*. So Ammonius —κατὰ τὸ τοῦτο τὸ σημαίνοντες, τὸ μὲν ΚΑΛΟΣ καὶ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα—ῬΗΜΑΤΑ λέγεσθαι καὶ ἐκ ὈΝΟΜΑΤΑ. According to this Signification (that is of denoting the Attributes of Substance and the Predicate

Ch. XI. that Intention and Remission are among the Attributes of such Attributes.— Hence then one copious Source of secondary Attributives, or Adverbs, to denote these two, that is, *Intension* and *Remission*. The *Greeks* have their *θαρσῶς* *μάλιστα*, *πάνυ*, *ἤμισα*; the *Latins* their *valdè*, *vehementer*, *maximè*, *satis*, *mediocriter*; the *English* their *greatly*, *vastly*, *extremely*, *sufficiently*, *moderately*, *tolerably*, *indifferently*, &c.

FARTHER than this, where there are different Intensions of the same Attribute, they may be *compared* together. Thus if the Garment A be EXCEEDINGLY *White*, and the Garment B be MODERATELY *White*, we may say, *the Garment A is MORE white than the Garment B.*

IN these Instances the Adverb **MORE** not only denotes Intension, but *relative Intension*. Nay we stop not here. **WE** not only denote Intension *merely relative*,

tive but relative Intension, than which Ch. XI.
there is none greater. Thus we not only
say the Mountain A is MORE high than the
Mountain B, but that it is the MOST high
of all Mountains. Even *Verbs, properly*
so called, as they admit simple Intensions,
so they admit also these comparative
ones. Thus in the following Example
 —*Fame he LOVETH MORE than Riches,*
but Virtue of all things he LOVETH MOST
 —the Words *MORE* and *MOST* denote
 the different *comparative Intensions* of
 the Verbal Attributive, *Loveth.*

AND hence the rise of *COMPARISON*,
 and of its different *Degrees*; which can-
 not well be more, than the two Species
 above mentioned, one to denote *Simple*
Excess, and one to denote *Superlative.*
 Were we indeed to introduce *more de-*
grees than these, we ought perhaps to
 introduce *infinite*, which is absurd. For
 why stop at a limited Number, when in
 all subjects, susceptible of Intension,
 the intermediate *Excesses* are in a man-

Ch. XI. ner infinite? There are infinite Degrees of *more* White, between the *first Simple White*, and the *Superlative, Whitest*; the same may be said of *more* Great, *more* Strong, *more* Minute, &c. The Doctrine of Grammarians about *three* such Degrees, which they call the Positive, the Comparative, and the Superlative, must needs be absurd; both because in their Positive there is † no Comparison at all, and because their *Superlative* is a Comparative, as much as their *Comparative* itself. Examples to evince this may be found every where. *Socrates was the MOST WISE of all the Athenians—Homer was the MOST SUBLIME of all Poets.—*

—*Cadit et Ripheus JUSTISSIMUS UNUS,
Qui fuit in Teucris—* Virg.

It

† Qui (scil. Gradus Positivus) quoniam perfectus est, a quibusdam in numero Graduum non computatur. Consentii Ars apud Putsch. p. 2022.

IT must be confessed these Comparatives, as well the *simple*, as the *superlative*, seem sometimes to part with their *relative* Nature, and only retain their *intensive*. Thus in the Degree, denoting *simple* Excess,

Tristior, *et lacrymis oculos suffusa nitescentes.*

Virg.

Rusticior paulo est—

Hor.

IN the *Superlative* this is more usual. *Vir doctissimus, Vir fortissimus*, a most learned Man, a most brave man,—that is to say, not the *bravest* and *most learned* Man, that ever existed, but a Man possessing those Qualities in an *eminent Degree*.

THE Authors of Language have contrived a method to retrench these Comparative Adverbs, by expressing their force in the Primary Attributive. Thus instead of *More fair*, they say FAIRER ; instead of *Most fair*, FAIREST, and the same holds true both in the *Greek* and

Ch. XI. *Latin.* This Practice however has reached no farther than to *Adjectives*, or at least to *Participles*, sharing the nature of *Adjectives*. Verbs perhaps were thought too much diversified already, to admit more Variations without perplexity.

As there are some Attributives, which admit of Comparison, so there are others, which admit of none. Such for example are those, which denote *that Quality of Bodies arising from their Figure*; as when we say, a *Circular Table*, a *Quadrangular Court*, a *Conical Piece of Metal*, &c. The reason is, that a million of things, participating the same Figure, participate it *equally*, if they participate it at all. To say therefore that while A and B are both quadrangular, A is *more* or *less* quadrangular than B, is absurd. The same holds true in all Attributives, denoting *definite Quantities*, whether *continuous* or *discrete*, whether *absolute* or *relative*.—

Thus

ot Rule A cannot be Ch. XI.
 Rule, than any other of
 length. *Twenty* Lions cannot
twenty than *twenty* Flies. If A
 be both *triple* or *quadruple* to C,
 y cannot be *more triple*, or *more qua-*
druple, one than the other. The reason
 of all this is, there can be *no Compa-*
raison without *Intension and Remission*;
 there can be no Intension and Remis-
 sion in things *always definite*; and such
 are the Attributives, which we have last
 mentioned.

IN the same reasoning we see the
 cause, why *no Substantive is susceptible*
of these Comparative Degrees. A *Moun-*
tain cannot be said MORE TO BE, or TO
 EXIST, than a *Mole-hill*, but the *More*
 and *Less* must be sought for in their
 Quantities. In like manner when we
 refer many Individuals to one Species,
 the Lion A cannot be called *more a Lion*,
 than the Lion B, but if more any thing,
 he is *more fierce*, *more speedy*, or exceed-
 ing

Ch. XI. ing in some such Attribute. So again, in referring many Species to one Genus, a Crocodile is not more an Animal, than a Lizard; nor a Tiger, more than a Cat, but if any thing, they are *more bulky, more strong*, &c. the Excess, as before, being derived from their Attributes.— So true is that saying of the acute *Stagirite*—that SUBSTANCE is not susceptible of MORE and LESS^(c). But this by way of digression; to return to the subject of Adverbs.

OF the Adverbs, or secondary Attributes already mentioned, these denoting Intension or Remission may be called Adverbs of *Quantity continuous*; *Once, Twice, Thrice*, are Adverbs of *Quantity discrete*; *More and Most, Less and*

(c) ἐκ αὐτοῦ ἐπιδέχεται ἡ εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστιν, *Categor.* c. 5. See also *Sanctius*, L. I. c. 11. L. II. c. 10, 11. where the subject of Comparatives is treated in a very masterly and philosophical manner. See also *Priscian*, p. 598. *Derivantur igitur Comparationes a Nominibus Adjectivis*, &c.

and *Least*, to which may be added *Ch. XI.*
Equally, Proportionally, &c. are Adverbs
 of *Relation*. There are others of *Qual-*
ity, as when we say, *HONESTLY industri-*
trious, PRUDENTLY brave, they fought
BRAVELY, he painted FINELY, a Portico
formed CIRCULARLY, a Plain cut TRI-
ANGULARLY, &c.

AND here it is worth while to observe,
 how the same thing, participating the
 same *Essence*, assumes different gram-
 matical forms from its different rela-
 tions. For example, suppose it should
 be asked, how differ *Honest, Honestly,*
 and *Honesty*. The Answer is, they are
in Essence the same, but they differ, in
 as much as *Honest* is the *Attributive of*
a Substantive; Honestly, of a Verb; and
Honesty, being divested of these its at-
tributive Relations, assumes the Power
of a Substantive, so as to stand by itself.

THE Adverbs, hitherto mentioned,
 are common to *Verbs of every Species;*

Ch. XI.

but there are some which are peculiar to *Verbs properly so called*, that is to say, to such as denote *Motion* or *Energy*, with their *Privations*. All *MOTION* and *REST* imply *TIME* and *PLACE*, as a kind of necessary *Coincidents*. Hence then, if we would express the *Place* or *Time* of either, we must needs have recourse to the proper Adverbs; of *Place*, as when we say, *he stood THERE*, *he went HENCE*; *he travelled FAR*, &c.: of *Time*, as when we say, *he stood THEN*; *he went AFTERWARD*; *he travelled FORMERLY*, &c. Should it be asked—why *Adverbs of Time*, when Verbs have *Tenses*? The Answer is, tho' *Tenses* may be sufficient to denote the greater distinctions of *Time*, yet to denote them all by *Tenses* would be a perplexity without end. What a variety of Forms, to denote *Yesterday*, *To-day*, *To-morrow*, *Formerly*, *Lately*, *Just now*, *Now*, *Immediately*, *Presently*, *Soon*, *Hereafter*, &c.? It was this then that made the

Tem-

Temporal Adverbs necessary, over and Ch. XI.
above the *Tenses*. ~

To the Adverbs just mentioned may be added those, which denote the *Intentions and Remissions peculiar to Motion*, such as *speedily, hastily, swiftly, slowly*, &c. as also *Adverbs of Place*, made out of *Prepositions*, such as ἀνω and κάτω from ἀνά and κατά, in *English upward and downward*, from *up and down*. In some instances the *Preposition* suffers no change, but becomes an *Adverb* by nothing more than its *Application*, as when we say, CIRCA equitat, *he rides ABOUT*; PROPE cecidit, *he was NEAR falling*; Verum ne POST conferas culpam in me, *But do not AFTER lay the blame on me*^(d).

THERE

^(d) Sosp. Charitii Inst. Gram. p. 170. Terent Eun. Act II. Sc. 3.

Ch. XL

THERE are likewise *Adverbs of Interrogation*, such as *Where, Whence, Whither, How*; of which there is this remarkable, that when they lose their *Interrogative* power, they assume that of a *Relative*, so as even to represent the *Relative* or *Subjunctive Pronoun*. Thus *Ovid*,

Et Seges est, UBI Troja fuit—

translated in our old *English Ballad*,

*And Corn doth grow WHERE Troy
town stood.*

That is to say, *Seges est in eo loco, IN QUO, &c. Corn groweth in that place, IN WHICH, &c.* the power of the *Relative*, being implied in the *Adverb*. Thus *Terence*,

*Hujusmodi mihi res semper comminiscere,
UBI me excarnufices—* Heaut. IV. 6.

where *UBI* relates to *res*, and stands for *quibus rebus*.

IT

- It is in like manner that the *Relative* Ch. XL
 - *Pronoun* upon occasion becomes an *Interrogative*, at least in *Latin* and *English*.
 Thus *Horace*,

QUEM *Virum aut Heroa lyrâ, vel acri*
Tibiâ sumes celebrare, Clio ?

So *Milton*,

WHO *first seduc'd them to that foul re-*
volt ?

THE reason of all this is as follows,
The Pronoun and Adverbs here mentioned are all alike, in their original character, RELATIVES. Even when they become Interrogatives, they lose not this character, but are still Relatives, as much as ever. The difference is, that *without* an Interrogation, they have reference to a Subject, which is *antecedent, definite, and known*; *with* an Interrogation, to a Subject which is *subsequent, indefinite, and unknown*, and
 which

Ch. XI. which it is expected that *the Answer* should express and ascertain.

Who first seduc'd them? —

The very Question itself supposes a Seducer, to which, though *unknown*, the Pronoun, *Who*, has a *reference*.

Th' infernal Serpent —

Here in the *Answer* we have *the Subject*, which was *indefinite*, *ascertained*; so that the *Who* in the *Interrogation* is (we see) as much a *Relative*, as if it had been said originally, without any *interrogation* at all, *It was the infernal SERPENT, who first seduced them.*

AND thus is it that *Interrogatives* and *Relatives* mutually pass into each other.

AND so much for *ADVERBS*, peculiar to Verbs properly so called. We have already spoken of those, which are common to all *Attributives*. We have *like-wise*

wise attempted to explain *their general* Ch. XL.
Nature, which we have found to consist
 in being *the Attributes of Attributes*.
 There remains only to add, that AD-
 VERBS *may be derived from almost every*
Part of Speech : from PREPOSITIONS, as
 when from *After* we derive *Afterwards*—
 from PARTICIPLES, and through these
 from *Verbs*, as when from *Know* we de-
 rive *Knowing*, and thence *Knowingly* ;
 from *Scio*, *Sciens*, and thence *Scienter*—
 from ADJECTIVES, as when from Vir-
 tuous and Vicious, we derive *Virtuously*
 and *Viciously*—from SUBSTANTIVES, as
 when from Πιθήκη, *an Ape*, we derive
 Πιθήκειον βλέπειν, *to look APISHLY* ; from
 Λέων, *a Lion*, Λεοντωδῶς, *Leoninely*—nay
 even from PROPER NAMES, as when
 from *Socrates* and *Demosthenes*, we de-
 rive *Socratically* and *Demosthenically*.—
It was Socratically reasoned, we say ; *it*
was Demosthenically spoken.* Of the
 same

* Aristotle has Κυκλοπικῶς *Cyclopically*, from Κύκλωψ
 Cyclops. Eth. Nic. X. 9.

~~CH. XX~~ ~~amongst~~ ~~all~~ ~~many~~ others, cited by the
~~old~~ ~~Grammarians~~, such as *Catilius*
from Catilius, *Silius* *from Silius*,
Tullius *from Tullius*, &c.⁽¹⁾

Now are they that extensive only in
Derivation, but in *Signification* also.
Thucydides *Galla* in his *Grammar* informs
us,⁽²⁾ that *Adjectives* may be found in
every one of the *Establishments*, and that
the readiest way to reduce their *Infini-*
tude, was to reduce them by classes to
those ~~ten~~ *universal* *Genera*. The *Stoics*
too called the *ADVERB* by the name of
Παράθετος, and that from a view to the
same *multiform Nature*. *Omnia in se*
rapit quasi collata per satiram, concessa
vbi rerum varia potestate. It is thus
that *Suspater* explains the Word,⁽³⁾ from
whose

⁽¹⁾ See *Princ. L. XV. p. 1092. Sss. Charis. 161.*
Nitt. Putschii.

⁽²⁾ — *ὅτι ἡ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὅλων*
ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, ὅπως τῶν, ἡ τ. λ. Gram.
Introduct. L. II.

⁽³⁾ *Suspater Char. p. 175. Edit. Putschii.*

whose authority we know it to be *Ch. XI.*
Stoical. But of this enough.

AND now having finished these PRINCIPAL PARTS of Speech, the SUBSTANTIVE and the ATTRIBUTIVE, which are SIGNIFICANT WHEN ALONE, we proceed to those AUXILIARY PARTS, which are ONLY SIGNIFICANT, WHEN ASSOCIATED. But as these make the Subject of a Book by themselves, we here conclude the first Book of this Treatise.

P 2

HER-

Ch. I.

DEFINITIVES, the Subject of the present Chapter, are commonly called by Grammarians, ARTICLES, ARTICULI, Ἀρθρα. They are of two kinds, either those *properly and strictly so called*, or else the *Pronominal Articles*, such as *This, That, Any, &c.*

WE shall first treat of those *Articles more strictly so denominated*, the reason and use of which may be explained, as follows.

THE visible and individual Substances of Nature are infinitely more numerous, than for each to admit of a particular Name. To supply this defect, when any Individual occurs, which either wants a proper Name, or whose proper Name is not known, we ascertain it, as well as we can, by referring it to its Species ; or, if the Species be unknown, then at least to some Genus. For example—a certain Object occurs, with a
head

HERMES
OR
A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY

CONCERNING

UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Concerning Definitives.

WHAT remains of our Work, is a matter of less difficulty, it being the same here, as in some Historical Picture; when the principal Figures are once formed, it is an easy labour to design the rest.

Ch. I.

P 3

DE-

Ch. 1. goes a Beggar with a long Beard. The Man departs, and returns a Week after. What do I say then?—There goes THE Beggar with the long Beard. The Article only is changed, the rest remains unaltered.

YET mark the force of this apparently minute Change. The Individual, *once vague*, is now recognized as *something known*, and that merely by the efficacy of this latter Article, which tacitly insinuates a kind of previous acquaintance, by referring the present Perception to a like Perception already past.^(a)

THE Truth is, the Articles (A) and (THE) are both of them *definitives*, as they circumscribe the latitude of Genera and Species, by reducing them for the most

^(a) See B. I. c. 5. p. 63, 64.

most part to denote Individuals. The Ch. I.
 difference however between them is this; }
 the Article (A) leaves the Individual it-
 self *unascertained*, whereas the Article
 (THE) *ascertains the Individual also*, and
 is for that reason the more accurate De-
 finitive of the two.

IT is perhaps owing to the imperfect
 manner, in which the Article (A) de-
 fines, that the *Greeks* have no Article
 correspondent to it, but supply its place,
 by a negation of their Article, 'Ο. 'Ο
 ἄνθρωπος ἐπέσεν, THE man fell— ἄν-
 θρωπος ἐπέσεν, A Man fell without any
 thing prefixed, but only the Article with-
 drawn.^(b) Even in *English*, where the
 Article

(b) Τὰ γὰρ ἀοριστῶς πῶτι νοόμενα, ἢ τῷ ἄρθρῳ παραθέσιν
 ὑπὸ ὀρισμὸν τῷ προσώπῳ ἄγει. *Those things, which are at
 times understood indefinitely, the addition of the Article
 makes to be definite as to their Person.* Apoll. L. IV.
 c. 1. See of the same author, L. I. c. 6, 36. ποιῇ (τὸ
 "Ἀρθεῖν sc.) ὃ ἀναπόλησιν προσγενομένη τῷ ἐν τῇ συντάξει οἷον ἔ-
 2 μὲ

Ch. I. Article (*A*) cannot be used, as in plurals, its force is express by the same Negation. *Those are THE Men*, means those are Individuals, of which we possess some previous Knowledge. *Those are Men*, the Article apart, means no more than that they are so many *vague* and *uncertain* Individuals, just as the Phrase, *A Man*, in the singular, implies one of the same number.

BUT

μὴν λέγει τις, ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ ΗΚΕ, ἄδελον τίνα ἄνθρωπον λέγει. εἰ δὲ Ο ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ, δῆλον, προσγεωσμένον γὰρ τινα ἄνθρωπον λέγει. Τῆτο δὲ αὐτὸ βάλονται καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες τ' ἀεθρον σημαντικὸν πρώτης γνώσεως καὶ δευτέρας. *The Article causes a Review within the Mind of something known before the texture of the Discourse. Thus if any one says* "Ἀνθρωπος ἦκε, MAN CAME (which is the same, as when we say in English a man came) it is not evident, of whom he speaks. But if he says ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦκε, THE MAN CAME, then it is evident; for he speaks of some Person known before. And this is what those mean who say that the Article is expressive of the First and Second Knowledge together. Theod. Gazæ. L. IV.

BUT tho' the *Greeks* have no Article correspondent to the Article (A,) yet nothing can be more nearly related, than their 'Ο, to the Article THE, 'Ο βασιλεὺς, THE King; ΤΟ δῶρον, THE Gift, &c. Nor is this only to be proved by parallel examples, but by the Attributes of the *Greek* Article, as they are described by *Apollonius*, one of the earliest and most acute of the old Grammarians, now remaining.

Ἔστιν ὅν καθὼ καὶ ἐν ἀλλοις ἀπεφηνάμεθα, ἴδιον ἄρθρων ἢ ἀναφορὰ, ἢ ἐς προκατελεγμένον προτῶν παραστατική.—Now the peculiar Attribute of the Article, as we have shewn elsewhere, is that Reference, which implies some certain Person already mentioned. Again—'Οὐ γὰρ δήγε τὰ ὀνόματα ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφορὰν παρίσχησιν, εἰ μὴ συμπαραλάβοιεν τὸ ἄρθρον, ὃ ἐξαιρέτως ἐστίν ἢ ἀναφορὰ. For Nouns of themselves imply not Reference, unless they take to them the Article,

Ch. I. *ticle, whose peculiar Character is Reference. Again—Τὸ ἄρθρον προῦφεσῶσαν γινώσκουσιν δὴλοῖ—The Article indicates a pre-established acquaintance.*^(c)

HIS reasoning upon *Proper Names* is worth remarking. *Proper Names* (he tells us) often fall into *Homonymie*, that is, different Persons often go by the same Name. To solve this ambiguity, we have recourse to *Adjectives* or *Epithets*. For example—there were two *Grecian* chiefs, who bore the name of *Ajax*. It was not therefore without reason, that *Menestheus* uses *Epithets*, when this intent was to distinguish the one of them from the other.

Ἀλλὰ

^(c) *Apoll. de Synt. L. I. c. 6, 7.* His account of REFERENCE is as follows—Ἰδίωμα ἀναφορᾶς προκαταλεγμένη προσώπων δευτέρᾳ γινώσις, *The peculiar character of Reference is the second or repeated Knowledge of some Person, already mentioned. L. II. c. 3.*

Ἀλλὰ περ οἷο ἵτω Τελαμώνιῳ ἄλκιμῳ Ch. I.
Αἴας. Hom.

*If both Ajaxes (says he) cannot be spared,
——at least alone
Let mighty Telamonian Ajax come.*

Apollonius proceeds——Even *Epithets* themselves are diffused thro' various Subjects, in as much as the same Adjective may be referred to many Substantives.

IN order therefore to render both Parts of Speech equally definite, that is to say the Adjective as well as the Substantive, the Adjective itself assumes *an Article* before it, that it may indicate *a Reference to some single Person only*, μοναδικὴ ἀναφορά, according to the Author's own Phrase. And thus it is we say, Τρύφων ὁ Γραμματικὸς, *Trypho THE Grammarian*; Ἀπολλόδωρῳ ὁ Κυρηναίῳ, *Apollodorus THE Cyrenean*, &c. The Author's

Ch. I.

Author's Conclusion of this Section is worth remarking. Δεόντως ἄρα καὶ κατὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡ πρόσθεσις ἐστὶ τῷ ἄρθρῳ, συνιδιάζουσα τὸ ἐπιθετικὸν τῷ κυρίῳ ὀνόματι—*It is with reason therefore that the Article is here also added, as it brings the Adjective to an Individuality, as precise, as the proper Name.*^(d)

WE may carry this reasoning farther, and shew, how by help of the *Article* even common *Appellatives*, come to have the force of *proper Names*, and that unassisted by epithets of any kinds. Among the *Athenians* Πλοῖον meant *Ship*; Ἐνδεκα, *Eleven*; and Ἀνθρωπῶν, *Man*. Yet add but the *Article*, and τὸ Πλοῖον, *THE SHIP*, meant *that particular Ship, which they sent annually to Delos*; οἱ Ἐνδεκα, *THE ELEVEN* meant *certain Officers of Justice*; and ὁ Ἀνθρωπῶν, *THE MAN*, meant *their public Executioner*. So in *English*,
City,

^(d) See *Apoll. L. I. c. 12.* where by mistake *Menelaus* is put for *Menestheus*.

City, is a Name common to many places; Ch. L
 and *Speaker*, a Name common to many
 Men. Yet if we prefix the Article, THE
 CITY means our Metropolis; and THE
 SPEAKER, a *high Officer* in the *British*
 Parliament.

AND thus it is by an easy transition,
 that the Article, from denoting *Reference*,
 comes to denote *Eminence* also;
 that is to say, from implying an *ordinary*
 pre-acquaintance, to presume a kind of
general and universal Notoriety. Thus
 among the *Greeks* Ὁ Ποιητής, THE POET,
 meant *Homer*^(e); and Ὁ Σταγειρίτης, THE
 STAGIRITE, meant *Aristotle*; not that
 there

(e) There are so few exceptions to this Observation,
 that we may fairly admit it to be generally true. Yet
Aristotle twice denotes *Euripides* by the Phrase ὁ ποιητής,
 once at the end of the seventh Book of his *Nicomachean*
Ethics, and again in his *Physics*, L. II. 2. *Plato* also in
 his tenth Book of *Laws* (p. 901. Edit. Serr.) denotes
Hesiod after the same manner.

Ch. I.

there were not many Poets, beside *Homer*; and many *Stagirites*, beside *Aristotle*; but none equally illustrious for their Poetry and Philosophy.

IT is on a like principle that *Aristotle* tells us, it is by no means the same thing to assert—*εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν*, or, *τὸ ἀγαθόν*—that, *Pleasure is a Good*, or, *THE GOOD*. The first only makes it a common *Object of Desire*, upon a level with many others, which daily raise our wishes; the last supposes it *that supreme and sovereign Good*, the ultimate Scope of all our Actions and Endeavours.⁽¹⁾

BUT to pursue our Subject. It has been said already that the Article has no meaning, but when associated to some other word.—To what words then may it be associated?—To such as require

⁽¹⁾ *Analyt. Prior. L. I. c. 40.*

quire *defining*, for it is by nature a *Definitive*.—And *what Words* are these?—Ch. I.
 Not those which already are *as definite*,
as may be. Nor yet those, which, *being*
indefinite, cannot properly be made other-
wise. It remains then they must be
those, which though indefinite, are yet ca-
pable, through the Article, of becoming
definite.

UPON these Principles we see the rea-
 son, why it is absurd to say, Ο ΕΓΩ, THE
 I, or Ο ΣΥ, THE THOU, because nothing
 can make those Pronouns more *definite*,
 than they are. (s) The same may be as-
 serted

(s) Apollonius makes it part of the Pronoun's Defini-
 tion, to refuse co-alescence with the Article. 'Εκείνο δὲ
 ἄντωνυμία, τὸ μετὰ διέξεως ἢ ἀναφορᾶς ἀντονομαζόμενον, ᾧ ἢ σύν-
 ης, τὸ ἄρθρον. *That therefore is a Pronoun, which with*
Indication or Reference is put for a Noun, and with
WHICH THE ARTICLE DOETH NOT ASSOCIATE. L. II. c. 5.
 So Gaza, speaking of Pronouns—πάντα δὲ—ἐκ ἐπιδήχοντα
 ἄρθρον. L. IV. Priscian says the same. *Jure igitur*
apud Græcos prima et secunda persona pronominum, quæ

Ch. I.


sorted of Proper Names, and though the *Greeks* say ὁ Σαρπητῆς, ἡ Ξάνθικτις, and the like, yet the Article is a mere Pleonasm, unless perhaps it serve to distinguish Sexes. By the same rule we cannot say in *Greek*, Οἱ Ἀμφοτέροι, or in *English*, THE BOTH, because these Words in *their own nature* are each of them perfectly defined, so that to define them farther would be quite superfluous.— Thus, if it be said, *I have read BOTH Poets*, this plainly indicates a definite pair, of whom some mention has been made already; Δις ἐγνωμένον, a known *Dead*, as *Apollonius* expresses himself, ^{b)} when he speaks of this Subject. On the contrary, if it be said, *I have read Two Poets*, this may mean any pair out of

sine dubio demonstrativa sunt, articulis adungi non possunt; nec tamen quando demonstrativa est. L. XII. p. 938. — In the beginning of the same Book, he gives the true reason of this. *Supra omnes alias partes orationis FINIT PERSONAS PRONOMEN.*

(^b) *Apollon.* L. I. c. 16.

of all that ever existed. And hence this Numeral, being in this Sense *indefinite* (as indeed are all others, as well as itself) is forced to assume the Article, whenever it would become *definite*.* And thus it is, THE Two in *English*, and ΟΙ ΔΥΟ in *Greek*, mean nearly the same thing, as BOTH or ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ.—Hence also it is, that as Two, when taken alone, has reference to some *primary* and *indefinite* Perception, while the Article, THE, has reference to some *secondary* and *definite*†; hence I say the Reason, why it is bad *Greek* to say ΔΥΟ ΟΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, and bad *English*, to say TWO THE MEN. Such Syntax is in fact a *Blending of Incompatibles*, that is

Q 2

to

* This explains *Servius* on the XIIth *Æneid*. v. 511. where he tells us that *Duorum* is put for *Amborum*. In *English* or *Greek* the Article would have done the business, for the *Two*, or τοῖν δυοῖν are equivalent to *Both* or ἀμφοτέρων, but not so *Duorum*, because the *Latins* have no Articles to prefix.

† Sup. p. 215, 216.

Ch. I. to say of a *defined Substantive* with an *undefined Attributive*. On the contrary to say in *Greek* ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ ΟΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, or in *English*, BOTH THE MEN, is good and allowable, because the Substantive cannot possibly be less apt, by being defined, to coalesce with an Attributive, which is defined as well as itself. So likewise, it is correct to say, ΟΙ ΔΥΟ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, THE TWO MEN, because here the Article, being placed in the beginning, *extends its Power* as well through Substantive as Attributive, and equally contributes to *define* them both.

As some of the words above admit of no Article, *because they are by Nature as definite as may be*, so there are others, which admit it not, *because they are not to be defined at all*. Of this sort are all INTERROGATIVES. If we question about *Substances*, we cannot say ΟΤΙΣ ΟΥΤΟΣ, THE WHO IS THIS; but ΤΙΣ ΟΥΤΟΣ,

ΟΤΟΣ, WHO IS THIS?⁽ⁱ⁾ The same as to *Qualities* and both kinds of *Quantity*. We say without an Article, ΠΟΙΟΣ ΠΟΣΟΙ, ΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ, in *English*, WHAT SORT OF, HOW MANY, HOW GREAT. The Reason is, that the Articles 'O and THE, respect Beings, *already known*; Interrogatives respect Beings, *about which we are ignorant*; for as to what we know, Interrogation is superfluous.

IN a word *the natural Associators with Articles* are all those *common Appellatives*, which denote the several Genera and Species of Beings. It is these, which, by assuming a different *Article*, serve either to explain an Individual upon its first being perceived, or else to indicate, upon its return, a Recognition, or repeated Knowledge.^(k)

Q 3

We

⁽ⁱ⁾ Apollonius calls ΤΙΣ, ἐναντιώτατος τῶν ἀφ' ἑσέων, a Part of Speech *most contrary, most averse to Articles*, L. IV. c. 1.

^(k) What is here said respects *the two Articles* which

Ch.I.

WE shall here subjoin a few Instances of the Peculiar Power of ARTICLES.

EVERY Proposition consists of a *Subject*, and a *Predicate*. In *English* these are distinguished by their Position, the Subject standing *first*, the Predicate *last*. *Happiness is Pleasure*—Here, *Happiness* is the *Subject*; *Pleasure*, the *Predicate*. If we change their order, and say, *Pleasure is Happiness*; then *Pleasure* becomes the *Subject*, and *Happiness* the *Predicate*. In *Greek* these are distinguished not by any Order or Position, but by help of the *Article*, which the Subject always assumes, and the Predicate in most instances (some few excepted) rejects. *Happiness is Pleasure*—ἡδονὴ ἡ εὐδαιμονία—*Pleasure is Happiness*—ἡ ἡδονὴ εὐδαιμονία—*Fine things are difficult*—χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ—*Difficult things are fine*—τὰ χαλεπὰ καλὰ.

In

we have in *English*. In *Greek* the Article does no more, than imply a *Recognition*. See before p. 216, 217, 218.

IN *Greek* it is worth attending, how in the same Sentence, the same *Article*, by being prefixed to a different Word, quite changes the whole meaning. For example—Ὁ Πτολεμαῖος γυμνασιάρχης, ἐτιμήθη—*Ptolemy, having presided over the Games, was publickly honoured.* The Participle γυμνασιάρχης has here no other force, than to denote to us *the Time, when* Ptolemy was honoured, viz. after having presided over the Games. But if, instead of the Substantive, we join the Participle to the *Article*, and say, Ὁ γυμνασιάρχης Πτολεμαῖος ἐτιμήθη, our meaning is then—*The Ptolemy, who presided over the Games, was honoured.* The Participle in this case, being joined to *the Article*, tends tacitly to indicate not one *Ptolemy* but many, of which number a particular one participated of honour.⁽¹⁾

Q 4

IN

⁽¹⁾ *Apollon. L. I. c. 33, 34.*

Ch. I.

IN *English* likewise it deserves remarking, how the Sense is changed by changing of the *Articles*, tho' we leave every other Word of the Sentence untouched.—*And Nathan said unto David, THOU ART THE MAN.** In that single *THE*, that diminutive Particle, all the force and efficacy of the Reason is contained. By that alone are the Premises applied, and so firmly fixed, as never to be shaken. It is possible this Assertion may appear at first somewhat strange; but let him, who doubts it, only change the *Article*, and then see what will become of the Prophet and his reasoning.—*And Nathan said unto David, THOU ART A MAN.* Might not the King well have demanded upon so impertinent a position.

Non dices hodie, quorsum hæc tam putida tendant?

BUT

* ΣΤ ΕΙ 'Ο ΑΝΗΡ. Βασιλ. Β'. κρη. Γ'.

BUT enough of such Speculations. Ch. I.
 The only remark, which we shall make
 on them, is this ; that “ minute Change
 “ in PRINCIPLES leads to mighty
 “ Change in EFFECTS ; so that well are
 “ PRINCIPLES intitled to our regard,
 “ however *in appearance* they may be
 “ trivial and low.”

THE ARTICLES already mentioned
 are those *strictly* so called ; but besides
 these there are the PRONOMINAL AR-
 TICLES, such as, *This, That, Any, Other,*
Some, All, No, or None, &c. Of these
 we have spoken already in our Chapter
 of Pronouns,^(m) where we have shewn,
 when

^(m) See B. I. c. 5. p. 72, 73. It seems to have been
 some view of words, like that here given, which induced
Quintilian to say of the *Latin Tongue*—*Noster sermo Ar-*
ticulos non desiderat ; ideoque in alius partes orationis spar-
guntur. Inst. Orat. L. I. c. 4. So *Scaliger.* *His de-*
claratis, satis constat Græcorum Articulos non neglectos a
nobis, sed eorum usum superfluum. Nam ubi aliquid præ-
scribendum est, quod Græci per articulum efficiunt (ἰλιξιν
 ἰ δῶλος)

Ch. I. when they may be taken as Pronouns, and when as Articles. Yet in truth it must be confessed, if the Essence of an Article be *to define and ascertain*, they are much more properly Articles, than any thing else, and as such should be considered in Universal Grammar.— Thus when we say, *THIS Picture I approve, but THAT I dislike*, what do we perform by the help of these Definitives, but bring down the common Appellative to denote two Individuals, the one as *the more near*, the other as *the more distant*? So when we say, *SOME men are virtuous, but ALL men are mortal*, what is the natural Effect of *this ALL* and *SOME*, but to define that *Universality*, and *Particularity*, which would remain

ὁ δὲλος) expletur a Latinis per Is aut ILLE; Is, aut, Ille servus dixit, de quo servo antea facta mentio sit, aut qui alio quo pacto notus sit. Additur enim Articulus ad rei memoriam renovandam, cujus antea non nescii sumus, aut ad prescribendam intellectionem, quæ latius putere queat; veluti cum dicimus, C. Cæsar, Is qui postea dictator fuit. Nam alii fuere C. Cæsares. Sic Græcè Καὶσαρὶς ὁ αὐτοκράτωρ. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 131.


remain indefinite, were we to take them away? The same is evident in such Sentences, as—*SOME substances have sensation ; OTHERS want it—Chuse ANY way of acting, and SOME men will find fault, &c.* For here *SOME, OTHER, and ANY,* serve all of them to *define* different Parts of a given Whole ; *SOME*, to denote a *definite Part* ; *ANY*, to denote an *indefinite* ; and *OTHER*, to denote the *remaining* Part, when a Part has been assumed already. Sometimes this last Word denotes a *large indefinite Portion*, set in opposition to some *single, definite, and remaining Part*, which receives from such Opposition no small degree of heightening. Thus *Virgil*,

*Excudent ALII spirantia mollius æra ;
(Credo equidem) vivos ducent de marmo-
re vultus ;*

*Orabunt causas melius, cælique meatus
Describent radio, et surgentia sidera
dicent :*

*TU regere imperio populos, ROMANE,
memento, &c.* *Æn. VI.*

NOTHING

Ch. I.  NOTHING can be stronger or more sublime, than this Antithesis; *one Act* set as equal to *many other Acts taken together*, and the Roman *singly* (for it is *Tu Romane*, not *Vos Romani*) to *all other Men*; and yet this performed by so trivial a cause, as the just opposition of ALII to TU.

BUT here we conclude, and proceed to treat of CONNECTIVES.

CHAP



CHAP. II.

*Concerning Connectives, and first those
called Conjunctions.*

CONNECTIVES are the subject of Ch. II.
what follows ; which, according as they
connect either *Sentences* or *Words*, are
called by the different Names of **CON-**
JUNCTIONS, or **PREPOSITIONS**. Of
these Names, that of the *Preposition* is
taken from a *mere accident*, as it com-
monly stands in connection before the
Part, which it connects. The name of
the *Conjunction*, as is evident, has refe-
rence to its *essential character*.

OF these two we shall consider the
CONJUNCTION first, because it connects,
not Words, but *Sentences*. This is con-
formable to the Analysis, with which we
began this inquiry*, and which led
us,

* Sup. p. 11, 12.

Ch. II. us, by parity of reason, to consider *Sentences themselves* before *Words*. Now the Definition of a CONJUNCTION is as follows—a *Part of Speech, void of Signification itself, but so formed as to help Signification, by making TWO or more significant Sentences to be ONE significant Sentence*^(a).

THIS

(a) Grammarians have usually considered the Conjunction as connecting rather *single Parts of Speech*, than *whole Sentences*, and that too with the addition of like with like, Tense with Tense, Number with Number, Case with Case, &c. This *Sanctius* justly explodes.—*Conjunctio neque casus, neque alias partes orationis (ut imperiti docent) conjungit, ipsæ enim partes inter se conjunguntur—sed conjunctio Orationes inter se conjungit.*—*Miner. L. III. c. 14.* He then establishes his doctrine by a variety of examples. He had already said as much, *L. I. c. 18.* and in this he appears to have followed *Scaliger*, who had asserted the same before him. *Conjunctionis autem notionem veteres paullo inconsultius prodidere; neque enim, quod aiunt, partes alias conjungit (ipsæ enim partes per se inter se conjunguntur)—sed conjunctio est, quæ conjungit Orationes plures.* *De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 165.*

This

THIS therefore being the general Ch. II.
 Idea of CONJUNCTIONS, we deduce
 their Species in the following manner.

CON-

This Doctrine of theirs is confirmed by *Apollonius*, who in the several places, where he mentions the Conjunction, always considers it in Syntax as connecting Sentences and not Words, though in his works now extant he has not given us its Definition. See L. I. c. 2. p. 14. L. II. c. 12. p. 124. L. III. c. 15. p. 234.

But we have stronger authority than this to support *Scaliger* and *Sanctius*, and that is *Aristotle's* Definition, as the Passage has been corrected by the best Critics and Manuscripts. A Conjunction, according to him, is *φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μιᾶς, σημαντικῆς δὲ, ποιῆν πεφυκυῖα μίαν φωνὴν σημαντικὴν*. An articulate sound, devoid of Signification, which is so formed as to make ONE significant articulate Sound out of several articulate Sounds, which are each of them significant. Poet. c. 20. In this view of things, the one significant articulate Sound, formed by the Conjunction, is not the Union of two or more Syllables in one simple Word, nor even of two or more Words in one simple Sentence, but of two or more simple Sentences in one complex Sentence, which is considered as ONE, from that Concatenation of Meaning effected by the Conjunctions. For example, let us take the Sentence, which follows. *If Men are by nature social, it is their*

HERMES.

THE CONJUNCTIONS, while they connect Sentences, either connect also their meanings or not. For example: let us take these

their Interest to be just, though it were not so ordained by the Laws of their Country. Here are three Sentences, (1.) *Men are by nature social.* (2.) *It is Man's Interest to be just.* (3.) *It is not ordained by the Laws of every Country that Man should be just.* The first two of these Sentences are made *One* by the Conjunction, *IF*; these, *One* with the third Sentence, by the Conjunction, *THO'*; and the three, thus united, make that *ῥωτὴ μία σημαίνουσα*, that one significant articulate Sound, of which Aristotle speaks, and which is the result of the conjunctive Power.

This explains a passage in his Rhetoric, where he mentions the same Subject. 'Ο γὰρ σύνδεσμος ἐν ποιεῖ τὸ πολλά ὥςτι ἐὰν ἐξαίρεθῇ, δῆλον ὅτι τεκαντίον εἶναι τὸ ἐν πολλά. *The Conjunction makes many, ONE; so that if it be taken away, it is then evident on the contrary that one will be MANY.* Rhet. III. c. 12. His instance of a Sentence, divested of its Conjunctions, and thus made *many* out of *one*, is, ἦλθον, ἀπήνησα, ἰδεόμεν, *veni, occurri, rogavi*, where by the way the three Sentences, resulting from this Dissolution, (for ἦλθον, ἀπήνησα, and ἰδεόμεν, are each of them, when unconnected, so many perfect Sentences) prove that these are the proper Subjects of the Conjunction's connective faculty.

Ammonius's

these two Sentences—*Rome was enslaved—Cæsar was ambitious*—and connect them together by the Conjunction *BECAUSE*. *Rome was enslaved, BECAUSE Cæsar was ambitious*. Here the *Meanings*, as well as the *Sentences*, appear to be connected. But if I say,—*Manners must be reformed, OR Liberty will be lost*—Here the Conjunction, *OR*, though it join the *Sentences*, yet as to their respective *Meanings*, is a perfect
Disjunc-

Ammonius's Account of the use of this Part of Speech is elegant. Διὸ καὶ τῶν λόγων ὁ μὲν ὑπαρξὶν μίαν σημαίνειν, ὁ κυρίως εἰς ἀνάλογον αὖ ἐστὶ τῷ μηδέπω τετμημένῳ ξύλῳ, καὶ διὰ τούτο ἐνὶ λεγομένῳ ὁ δὲ πλείονας ὑπάρξεις δηλῶν, ἵνα (lege διὰ) τινὰ δὲ σύνδεσμον ἠνώσθαι πως δοκῶν, ἀναλογεῖ τῇ ἐνὶ τῇ ἐκ πολλῶν συγκειμένῃ ξύλῳ ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν γόμφων φαινομένην ἐχέσθαι τὴν ἑνωσιν. *Of Sentences that, which denotes one Existence simply, and which is strictly ONE, may be considered as analogous to a piece of Timber not yet severed, and called on this account One. That, which denotes several Existences, and which appears to be made ONE by some Conjunctive Particle, is analogous to a Ship made up of many pieces of Timber, and which by means of the nails has an apparent Unity.* Am. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 54. 6.

Ch. II.

Disjunctive. And thus it appears, that though all Conjunctions *conjoin Sentences*, yet with respect to the *Sense*, some are CONJUNCTIVE, and some DISJUNCTIVE; and hence ^(b) it is that we derive their different Species.

The *Conjunctions which conjoin both Sentences and their Meanings*, are either COPULATIVES, or CONTINUATIVES. The principal Copulative in *English* is, AND. The Continuatives are IF, BECAUSE, THEREFORE, THAT, &c. The Difference between these is this—The *Copulative* does no more than barely *couple* Sentences, and is therefore applicable to all Subjects whose natures are not incompatible. *Continuatives*, on the contrary, by a more intimate connection, consolidate Sentences into one continuous

^(b) Thus Scaliger. *Aut ergo Sensum conjungunt, ac Verba; aut Verba tantum conjungunt, Sensum vero disjungunt.* De C. L. Lat. c. 167.

continuous Whole, and are therefore applicable only to Subjects, which have an *essential Co-incidence*. Ch. II.

To explain by examples—It is no way improper to say, *Lysippus was a Statuary, AND Priscian was a Grammarian—The Sun shineth, AND the Sky is clear*—because these are things that may co-exist, and yet imply no absurdity. But it would be absurd to say, *Lysippus was a Statuary, BECAUSE Priscian was a Grammarian*; tho' not to say, *the Sun shineth, BECAUSE the Sky is clear*. The Reason is, with respect to the first, the *Co-incidence* is merely *accidental*; with respect to the last, it is *essential*, and founded in nature. And so much for the Distinction between *Copulatives* and *Continuatives*^(c).

R 2

As

^(c) *Copulativa est, quæ copulat tam Verba, quam Sententiam.* Thus *Priscian*, p. 1026. But *Scaliger* is more explicit—*si Sententiam conjungunt (conjunctiones sc.) aut necessariò,*

Ch. II.

As to *Continuatives*, they are either *SUPPOSITIVE*, such as, *IF*; or *POSITIVE*, such as *BECAUSE*, *THEREFORE*, *As*, &c. Take Examples of each—you will live happily, *IF* you live honestly—you live happily, *BECAUSE* you live honestly. The Difference between these *Continuatives* is this—The *Suppositives* denote *Connection*, but assert not actual *Existence*; the *Positives* imply both the one and the other^(d).

FARTHER

cessariò, aut non necessariò: & si non necessario, tum fiunt Copulativæ, &c. De C. Ling. Lat. c. 167. Priscian's own account of Continuatives is as follows. Continuativæ sunt, quæ continuationem & consequentiam rerum significant—ibid. Scaliger's account is—causam aut præstitunt, aut subdunt. Ibid. c. 168. The Greek name for the Copulative was Σύνδεσμος συμπλεκτικός; for the Continuative, συναπτικός; the Etymologies of which words justly distinguish their respective characters.

^(d) The old *Greek* Grammarians confined the name Συναπτικοί, and the *Latins* that of *Continuativæ*, to those
Con-

FARTHER than this, the Positives Ch. II.
 above mentioned are either CAUSAL,
 such as, BECAUSE, SINCE, AS, &c.
 or COLLECTIVE, such as, THEREFORE,
 WHEREFORE, THEN, &c. The Dif-
 ference between these is this—The *Cau-*
sals subjoin *Causes to Effects*—*The Sun*
is in Eclipse, BECAUSE the Moon inter-

R 3

venes

Conjunctions, which we have called *Suppositive* or *Con-*
ditional, while the Positive they called *παρασυντακτικῶν*, or
Subcontinuativæ. They agree however in describing their
 proper characters. The first according to *Gaza* are,
 οἱ ὑπαζῖν μὲν ἔ, ἀκολουθίαν δὲ τινα καὶ τάξιν δηλοῦντες—L. IV.
Priscian says, they signify to us, *qualis est ordinatio &*
natura rerum, cum dubitatione aliquâ essentia rerum—p.
 1027. And *Scaliger* says, they conjoin *sine substituentiâ*
necessariâ; potest enim subsistere & non subsistere;
utrumque enim admittunt. Ibid. c. 168.. On the con-
 trary of the Positive, or *παρασυντακτικῶν* (to use his own
 name) *Gaza* tells us, ὅτι καὶ ὑπαζῖν μετὰ τάξεως σημαίνει
 ἕτοιγον—And *Priscian* says, *causam continuationis osten-*
dunt consequentem cum essentia rerum—And *Scaliger*, *non*
ex hypothesi, sed ex eo, quod subsistit, conjungunt. Ibid.

Ch. II. *venes—The Collectives subjoin Effects to Causes—The Moon intervenes, THEREFORE the Sun is in Eclipse.* Now we use *Causals* in those instances, where, the Effect being conspicuous, we seek its Cause; and *Collectives*, in *Demonstrations*, and *Science properly so called*, where

It may seem at first somewhat strange, why the *Positive* Conjunctions should have been considered as Subordinate to the *Suppositive*, which by their antient Names appears to have been the fact. Is it, that the *Positive* are confined to what *actually is*; the *Suppositive* extend to *Possibles*, nay even as far as to *Impossibles*? Thus it is false to affirm, *As it is Day, it is Light*, unless it *actually be* Day. But we may at midnight affirm, *If it be Day, it is Light*, because the, *Ir*, extends to *Possibles* also. Nay we may affirm, by its help (if we please) even *Impossibles*. We may say, *If the Sun be cubical, then is the Sun angular; If the Sky fall, then shall we catch Larks*. Thus too Scaliger upon the same occasion—*amplitudinem Continuativæ percipi ex eo, quod etiam impossibile aliquando præsupponit.* De C. L. Lat. C. 168. In this sense then the *Continuative*, *Suppositive* or *Conditional* Conjunction is, (as it were) superior to the *Positive*, as being of greater latitude in its application.

where the Cause being known first, by its help we discern consequences^(c). Ch. II.

ALL these *Continuatives* are resolvable into *Copulatives*. Instead of, *BECAUSE it is Day, it is light*, we may say, *It is Day, AND it is Light*. Instead of, *IF it be Day, it is Light*, we may say, *It is at the same time necessary to be Day, AND to be Light*; and so in other Instances. The Reason is, that the Power of the *Copulative* extends to all Connexions, as well to the *essential*, as to the *casual* or *fortuitous*. Hence therefore the *Continuative* may be resolved into a *Copulative* and something more, that is to say, into a *Copulative* implying an *essential* Co-incidence^(s) in the subjects conjoined.

R 4

As

(c) The *Latins* called the Causals, *Causales* or *Causativæ*; the Collectives, *Collectivæ* or *Illativæ*; The *Greeks* called the former *Ἀιτιολογικοί*, and the latter *Σύλλογιστικοί*.

(s) *Resolvuntur autem in Copulativas omnes hæ, propterea quod Causa cum Effectu Subjunctæ naturæ conjuncta est.* *Soul. de C. L. Lat. c. 169.*

h. II.

As to *Causal Conjunctions* (of which we have spoken already) there is no one of the four Species of Causes, which they are not capable of denoting: for example, THE MATERIAL CAUSE—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE it is made of Métal*—THE FORMAL—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE it is long and hollow*—THE EFFICIENT—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE an Artist blows it*—THE FINAL—*The Trumpet sounds, THAT it may raise our courage.* Where it is worth observing, that the three first Causes are express by the strong affirmation of the *Indicative Mode*, because if the Effect actually be, these must of necessity be also. But the last Cause has a different Mode, namely, the *Contingent* or *Potential*. The Reason is, that the Final Cause, tho' it may be *first in Speculation*, is always *last in Event*. That is to say, however it may be the End, which set the Artist first to work, it may still be an End beyond his Power to obtain, and which, like other Contingents, may
either

either happen or not^(g). Hence also Ch. II.
 it is connected by Conjunctions of
 a peculiar kind, such as, THAT, ἵνα,
 UT, &c.

THE Sum is, that ALL CONJUNCTIONS, *which connect both Sentences and their Meanings*, are either COPULATIVE, or CONTINUATIVE; the Continuatives are either *Conditional*, or *Positive*; and the Positives are either *Causal* or *Collective*.

AND now we come to the DISJUNCTIVE CONJUNCTIONS, a Species of Words which bear this contradictory Name, because, while they *disjoin the Sense*, they *conjoin the Sentences*^(h).

WITH

(g) See B. I. c. 8. p. 142. See also Vol. I. Note VIII. p. 271. For the four Causes, see Vol. I. Note XVII. p. 280.

(h) 'Οι δὲ διαζευκτικοὶ τὰ διαζευγμένα συντιθέασιν, καὶ ἡ πράγμα ἀπὸ πραγμάτων, ἡ πρόσωπον ἀπὸ προσώπου διαζευγνύσας, τῶν φρασιν ἐπισυνδύσιν. *Gram. L. IV. Disjunctiva*
sunt,

CH. II.

WITH respect to these we may observe, that as there is a Principle of UNION diffused throughout all things, by which THIS WHOLE is kept together, and preserved from Dissipation; so there is a Principle of DIVERSITY diffused in like manner, the Source of Distinction, of Number, and of Order⁽¹⁾.

Now

nunt, quæ, quævis dictiones conjungunt, sensum tamen disjunctum habent. Prisc. L. XVI. p. 1029. And hence it is, that a Sentence, connected by Disjunctives, has a near resemblance to a *simple negative Truth*.

For though this as to its Intellection be *disjunctive* (its end being to disjoin the Subject from the predicate) yet as it combines Terms together into one Proposition, it is as truly *synthetical*, as any Truth, that is *affirmative*. See Chap. I. Note (b) p. 3.

⁽¹⁾ The DIVERSITY, which adorns Nature may be said to heighten by degrees, and as it passes to different Subjects, to become more and more intense. Some things only differ, when considered as *Individuals*, but if we recur to their *Species*, immediately lose all Distinction: such for instance are *Socrates* and *Plato*. Others differ as to *Species*, but as to *Genus* are the same:

Now it is to express in some degree the Modifications of this Diversity, that DISJUNCTIVE CONJUNCTIONS seem first to have been invented.

OF these DISJUNCTIVES, some are SIMPLE, some ADVERSATIVE—*Simple*, as when we say, EITHER *it is Day*, OR *it is*

same: such are *Man* and *Lion*. There are others again, which differ as to *Genus*, and co-incide only in those *transcendental Comprehensions* of *Ens*, *Being*, *Existence*, and the like: such are *Quantities* and *Qualities*, as for example *an Ounce*, and the Colour, *White*. Lastly ALL BEING whatever differs, as *Being* from *Non-being*.

Farther, in all things different, however moderate their Diversity, there is an appearance of OPPOSITION with respect to each other, in as much as each thing is *it self*, and *not any* of the rest. But yet in all Subjects this Opposition is not *the same*. In RELATIVES, such as Greater and Less, Double and Half, Father and Son, Cause and Effect, in *these* it is *more striking*, than in ordinary Subjects, because *these* always shew it, by *necessarily inferring each other*. In CONTRARIES, such as Black and White, Even and Odd, Good and Bad,

Ch. II. *is Night—Adversative*, as when we say, *It is not Day, BUT it is Night*. The Difference between these is, that the simple do no more, than *merely disjoin*; the *Adversative* disjoin, with an *Opposition concomitant*. Add to this, that the *Adversative* are *definite*; the *Simple*, *indefinite*. Thus when we say, *The Number of*

Bad, Virtuous and Vitious, in these the *Opposition* goes still farther, because these not only *differ*, but are *even destructive of each other*. But the *most potent Opposition* is that of *Ἀντίφασις*, or *CONTRADICTION*, when we oppose *Proposition to Proposition, Truth to Falshood*, asserting of any Subject, *either it is, or it is not*. This indeed is an *Opposition*, which extends itself to all things, for every thing conceivable must needs have its *Negative*, though multitudes by nature have neither *Relatives*, nor *Contraries*.

Besides these Modes of *DIVERSITY*, there are others that deserve notice: such for instance, as the *Diversity* between the *Name* of a thing, and its *Definition*; between the *various Names*, which belong to the *same thing*, and the *various things*, which are denoted by the *same Name*; all which *Diversities* upon occasion become a Part of our Discourse. And so much, in short, for the Subject of *DIVERSITY*.

of Three is not an even Number, BUT an odd, we not only disjoin two opposite Attributes, but we definitely affirm one, and deny the other. But when we say, *The Number of the Stars is EITHER even OR odd*, though we assert one Attribute *to be*, and the other *not to be*, yet the Alternative notwithstanding is left indefinite. And so much for *simple Disjunctives*^(k).

Ch. II.

As

(k) The simple Disjunctive η , or *Vel*, is mostly used indefinitely, so as to leave an Alternative. But when it is used definitely, so as to leave no Alternative, it is then a perfect Disjunctive of the Subsequent from the Previous, and has the same force with ϵ η , or, *Et non*. It is thus *Gaza* explains that Verse of *Homer*.

Βέλομαι ἐγὼ λαὸν σὸόν ἕμμεναι, ἢ ἀπολείσθαι.

U. A.

That is to say, *I desire the people should be saved, AND NOT be destroyed*, the Conjunction η being *ἀναιρετικός*, or *sublative*. It must however be confessed, that this Verse is otherwise explained by an Ellipsis, either of $\mu\alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu$, or *autis* concerning which see the Commentators.

Ch. II.

As to *Adversative Disjunctives*, it has been said already that they imply *OPPOSITION*. Now there can be no *Opposition* of the *same Attribute*, in the *same Subject*, as when we say, *Nireus was beautiful*; but the *Opposition* must be either of the *same Attribute* in *different Subjects*, as when we say, *Brutus was a Patriot, BUT Cæsar was not*—or of *different Attributes* in the *same Subject*, as when we say, *Gorgias was a Sophist, BUT not a Philosopher*—or of *different Attributes* in *different Subjects*, as when we say, *Plato was a Philosopher, BUT Hippias was a Sophist*.

THE *Conjunctions* used for all these purposes may be called *ABSOLUTE ADVERSATIVES*.

BUT there are *other Adversatives*, besides these; as when we say, *Nireus was more beautiful, THAN Achilles—Virgil was as great a Poet, AS Cicero was an Orator*.

The

The Character of these latter is, that they go farther than the former, by marking not only *Opposition*, but that *Equality* or *Excess*, which arises among Subjects from their being *compared*. And hence it is they may be called ADVERSATIVES OF COMPARISON. Ch. II.

BESIDES the Adversatives here mentioned, there are two other Species, of which the most eminent are UNLESS and 'ALTHO'. For example—*Troy will be taken, UNLESS the Palladium be preserved*—*Troy will be taken, ALTHO' Hector defend it*. The nature of these *Adversatives* may be thus explained. As every *Event* is naturally *allied* to its *Cause*, so by parity of reason it is *opposed* to its *Preventive*. And as every *Cause* is either *adequate* ⁽¹⁾ or *in-adequate* (in-adequate,

(1) This Distinction has reference to common Opinion, and the form of Language, consonant thereto. In strict metaphysical truth, No Cause, that is not adequate, is any Cause at all.

Ch. II.

quate, when it endeavours, without being effectual) so in like manner is every *Preventive*. Now *adequate Preventives* are exprest by such Adversatives, as *UNLESS—Troy will be taken, UNLESS the Palladium be preserved*; that is, *This alone is sufficient to prevent it*. The *Inadequate* are exprest by such Adversatives, as *ALTHO'—Troy will be taken, ALTHO' Hector defend it*; that is, *Hector's Defence will prove in-effectual*.

THE Names given by the old Grammarians to denote these last Adversatives, appear not sufficiently to express their Natures^(m). They may be better perhaps called *ADVERSATIVES ADEQUATE AND IN-ADEQUATE*.

AND thus it is that all *DISJUNCTIVES*, that is *CONJUNCTIONS*, which con-
join

(m) They called them for the most part, without sufficient Distinction of their Species, *Adversativa*, or *Ἐναντιωματικοί*.

join Sentences, but not their Meanings, are Ch. II.
 either SIMPLE or ADVERSATIVE, and
 that all ADVERSATIVES are either *Ab-*
absolute or Comparative; or else Adequate
or In-adequate.

WE shall finish this Chapter with a few miscellany Observations.

IN the first place it may be observed, through all the Species of Disjunctives, that the *same* Disjunctive appears to have *greater or less* force, according as the Subjects, which it disjoins, are more or less disjoined by Nature. For example, if we say, *Every Number is even, or odd—Every Proposition is true, or false*—nothing seems to disjoin *more strongly* than the *Disjunctive*, because no things are in Nature more *incompatible* than the Subjects. But if we say, *That Object is a Triangle, or Figure contained under three right lines*—the (or) in this case hardly seems to disjoin, or indeed to do more, than *dis-*
 S *tinctly*

Ch. II. *tinctly* to express the Thing, first by its *Name*, and then by its *Definition*. So if we say, *That Figure is a Sphere, OR a Globe, OR a Ball*—the Disjunctive in this case, tends no farther to disjoin, than as it distinguishes the *several Names*, which belong to the *same Thing* ^(*).

AGAIN—the Words, *When* and *Where*, and all others of the same nature, such as, *Whence, Whither, Whenever, Wherever, &c.* may be properly called **ADVERBIAL CONJUNCTIONS**; because they participate the nature both of Adverbs and Conjunctions—*of Conjunctions*, as they *conjoin* Sentences; *of Adverbs*, as they denote

(*) The *Latins* had a peculiar Particle for this occasion, which they called *Subdisjunctiva*, a *Subdisjunctive*; and that was *SIVE*. *Alexander sive Paris; Mars sive Marors*. The *Greek* "ἢ" seems to answer the same end. Of these Particles, *Scaliger* thus speaks—*Et sane nomen Subdisjunctivarum recte acceptum est, neque enim tam planè disjungit, quam Disjunctivæ. Nam Disjunctivæ sunt in Contrariis—Subdisjunctivæ autem etiam in non Contrariis, sed Diversis tantum; ut, Alexander sive Paris.* De C.L. Lat. c. 170.

denote the Attributes either of *Time*, or *Place*. Ch. II.

AGAIN—these *Adverbial Conjunctions*, and perhaps *most of the Prepositions* (contrary to the Character of *accessory Words*, which have strictly no Signification, but when associated with other words) have a kind of *obscure Signification*, when taken alone, by denoting those Attributes of Time and Place. And hence it is, that they appear in Grammar, like *Zoophytes* in Nature; a kind of ^(o) *middle Beings*, of amphibious character, which, by sharing the Attributes of the higher and the lower, conduce to link the Whole together ^(p).

S 2

AND

^(o) Πολλαχού γὰρ ἡ φύσις δῆλη γίνεται κατὰ μικρὸν μεταβά-
 ῖνυσιν, ὥστε ἀμφισχητῆσθαι ἐπὶ τίνων, πότερον ζῶον ἢ φυτὸν.
Themist. p. 74. Ed. Ald. See also *Arist. de Animal.*
Part. p. 93. l. 10. Ed. Syll.

^(p) It is somewhat surprising that the politest and most elegant of the *Attic Writers*, and *Plato* above all
 the

AND so much for CONJUNCTIONS,
their Genus, and their Species.

CHAP.

the rest, should have their works filled with Particles of all kinds, and with Conjunctions in particular ; while in the modern polite works, as well of ourselves as of our neighbours, scarce such a word as a Particle, or Conjunction is to be found. Is it, that where there is *Connection in the Meaning*, there must be *Words had to connect* ; but that where the Connection is little or none, such connectives are of little use ? That Houses of Cards, without cement, may well answer their end, but not those Houses, where one would chuse to dwell ? Is this the Cause ? or have we attained an elegance, to the Antients unknown ?

Veniſmus ad ſummam fortunæ, &c.

CHAP. III.

*Concerning those Connectives, called
Prepositions.*

PREPOSITIONS by their name express Ch. III.
their *Place*, but not their *Character*.—
Their Definition will distinguish them
from the former Connectives. A PRE-
POSITION is a Part of Speech, devoid it-
self of Signification, but so formed as to
unite two Words that are significant, and
that refuse to co-alesce or unite of them-
selves ^(a). This connective Power, (which
S 3 relates

(a) The Stoic Name for a Preposition was Προθετικὸς
Σύνδεσμος, *Præpositiva Coniunctio*, a *Prepositive Coniunc-*
tion. Ὡς μὲν ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας παραθέσεις αἱ προθεσεις
συνδεσμικῆς συντάξεως γίνονται παρεμφατικά, λέλεκται ἡμῖν· ἐξ
ὧν καὶ ἀφορμὴ ἔγρηται παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς τὸ καλεῖσθαι αὐτὰς
Προθετικὰς Συνδέσμους. Note in what manner even in other
applications (besides the present) Prepositions give proof
of their Coniunctive Syntax, we have mentioned already;
whence

CL. III. "MAR, WHOSE ORIGINAL ARCHETYPES UNITE OF THEMSELVES IN "NATURE." To which we may add, as following from what has been said, that *the great Objects of Natural Union are SUBSTANCE and ATTRIBUTE.* Now tho' *Substances* naturally co-incide with their *Attributes*, yet they absolutely refuse doing so, *one with another* ^(b). And hence those known Maxims in Physics, that *Body is impenetrable*; that *two Bodies cannot possess the same place*; that *the same Attribute cannot belong to different Substances*, &c.

FROM these principles it follows, that when we form a Sentence, the *Substantive* without difficulty co-incides with the *Verb*, from the natural Co-incidence of *Substance* and *Energy*—THE SUN WARMETH. So likewise the *Energy* with

^(b) *Causa, propter quam duo Substantia non ponuntur sine copulâ, e Philosophiâ petenda est: neque enim duo substantialiter unum esse potest, sicut Substantia et Accidentis; itaque non dicas, CÆSAR, CATO PUGNAT. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 177.*

with the *Subject, on which it operates*— Ch. III.

WARMETH THE EARTH. So likewise both *Substance* and *Energy* with their proper *Attributes*.—THE SPLENDID SUN,

—GENIALLY WARMETH—THE FERTILE EARTH. But suppose we were

desirous to add other Substantives, as for instance, AIR, or BEAMS. How would these co-incide, or under what Character could they be introduced?

Not as *Nominatives* or *Accusatives*, for both those places are already filled;

the Nominative by the Substance, SUN; the Accusative by the Substance,

EARTH. Not as *Attributes* to these last, or to any other thing; for *Attri-*

butes by nature they neither are, nor can be made. Here then we perceive the

Rise and Use of PREPOSITIONS. By these we connect those Substantives to

Sentences, which at the time are unable to co-alesce *of themselves*. Let us assume

for instance a pair of these Connectives, THRO', and WITH, and mark their Ef-

fect upon the Substances here mentioned.

Ch. III.

tioned. *The splendid Sun* WITH *his Beams genially warmeth* THRO' *the Air the fertile Earth.* The Sentence, as before, remains *entire and one*; the *Substantives* required are both *introduced*; and not a Word, which was there before, is *detruded* from its proper place.

IT must here be observed that most, if not all Prepositions seem originally formed to denote the *Relations of PLACE* (c). The reason is, this is that grand *Relation*, which *Bodies* or *natural Substances* maintain at all times one to another, whether they are *contiguous* or *remote*, whether in *motion* or at *rest*.

IT may be said indeed that *in the Continuity of Place* they form this **UNIVERSE**

(c) *Omne corpus aut movetur aut quiescit: quare opus fuit aliquâ notâ, quæ TO ΠΟΤ significaret, sive esset inter duo extrema, inter quæ motus fit, sive esset in altero extremorum, in quibus fit quies. Hinc eliciemus Præpositionis essentialem definitionem. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 152.*

VERSE OF VISIBLE WHOLE, and are made as much ONE by that general Comprehension, as is consistent with their several Natures, and specific Distinctions. Thus it is we have Prepositions to denote the *contiguous Relation* of Body, as when we say, *Caius walketh WITH a Staff; the Statue stood UPON a Pedestal; the River ran OVER a Sand*; others for the *detached Relation*, as when we say, *He is going TO Italy; the Sun is risen ABOVE the Hills; these Figs came FROM Turkey*. So as to *Motion* and *Rest*, only with this difference, that *here* the Preposition varies its character with the Verb. Thus if we say, *that Lamp hangs FROM the Ceiling*, the Preposition, FROM, assumes a Character of *Quiescence*. But if we say, *that Lamp is falling FROM the Ceiling*, the Preposition in such case assumes a Character of *Motion*. So in *Milton*,

—*To support uneasy steps*

OVER the Burning Marle—Par. L. I.

Here OVER denotes *Motion*.

Again—

Ch. III. Again—

—*He—with looks of cordial Love*
Hung OVER her enamour'd—Par. L. IV.

Here OVER denotes *Rest*.

BUT though the original use of Prepositions was to denote *the Relations of Place*, they could not be confined to this Office only. They by degrees extended themselves to Subjects *incorporeal*, and came to denote Relations, as well *intellectual as local*. Thus, because in Place he, who is *above*, has commonly the advantage over him, who is *below*, hence we transfer OVER and UNDER to *Dominion and Obedience*; of a King we say, *he ruled OVER his People*; of a common Soldier, *he served UNDER such a General*. So too we say, *with Thought; without Attention; thinking over a Subject; under Anxiety; from Fear; out of Love; through Jealousy, &c.* All which instances, with many others of like

like kind, shew that the *first Words* of Ch. III.
Men, like their *first Ideas*, had an immediate reference to *sensible Objects*, and that in afterdays, when they began to discern with their *Intellect*, they took those Words, which they found *already* made, and transferred them by metaphor to *intellectual Conceptions*. There is indeed no Method to express new Ideas, but either this of *Metaphor*, or that of *Coining new Words*, both which have been practised by Philosophers and wise Men, according to the nature, and exigence of the occasion ^(d).

IN

(d) Among the Words new coined we may ascribe to Anaxagoras, Ὁμοιομετρία; to Plato, Ποιότης; to Cicero, Qualitas; to Aristotle, Ἐγγέλχεια; to the Stoics, Ὀντισ, κεράτις, and many others.—Among the Words transferred by Metaphor from common to special Meanings, to the Platonics we may ascribe Ἰδέα; to the Pythagoreans and Peripatetics, Κατηγορία, and Κατηγορεῖν; to the Stoics, Κατάληψις, ὑπόληψις, καθήκον; to the Pyrrhonists, Ἐξεσι, ἐνδύχεται, ἐπίχω, &c.

Ch. III. In the foregoing use of Prepositions, we have seen how they are applied *κατὰ παραθεσιν*, *by way of Juxta-position*, that is to say, where they are prefix to a Word, without becoming a Part of it. But

And here I cannot but observe, that he who pretends to discuss the Sentiments of any one of these Philosophers, or even to cite and translate him (except in trite and obvious sentences) without accurately knowing the *Greek Tongue* in general; the nice differences of many Words apparently synonymous; the peculiar Stile of the Author whom he pre-sumes to handle; the new coined Words, and new Significations given to old Words, used by such author, and his Sect: the whole Philosophy of such Sect, together with the Connections and Dependencies of its several Parts, whether Logical, Ethical, or Physical;—He I say, that, without this previous preparation, attempts what I have said, will shoot in the dark; will be liable to perpetual blunders: will explain, and praise, and censure merely by chance; and though he may possibly to Fools appear as a wise Man, will certainly among the wise ever pass for a Fool. Such a Man's Intellect comprehends ancient Philosophy, as his Eye comprehends a distant Prospect. He may see perhaps enough, to know Mountains from Plains, and Seas from Woods; but for an accurate discernment of particulars, and their character, this without farther helps, it is impossible he should attain.

But they may be used also κατὰ σύνθεσιν, Ch. III.
by way of Composition, that is, they may
 be prefixt to a Word, so as to become
 a real Part of it (e). Thus in *Greek* we
 have Ἐπίσασθαι, in *Latin*, *Intelligere*, in
English, to *Understand*. So also, to
foretel, to *overact*, to *undervalue*, to *out-*
go, &c. and in *Greek* and *Latin*, other
 instances innumerable. In this case the
 Prepositions commonly transfuse some-
 thing of their own Meaning into the
 Word, with which they are compound-
 ed; and this imparted Meaning in most
 instances will be found ultimately re-
 solvable into some of the Relations of
 PLACE, (f) as used either in its *proper*
 or *metaphorical* acceptation.

LASTLY,

(e) See *Gaz. Gram. L. IV. Cap. de Præpositione*.

(f) For example, let us suppose some given Space.
E and *Ex* signify *out of* that Space; *PER*, *through it*, from
 beginning to end; *IN*, *within it*; *SUB*, *under it*. Hence
 then

HERMES.

LASTLY, there are times, when Propositions totally lose their connective Nature,

E and PER in composition augment: *Enormis*, being not simply big, but big in excess; something out of the rule, and beyond the measure; *Dico*, to *Edico*, to speak out; whence *Edictum*, an *Edict*, something so effectually spoken, as all are supposed to hear, and all to obey. So *Terence*,

Dico, Edico vobis—*Eun. V. 5. 20.*

which (as *Donatus* tells us in his Comment) is an *Assertio*. *Fari*, to speak; *Effari*, to speak out—hence *Effatum*, an *Axiom*, or self-evident Proposition, something addressed as it were to all men, and calling for universal Assent. *Cic. Acad. II. 29. Permagmus, Perutilis*, great throughout, useful through every part.

On the contrary, *IN* and *SUB* diminish and lessen. *Injustus, Iniquus*, unjust, inequitable, that lies within Justice and Equity, that reaches not so far, that falls short of them; *Subniger, blackish; Subrubicundus, reddish;* tending to black, and tending to red, but yet under the standard, and below perfection.

Emo originally signified to take away; hence it came to signify to buy, because he, who buys, takes away his purchase. *INTER, Between*, implies Discontinuance, for

Nature, being converted into Adverbs, Ch. III.
and used in Syntax accordingly. Thus
Homer,

—Γέλασσε δὲ πᾶσα περὶ χθών.

—*And earth smil'd all around.*

IL. T. 362.

But of this we have spoken in a preceding Chapter^(s). One thing we must however observe, before we finish this Chapter, which is, that whatever we may be told of CASES in modern Languages, there are in fact no such things; but their force and power is exprest by
two

for in things continuous there can nothing lie between. From these two comes, *Interimo*, *to kill*, that is to say, *To take a Man away in the midst of Life, by making a Discontinuance of his vital Energy*. So also, *Perimo*, *to kill* a Man, that is to say, *to take him away thoroughly*; for indeed what more thorough taking away can well be supposed? The Greek Verb, *Ἀραιεῖν*, and the English Verb, *To take off*, seem both to carry the same allusion. And thus it is that Prepositions become Parts of other Words.

(s) See before, p. 205.

Ch. III. two Methods, either by *Situation*, or by *Prepositions*; *the Nominative and Accusative Cases* by *Situation*; *the rest*, by *Prepositions*. But this we shall make the Subject of a Chapter by itself, concluding here our Inquiry concerning *Prepositions*.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning Cases.

AS CASES, or at least their various Powers, depend on the knowledge partly of *Nouns*, partly of *Verbs*, and partly of *Prepositions*; they have been reserved, till those Parts of Speech had been examined and discussed, and are for that reason made the Subject of so late a Chapter, as the present. Ch. IV.

THERE are no CASES in the modern Languages, except a few among the *primitive Pronouns*, such as I and ME; JE, and MOY; and the *English Genitive*, formed by the addition of s, as when from *Lion*, we form *Lion's*; from *Ship*, *Ship's*. From this defect however we may be enabled to discover in some instances *what a Case is*, the *Periphrasis*,

T. 2
sis,

CH. IV. *sis*, which supplies its place, being *the Case* (as it were) *unfolded*. Thus *Equi* is analized into *Du Cheval*, *Of the Horse*, *Equo* into *Au Cheval*, *To the Horse*.— And hence we see that the GENITIVE and DATIVE CASES imply the joint Power of a *Noun* and a *Preposition*, the Genitive's Preposition being *A*, *De*, or *Ex*, the Dative's Preposition being *Ad*, or *Versus*.

WE have not this assistance as to the ACCUSATIVE, which in modern Languages (a few instances excepted) is only known from its position, that is to say, by being subsequent to its Verb, in the collocation of the words.

THE VOCATIVE we pass over from its little use, being not only unknown to the modern Languages, but often in the antient being supplied by the *Nominative*.


THE ABLATIVE likewise was used by the *Romans* only; a Case they seem

1

to

to have adopted *to associate with their* Ch. IV.
Prepositions, as they had deprived their
Genitive and *Dative* of that privilege;
 a Case certainly not necessary, because
 the *Greeks* do as well without it, and
 because with the *Romans* themselves it
 is frequently undistinguished.


THERE remains the NOMINATIVE;
 which whether it were a Case or no, was
 much disputed by the Antients. The
Peripatetics held it to be no Case, and
 likened the Noun, in this its *primary*
 and *original Form*, to a perpendicular
 Line, such for example, as the line
 AB.



The Variations from the Nominative,
 they considered as if AB were to fall
 from its perpendicular, as for example,
 to AC, or AD. Hence then they only

T 3

called

Ch. IV.  called these Variations ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ, CASUS, CASES, or FALLINGS. The *Stoics* on the contrary, and the Grammarians with them, made the *Nominative* a CASE also. Words they considered (as it were) *to fall from the Mind*, or *discursive Faculty*. Now when a Noun fell thence *in its primary Form*, they then called it ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΟΡΘΗ, CASUS RECTUS, AN ERECT, or UPRIGHT CASE or FALLING, such as AB, and by this name they distinguished the *Nominative*.—When it *fell from the Mind under any of its variations*, as for example in the form of a *Genitive*, a *Dative*, or the like, such variations they called ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΠΛΑΓΙΑΙ, CASUS OBLIQUI, OBLIQUE CASES, or SIDE-LONG FALLINGS (such as AC, or AD) in opposition to the other (that is AB) which was erect and perpendicular^(a). Hence too Grammarians called the Method of enumerating the various Cases of a Noun, ΚΛΙΣΙΣ, DECLINATIO, a DECLENSION, it being

(a) See *Ammon.* in *Libr. de Interpr.* p. 35.

ing a sort of *progressive Descent from* Ch. IV.
the Noun's upright Form thro' its various
declining Forms, that is, a Descent from
 AB, to AC, AD, &c.

OF these CASES we shall treat but of
 four, that is to say, the NOMINATIVE,
 the ACCUSATIVE, the GENITIVE, and
 the DATIVE.

IT has been said already in the pre-
 ceding Chapter, that the great Objects
 of natural Union are SUBSTANCE and
 ATTRIBUTE. Now from this *Natural*
Concord arises the *Logical Concord* of
 SUBJECT and PREDICATE, and the
Grammatical Concord of SUBSTANTIVE
 and ATTRIBUTIVE^(b). These CON-
 CORDS in SPEECH produce PROPOSИ-
 TIONS and SENTENCES, as that previ-
 ous CONCORD in NATURE produces
 NATURAL BEINGS. This being ad-

T 4

mitted,

^(b) See before, p. 264.

HOMO *est* **ANIMAL**, &c. When it has Ch. 1
 no Cases, (as happens with Verbs) it is
 forced to content itself with such assi-
 milations as it has, those of Number
 and Person*; as when we say, **CICERO**
LOQUITUR; **NOS LOQUIMUR**; **HOMI-**
NES LOQUUNTUR.

FROM what has been said, we may
 make the following observations—that
 as there can be no *Sentence without a*
Substantive, so that Substantive, if the
 Sentence be *regular*, is always denoted
 by a *Nominative*—that on this occasion
all the Attributives, that have Cases, ap-
 pear as *Nominatives* also—that there
 may be a regular and perfect Sentence
without any of the other Cases, but that
without one Nominative at least, this is
 utterly impossible. Hence therefore
 we form its Character and Description—
THE NOMINATIVE is that Case, without
which

* What sort of Number and Person Verbs have, see
 before, p. 170, 171.

Ch. IV. *which there can be no regular^(c) and perfect Sentence.* We are now to search after another Case.

WHEN the *Attributive* in any Sentence is some *Verb denoting Action*, we may be assured the *principal Substantive* is some *active efficient Cause*. So we may call *Achilles* and *Lysippus* in such Sentences as *Achilles vulneravit*, *Lysippus fecit*. But though this be evident and clearly understood, the Mind is still *in suspence*, and finds its conception *incomplete*. ACTION, it well knows, not only requires some *Agent*, but it must have a *Subject* also to work on, and it must produce some *Effect*. It is then to denote one of these (that is, the *Subject* or the *Effect*) that the Authors
of

^(c) We have added *regular* as well as *perfect*, because there may be *irregular* Sentences, which may be *perfect* without a *Nominative*. Of this kind are all Sentences, made out of those Verbs, called by the *Stoics* Παρασυνεζήματα or Παρακτινησθήματα, such as Σωκράτι μετὰ μέλι, *Socratem panitct*, &c. See before, p. 180.

of Language have destined THE ACCUSATIVE. *Achilles vulneravit HEC-
 REM*—here the Accusative denotes the Subject. *Lysippus fecit STATUAS*—
 here the Accusative denotes the Effect. By these additional Explanations the Mind becomes satisfied, and the Sentences acquire a Perfection, which before they wanted. In whatever other manner, whether figuratively, or with Prepositions, this Case may have been used, its first destination seems to have been that here mentioned, and hence therefore we shall form its Character and Description—THE ACCUSATIVE is that Case, which to an efficient Nominative and a Verb of Action subjoins either the Effect or the passive Subject. We have still left the Genitive and the Dative, which we investigate, as follows.

It has been said in the preceding Chapter^(d), that when the Places of the
 Nomi-

^(d) See before, p. 265.

Ch. IV. *Nominative* and the *Accusative* are filled by proper Substantives, other Substantives are annexed by the help of *Prepositions*. Now, though this be so far true in the modern Languages, that (a very few instances excepted) they know no other method, yet is not the rule of equal latitude with respect to the *Latin* or *Greek*, and that from reasons which we are about to offer.

AMONG the various Relations of Substantives denoted by Prepositions, there appear to be two principal ones; and these are, the *Term* or *Point*, which something commences FROM, and the *Term* or *Point*, which something tends to. These Relations the *Greeks* and *Latins* thought of so great importance, as to distinguish them, when they occurred, by peculiar *Terminations of their own*, which exprest their force, without the help of a *Preposition*. Now it is here we behold the Rise of the antient Genitive, and Dative,

tive, the GENITIVE *being formed to express all relations commencing FROM itself*; THE DATIVE, *all Relations tending TO itself*. Of this there can be no stronger proof, than the Analysis of these Cases in the modern Languages, which we have mentioned already^(c).

Ch. IV.

It is on these Principles that they say in Greek—*Ἀεομαι ΣΟΙ, δίδωμι ΣΟΙ*, OF *thee I ask, To thee I give*. The reason is, in requests the person requested is one whom something is expected *from*; in donations, the person presented, is one whom something passes *to*. So again—*(f) Πεποιήται λίθῳ*, *it is made of Stone*. Stone was the passive Subject, and thus it appears in the *Genitive*, as being the *Term from, or out of which*. Even in *Latin*, where the Syntax is more formal and strict, we read—

Implentur

^(c) See before, p. 275, 276.

^(f) *Χρυσῷ ποικιμίῳ, ἢ ἰλιβαίῳ*, *made of Gold and Ivory*. So says *Pausanias* of the *Olympian Jupiter*, L. V. p. 400. See also *Hom. Iliad*. Σ. 574.

Ch. IV. *Implentur veteris Bacchi, pinguisque fe-*
rinae. Virg.

The old Wine and Venison were the funds or stores, *of* or *from* which they were filled. Upon the same principles, Πίνω τῆ ὕδατος, is a Phrase in Greek; and *Je bois de l'eau*, a Phrase in French, as much as to say, *I take some or a certain part, FROM OR OUT OF a certain whole.*

WHEN we meet in Language such Genitives as *the Son of a Father*; *the Father of a Son*; *the Picture of a Painter*; *the Painter of a Picture*, &c. these are all RELATIVES, and therefore each of them reciprocally a *Term or Point* to the other, FROM OR OUT OF which it derives its *Essence*, or at least its *Intellection*.^(G)

THE

(G) All Relatives are said to reciprocate, or mutually infer each other, and therefore they are often exprest by this Case, that is to say, the Genitive. Thus *Aristotle*, Πάντα δι τὰ πρὸς τι πρὸς ἀντιθέτιστα λέγεται οἷον ὁ δὲ ἄλ-
 πότε

THE *Dative*, as it implies *Tendency* Ch. IV.
to, is employed among its other uses to
denote the FINAL CAUSE, that being
the Cause *to which* all Events, not for-
tuitous, may be said to tend. It is thus
used in the following instances, among
innumerable others.

——TIBI *suaveis dædala tellus*
Submittit flores—— Lucret.

——TIBI *brachia contrahit ardens*
Scorpius—— Virg. G. I.

——TIBI *serviat ultima Thule.*
Ibid.

AND so much for CASES; their Origin
and Use; a Sort of Formis, or Termina-
tions,

πότε δὲ λ^ο, καὶ ὁ δισπότης δὲ λ^ο δισπότης λέγεται εἶναι, καὶ τὸ δι-
πλάσιον ἡμίσε^ο διπλάσιον, καὶ τὸ ἡμισυ διπλάσι^ο ἡμισυ. *Om-*
nia vero, quæ sunt ad aliquid, referuntur ad ea, quæ re-
ciprocantur. Ut servus dicitur domini servus; et domi-
nus, servi dominus; necnon duplum, dimidii duplum; et
dimidium, dupli dimidium. Categor. C. VII.

Ch. IV. } tions, which we could not well pass over, from their great importance ⁽⁴⁾ both in the *Greek* and *Latin* Tongues; but which however, not being among the Essentials of Language, and therefore not to be found in many particular Languages, can be hardly said to fall within the limits of our Inquiry.

CHAP.

(b) Annon et illud observatione dignum (licet nobis modernis spiritus nonnihil redundat) antiquas Linguas plenas declinationum, casuum, conjugationum, et similium fuisse; modernas, his ferè destitutas, plurima per prepositiones et verba auxiliaria segnitè expedire? Sanè facile quis conjiciat (utcunque nobis ipsi placeamus) ingenia priorum seculorum nostris fuisse multo acutiora et subtiliora. Bacon. de Augm. Scient. VI. 1.

CHAP. V.

*Concerning Interjections—Recapitulation
—Conclusion.*

BESIDES the Parts of Speech before Ch. V.
mentioned, there remains THE INTER-
JECTION. Of this Kind among the
Greeks are ὦ, εὐ, αἰ, &c. among the
Latins, *Ah! Heu! Hei! &c.* among
the English, *Ah! Alas! Fie! &c.* These
the Greeks have ranged among their
Adverbs; improperly, if we consider the
Adverbial Nature, which always co-
incides with some Verb, as its Princi-
pal, and to which it always serves in the
character of an Attributive. Now IN-
TERJECTIONS *co-incide with no Part of
Speech, but are either uttered alone, or else
thrown into a Sentence, without altering
its Form, either in Syntax or Significa-
tion.* The Latins seem therefore to have
done better in† separating them by
themselves,

† *Vid. Servium in Æneid XII. v. 486.*

Ch. V. themselves, and giving them a name by way of distinction from the rest.

SHOULD it be ask'd, if not Adverbs, what then are they? It may be answered, not so properly Parts of Speech, as adventitious Sounds; certain VOICES OF NATURE, rather than Voices of *Art*, expressing those Passions and natural Emotions, which spontaneously arise in the human Soul, upon the View or Narrative of interesting Events^(a).

“ AND

(a) INTERJECTIONES a Græcis ad adverbia referuntur, atque eos sequitur etiam Boethius. Et recte quidem de iis, quando casum regunt. Sed quando orationi solum inseruntur, ut nota affectus, velut suspirii aut metus, vix videntur ad classem aliquam pertinere, ut quæ NATURALES sint NOTÆ; non, aliarum vocum instar, ex instituto significant. Voss. de Anal. L. I. c. 1. INTERJECTIO est Vox affectum mentis significans, ac citra verbi opem sententiam complens. Ibid. c. 3. Restat classium extrema, INTERJECTIO. Hujus appellatio non similiter se habet ac Conjunctionis.

“ AND thus we have found that ALL
 “ WORDS ARE EITHER SIGNIFICANT
 “ BY THEMSELVES, OR ONLY SIGNI-
 U 2 “ FICANT,

Ch. V.

junctionis. Nam cum hæc dicatur Conjunctio, quia conjungat; Interjectio tamen, non quia interjacet, sed quia interjicitur, nomen accepit. Nec tamen de ἑοῖα ejus est, ut interjiciatur; cum per se compleat sententiam, nec raro ad eâ incipiat oratio. Ibid. L. IV. c. 28. INTERJECTIONEM non esse partem Orationis sic ostendo: Quod naturale est, idem est apud omnes: Sed gemitus & signa lætitiæ idem sunt apud omnes: Sunt igitur naturales. Si vero naturales, non sunt partes Orationis. Nam eæ partes, secundum Aristotelem, ex instituto, non naturæ, debent constare. Interjectionem Græci Adverbiis adnumerant; sed falso. Nam neque, &c. Sanct. Miner. L. I. c. 2. INTERJECTIONEM Græci inter Adverbia ponunt, quoniam hæc quoque vel adjungitur verbis, vel verba ei subaudiuntur. Ut si dicam—Papæ! quid video?—vel per se—Papæ!—etiāsi non addatur, Miror; habet in se ipsius verbi significationem. Quæ res maxime fecit Romanarum artium Scriptores separatim hanc partem ab Adverbiis accipere; quia videtur affectum habere in sese Verbi, et plenam motus animi significationem, etiāsi non addatur Verbum, demonstrare. Interjectio tamen non solum illa, quæ dicunt Græci σχηλιασµοι, significat; sed etiā voces, quæ cujuscunque passionis animi pulsu per exclamationem interjiciuntur. Prisc. L. XV.

Ch. V.

" **SIGNIFICANT, WHEN ASSOCIATED—that**
 " *those significant by themselves, denote*
 " *either SUBSTANCES or ATTRIBUTES,*
 " *and are called for that reason SUB-*
 " *STANTIVES and ATTRIBUTIVES—*
 " *that the Substantives are either NOUNS*
 " *or PRONOUNS—that the ATTRIBU-*
 " *TIVES are either PRIMARY or SE-*
 " *CONDARY—that the Primary Attri-*
 " *butes are either VERBS, PARTICI-*
 " *PLES, or ADJECTIVES; the Secon-*
 " *dary, ADVERBS—Again, that the*
 " *Parts of Speech, only significant when*
 " *associated, are either DEFINITIVES*
 " *or CONNECTIVES—that the Defini-*
 " *tives are either ARTICULAR or PRO-*
 " *NOMINAL—and that the Connectives*
 " *are either PREPOSITIONS or CON-*
 " *JUNCTIONS.*"

AND thus have we resolved LAN-
 GUAGE, AS A WHOLE INTO ITS CON-
 STITUENT PARTS, which was the first
 thing

thing, that we proposed, in the course of this Inquiry. ^(b) Ch. V.

BUT now as we conclude, methinks I hear some Objector, demanding with an air of pleasantry, and ridicule—"Is there no speaking then without all this trouble? Do we not talk every one of us, as well unlearned, as learned; as well poor Peasants, as profound Philosophers?" We may answer by interrogating on our part—Do not those same poor Peasants use the Lever and the Wedge, and many other Instruments, with much habitual readiness? And yet have they any conception of those Geometrical Principles, from which those Machines derive their Efficacy and Force? And is the Ignorance of these Peasants, a reason for others to remain ignorant; or to render the Subject a less becoming Inquiry? Think of Animals, and Vegetables, that

U 3

occur

^(b) See before, p. 7.

cellent for the gauging of Liquors ; Ch. V.
Geometry, for the measuring of Estates ;
Astronomy, for the making of Alman-
nacks ; and Grammar perhaps, for the
drawing of Bonds and Conveyances.

THUS much to the *Sordid*—If the
Liberal ask for something better than
this, we may answer and assure them
from the best authorities, that every
Exercise of the Mind upon Theorems
of Science, like generous and manly
Exercise of the Body, tends to call
forth and strengthen Nature's original
Vigour. Be the Subject itself immedi-
ately lucrative or not, the Nerves of
Reason are braced by the mere Em-
ploy, and we become abler Actors in
the Drama of Life, whether our Part
be of the busier, or of the sedater
kind.

Ch. V.

PERHAPS too *there is a Pleasure even in Science itself*, distinct from any End, to which it may be farther conducive. Are not Health and Strength of *Body* desirable for their own sakes, tho' we happen not to be fated either for Porters or Draymen ; And have not Health and Strength of *Mind* their intrinsic Worth also, tho' not condemned to the low drudgery of sordid Emolument ? Why should there not be a *Good* (could we have the Grace to recognize it) *in the mere Energy of our Intellect*, as much as in *Energies of lower degree* ? The Sportsman believes there is Good in his Chace ; the Man of Gaiety, in his Intrigue ; even the Glutton, in his Meal. We may justly ask of these, *why they pursue such things* ; but if they answer, *they pursue them, because they are Good*, it would be folly to ask them farther, *WHY they PURSUE what is Good*. It might well in such case be replied on their

their behalf (how strange soever it may Ch. V.
at first appear) *that if there was not*
something GOOD, which was in no respect
USEFUL, even things useful themselves
could not possibly have existence. For
this is in fact no more than to assert,
that some things are ENDS, some
things are MEANS, and that if there
were NO ENDS, there could be of course
NO MEANS.

IT should seem then the Grand Question was, WHAT IS GOOD—that is to say, *what is that which is desirable, not for something else, but for itself*; for whether it be the Chace, or the Intrigue, or the Meal, may be fairly questioned, since Men in each instance are far from being agreed,

IN the mean time it is plain from daily experience, there are infinite Pleasures, Amusements, and Diversions, some for Summer, others for Winter; some for
Country,

Ch. V. Country, others for Town ; some, easy, indolent, and soft ; others, boisterous, active, and rough ; a multitude diversified to every taste, and which for the time are enjoyed as PERFECT GOOD, *without a thought of any End, that may be farther obtained.* Some Objects of this kind are at times sought by all men, excepting alone that contemptible Tribe, who, from a love to the Means of life wholly forgetting its End, are truly for that reason called *Misers*, or Miserable.

If there be supposed then a Pleasure, a Satisfaction, a Good, a Something valuable for its self without view to any thing farther, in so many Objects of the *subordinate* kind ; shall we not allow the same praise to the *sublimest* of all Objects ? Shall THE INTELLECT alone feel no pleasures *in its Energy*, when we allow them to the grossest Energies of Appetite, and Sense ? Or if the Reality of all Pleasures and Goods were

to be controverted, may not the *Intellectual* Sort be defended, as rationally as any of them? Whatever may be urged in behalf of the rest (for we are not now arraigning them) we may safely affirm of INTELLECTUAL GOOD, that it is “the Good of that Part, which is
 “most excellent within us; that it is a
 “Good accommodated to all Places
 “and Times; which neither depends
 “on the will of others, nor on the influence of external Fortune; that it
 “is a Good, which decays not with
 “decaying Appetites, but often rises
 “in vigour, when those are no more. ^(d)”

THERE is a Difference, we must own, between this *Intellectual* Virtue, and *Moral* Virtue. MORAL VIRTUE, from its Employment, may be called more HUMAN, as it tempers our Appetites

^(d) See Vol. I. p. 119, 120, &c.

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Or V. petites to the purposes of human Life.
 But **INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE** may be
 surely called more **DIVINE**, if we con-
 sider the Nature and Sublimity of its
 End.

INDEED for *Moral Virtue*, as it is
 almost wholly conversant about Ap-
 petites, and Affections, either to re-
 duce the natural ones to a proper
 Mean, or totally to expel the unna-
 tural and vitious, it would be impious
 to suppose **THE DEITY** to have occa-
 sion for such an Habit, or that any
 work of this kind should call for his
 attention. Yet **GOD IS**, and **LIVES**.
 So we are assured from Scripture it
 self. What then may we suppose the
DIVINE LIFE to be? Not a **Life of**
Sleep, as Fables tell us of *Endymion*.
 If we may be allowed then to con-
 jecture with a becoming reverence,
 what more likely, than **A PERPETUAL**
ENERGY OF THE PUREST INTELLECT

ABOUT

ABOUT THE FIRST, ALL-COMPREHENSIVE OBJECTS OF INTELECTION, WHICH OBJECTS ARE NO OTHER THAN THAT INTELLECT ITSELF? Ch. V. For in pure INTELECTION it holds the reverse of all Sensation, that THE PERCEIVER AND THING PERCEIVED ARE ALWAYS ONE AND THE SAME^(c).

IT was Speculation of this kind concerning THE DIVINE NATURE, which induced

(c) 'Εἰ ἐν ὅτῳ εὔρεται, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτε, ὁ Θεὸς αἰεὶ, θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, εἰ θαυμασιώτερον· ἔχει δὲ ὧδε, καὶ ζωὴ δὲ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ Νῦ ἐνέργεια, ζωὴ· Ἐκεῖνος δὲ, ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αὐτήν, ἐκείνη ζωὴ ἀείων καὶ αἰδίου. Φαμὲν δὲ τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι ζῶντα αἰδίον, ἀείων· ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ αἰδίου ὑπάρχει τῷ Θεῷ· ΤΟΥΤΟ γὰρ Ο ΘΕΟΣ. Τῶν μετὰ τὰ φουσ· Α'. Ζ'. It is remarkable in Scripture that God is peculiarly characterized as A LIVING GOD, in opposition to all false and imaginary Deities, of whom some had no pretensions to Life at all; others to none higher than that of Vegetables or Brutes; and the best were nothing better than illustrious Men, whose existence was circumscribed by the short period of Humanity.

Ch. V. induced one of the wisest among the Ancients to believe—"That the Man, "who could live in the pure enjoyment of his *Mind*, and who properly cultivated that *divine* Principle, was "*happiest in himself, and most beloved by the Gods.* For if the Gods had any regard to what passed among Men (as it appeared they had) it was probable they should rejoice in *that which was most excellent, and by nature the most nearly allied to themselves; and, as this was MIND, that they should requite the Man, who most loved and honoured This, both from his regard to that which was dear to themselves, and from his acting a Part, which was laudable and right (f).*"

AND

To the passage above quoted, may be added another, which immediately precedes it. Ἀὐτὸν δὲ καὶ ὁ νῦν κατὰ μετάληψιν τῷ νοητῷ νοητὸς γὰρ γίνεταί, διγ' αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος ὡς τὸν TAYTON NOYΣ KAI NOHTON.

(f) Ἡθικ' Νικομαχ' τὸ Κ'. κεφ. η.

AND thus in all SCIENCE there is Ch. V.
 something *valuable for itself*, because it
 contains within it something which is
divine.

END OF THE SECOND BOOK.

HER-



HERMES
OR
A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY
CONCERNING
UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

*Introduction—Division of the Subject into
its principal Parts.*

SOME things the MIND performs Ch. I.
thro' the BODY; as for example the various Works and Energies of Art.—
Others it performs *without such Medium*;
as for example, when it thinks, and reasons, and concludes. Now tho' the Mind, in either case, may be called the Principle or Source, yet are these last
X . . . more

Ch. I.

more properly *its own* peculiar Acts, as being immediately referable to its own innate Powers. And thus is MIND ultimately the Cause of all; of every thing at least that is *Fair* and *Good*.

AMONG those Acts of Mind more immediately its own, that of *mental Separation* may be well reckoned one.—*Corporeal* Separations, however accurate otherwise, are in one respect incomplete, as they may be repeated without end. The smallest Limb, severed from the smallest Animalcule (if we could suppose any instrument equal to such dissection) has still a triple Extension of length, breadth, and thickness; has a figure, a colour, with perhaps many other qualities; and so will continue to have, tho' thus divided to infinity. But ^(a) the *Mind* surmounts all power of *Concretion*,

^(a) *Itaque Naturæ faciendæ est prorsus Solutio & Separatio; non per Ignem certe, sed per Mentem, tanquam ignem divinum.* Bacon. Organ. Lib. II. 16.

cretion, and can place in the simplest manner every Attribute by itself, convex without concave; colour without superficies; superficies without Body; and Body without its Accidents; as distinctly each one, as tho' they had never been united. Ch. I.

AND thus it is that it penetrates into the recesses of all things, not only dividing them, as *Wholes*, into their *more conspicuous Parts*, but persisting, till it even separate those *Elementary Principles*, which, being blended together after a more mysterious manner, are united in the *minutest Part*, as much as in the *mightiest Whole*.^(b)

NOW if MATTER and FORM are among these Elements, and deserve perhaps to be esteemed as *the principal* among them, it may not be foreign to the Design of this Treatise, to seek whe-

X 2

ther

^(b) See below, p. 312.

Ch. I.

ther *these*, or *any thing* analogous to them, may be found in SPEECH or LANGUAGE.^(c) This therefore we shall attempt after the following method.

EVERY

(c) See before, p. 2. 7. MATTER and FORM (in Greek ΥΛΗ and ΕΙΔΟΣ) were Terms of great import in the days of antient Philosophy, when things were scrutinized rather at their beginning than at their End. They have been but little regarded by modern Philosophy, which almost wholly employs itself about the last order of Substance, that is to say, the *tangible, corporeal or concrete*, and which acknowledges no separations even in this, but those made by mathematical Instruments or Chemical Process.

The original meaning of the Word ΥΛΗ, was ΣΥΛΥΔ, a Wood. Thus Homer,

—Τρέμει δ' ἔρτα μακρὰ κ' ΥΛΗ,
Ποσσὶν ὑπ' ἀθανάτοισι Ποσειδάωνος ἰδντος.

*As Neptune past, the Mountains and the Wood
Trembled beneath the God's immortal Feet.*

Hence as WOOD was perhaps the first and most useful kind of Materials, the Word ὕλη, which denoted it, came to be by degrees extended, and at length to denote MATTER or MATERIALS in general. In this sense BRASS was called the ὕλη or Matter of a Statue; Stone, the ὕλη

EVERY thing in a manner, whether Ch. I.
 natural or artificial, is in its constitution
 X 3 com-

ἡλκ or *Matter* of a Pillar; and so in other instances.—
 The *Platonic Chalcidius*, and other Authors of the latter
 Latinity use *SYLVA* under the same extended and com-
 prehensive Signification.

Now as the Species of *Matter* here mentioned, (Stone,
 Metal, Wood, &c.) occur most frequently in common
 life, and are all nothing more than natural Substances or
 Bodies, hence by the Vulgar, *MATTER* and *BODY* have
 been taken to denote the same thing; *Material* to mean
Corporeal; *Immaterial*, *Incorporeal*, &c. But this was
 not the Sentiment of Philosophers of old, by whom the
 Term *Matter* was seldom used under so narrow an ac-
 ceptation. By these, every thing was called ἡλκ, or
MATTER, whether corporeal or incorporeal, which was
 capable of becoming something else, or of being moulded
 into something else, whether from the operation of Art,
 of Nature, or a higher Cause.

In this sense they not only called *Brass* the ἡλκ of a
 Statue, and *Timber* of a Boat, but Letters and Syllables
 they called the ἡλκ of Words; Words or simple Terms,
 the ἡλκ of Propositions; and Propositions themselves
 the ἡλκ of Syllogisms. The *Stoics* held all things out
 of our own power (τὰ ἐκ ἡμῶν) such as Wealth and
 Poverty, Honour and Dishonour, Health and Sickness,
 Life

Ch. I.

compounded of something COMMON,
and something PECULIAR; of some-
thing

Life and Death, to be the *Υλαι*, or *Materials of Virtue or Moral Goodness*, which had its essence in a proper conduct with respect to all these, (Vid. *Arr. Epict. L. 1. c. 29.* Also Vol. the first of these miscellaneous Treatises, p. 187, 309. *M. Ant. XII. 29. VII. 29. X. 18, 19.* where the *Υλικόν* and *Λιτιῶδες* are opposed to each other.) The *Peripatetics*, tho' they expressly held the Soul to be *ἀσώματος*, or *Incorporeal*, yet still talked of a *Νῆς Υλικός*, a *material Mind or Intellect*.—This to modern Ears may possibly sound somewhat harshly. Yet if we translate the Words, *Natural Capacity*, and consider them as only denoting that *original and native Power* of Intellection, which being previous to all *human Knowledge*, is yet necessary to its *reception*; there seems nothing then to remain, that can give us offence. And so much for the Idea of *ΥΛΗ*, or *MATTER*. See *Alex. Aphrod. de Anim.* p. 144. b. 145. *Arist. Metaph.* p. 121, 122, 141. *Edit. Sylb. Procl. in Euclid.* p. 22, 23.

As to *ΕΙΔΟΣ*, its original meaning was that of *FORM* or *FIGURE*, considered as denoting *visible Symmetry*, and *Proportion*; and hence it had its name from *εἶδω* *to see*, Beauty of person being one of the noblest and most excellent Objects of *Sight*. Thus *Euripides*,

Πρῶτον μὲν εἶδος ἔξισι τοῦρανιδος.

Fair FORM to Empire gave the first pretence.

thing *Common*, and belonging to many other things ; and of something *Peculiar*,
X 4 by

Ch. I.


Now as the *Form* or *Figure* of visible Beings tended principally to *distinguish* them, and to give to each its Name and Essence ; hence in a more general sense, *whatever of any kind (whether corporeal or incorporeal)* was peculiar, essential, and distinctive, so as by its accession to any Beings, as to its *ῥα* or *Matter*, to mark them with a Character, which they had not before, was called by the Antients ΕΙΔΟΣ or FORM. Thus not only the *Shape* given to the Brass was called the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Statue ; but the *Proportion* assigned to the Drugs was the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Medicine ; the *orderly Motion* of the human Body was the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Dance ; the *just Arrangement* of the Propositions, the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Syllogism. In like manner the *rational and accurate Conduct* of a wise and good man, in all the various Relations and Occurrences of life, made that Εἶδος or *Form*, described by Cicero to his Son,—FORMAM quidam ipsam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem HONESTI vides : quæ, si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores (ut ait Plato) excitaret sapientiæ, &c. De Offic. I.

We may go farther still—THE SUPREME INTELLIGENCE, which passes thro' all things, and which is the same to our Capacities, as Light is to our Eyes, this supreme Intelligence has been called ΕΙΔΟΣ ΕΙΔΩΝ, THE FORM OF FORMS, as being the Fountain of all Symmetry, of all Good, and of all Truth ; and as imparting to every

Reine

Ch. I. by which it is distinguished, and made
to be its true and proper self.

HENCE

Being those *essential* and *distinctive* Attributes, which make it to be *itself*, and *not any thing* else.

And so much concerning *FORM*, as before concerning *MATTER*. We shall only add, that it is in the *uniting* of these, that every thing generable begins to exist; in their *separating*, to *perish*, and *be at an end*—that while the two co-exist, they co-exist not by *juxta-position*, like the stones in a wall, but by a more *intimate Coincidence*, complete in the minutest part—that hence, if we were to persist in dividing any substance (for example *Marble*) to infinity, there would still remain after every section both *Matter* and *Form*, and these as perfectly united, as before the Division began—lastly, that they are both *pre-existent* to the Beings, which they constitute; the *Matter* being to be found in the world at large; the *Form*, if artificial, pre-existing within the *Artificer*, or if natural, within the *supreme Cause*, the Sovereign Artist of the Universe,

—*Pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse*

Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans.

Even without speculating so high as this, we may see among all animal and vegetable Substances, the *Form* pre-existing in their *immediate generating Cause*; Oak being the parent of Oak, Lion of Lion, Man of Man, &c.

Cicero's

HENCE LANGUAGE, if compared according to this notion to the murmurs of a Fountain, or the dashings of a Cataract, has *in common* this, that like them, *it is a SOUND*. But then on the contrary

Ch. I.

Cicero's account of these Principles is as follows.

MATTER.

Sed subjectam putant omnibus sine ulla specie, atque carentem omni illa qualitate (faciamus enim tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius) MATERIAM quandam, ex qua omnia expressa atque efficta sint: (quæ tota omnia accipere possit, omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte) eoque etiam interire, non in nihilum, &c.— Acad. I. 8:

FORM.

Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrius id sit, unde illud, ut ex ore aliquo, quasi imago, exprimatur, quod neque oculis, neque auribus, neque ullo sensu percipi potest: cogitatione tantum et mente complectimur.—HAS RERUM FORMAS appellat Idcas ille non intelligendi solum, sed etiam dicendi gravissimus auctor et magister, Plato: easque gigni negat, et ait semper esse, ac ratione et intelligentiâ contineri: cætera nasci, occidere, fluere, labi; nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu. Quidquid est igitur, de quo ratione et viâ disputetur, id est ad ultimum sui generis Formam speciemque ridigendum, Cic. ad M. Brut. Orat.

Ch. I.

contrary it has in *peculiar* this, that whereas those Sounds have *no Meaning or Signification*, to Language a *MEANING or SIGNIFICATION is essential*.—Again, *Language*, if compared to the Voice of irrational Animals, has in *common* this, that like them, *it has a Meaning*. But then it has this in *peculiar* to distinguish it from them, that whereas the *Meaning* of those Animal Sounds is derived from *NATURE*, that of *Language* is derived, not from Nature, but from *COMPACT*.^(d)

FROM

^(d) The *Peripatetics* (and with just reason) in all their definitions as well of Words as of Sentences, made it a part of their character to be significant *κατὰ συνθήκην*, by *Compact*. See *Aristot. de Interp. c. 2. 4.* *Boethius* translates the Words *κατὰ συνθήκην*, *ad placitum*, or *secundum placitum*, and thus explains them in his comment —*SECUNDUM PLACITUM vero est, quod secundum quandam positionem, placitumque ponentis aptatur; nullum enim nomen naturaliter constitutum est, neque unquam, sicut subjecta res à naturâ est, ita quoque a naturâ veniente vocabulo nuncupatur. Sed hominum genus, quod et ratione, et oratione rigeret, nomina posuit, eaque quibus libuit*

FROM hence it becomes evident, that
 LANGUAGE, taken in the most comprehensive view, *implies certain Sounds, having certain Meanings*; and that of these two Principles, the SOUND is as the MATTER, common (like other Matter) to many different things; the MEANING as that peculiar and characteristic FORM, by which the Nature or Essence of Language becomes complete.

Ch. I.

CHAP.

libuit literis syllabisque conjungens, singulis subjectarum rerum substantiis dedit. Boeth. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 308.

CHAP. II.

*Upon the Matter, or common Subject of
Language.*

Ch. II. **T**HE T^AH OF MATTER OF LANGUAGE comes first to be considered, a Subject, which Order will not suffer us to omit, but in which we shall endeavour to be as concise as we can. Now this T^AH or Matter is SOUND, and SOUND is *that Sensation peculiar to the Sense of Hearing, when the Air hath felt a Percussion, adequate to the producing such Effect.*^(a)

As

^(a) This appears to be *Priscian's* Meaning when he says of a VOICE, what is more properly true of SOUND in general, that it is—*suum sensibile aurium, id est, quod propriè auribus accidit.* Lib. I. p. 537.

The following account of the *Stoics*, which refers the cause of SOUND to an *Undulation in the Air propagated circularly*, as when we drop a stone into a Cistern of water,

As the Causes of this Percussion are Ch. II.
various, so from hence *Sound* derives
the Variety of its Species.

FARTHER, as all these Causes are either Animal or Inanimate, so the two grand *Species* of Sounds are likewise *Animal* or *Inanimate*.

THERE is no peculiar Name for *Sound Inanimate*; nor even for that of Animals, when made by the trampling of their Feet, the fluttering of their Wings, or any other Cause, which is
merely

water, seems to accord with the modern Hypothesis, and to be as plausible as any—'Ακούειν δι, τῷ μεταξὺ τῷ τε φωνούντος καὶ τῷ ἀκούντος αἴρος περιστρεφόμενος σφαιροειδῶς, ἵτα κυματούμενος, καὶ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς προσπίπλοντος, ὡς κυματοῦται τὸ ἐν τῇ δεξαμένῃ ὕδατος κατὰ κύκλους ὑπὸ τῷ ἑμβληθέντος λίθου—
Porro audire, cum is, qui medius inter loquentem, et audientem est, aër verberatur orbiculariter, deinde agitur auribus insuit, quemadmodum et cisternæ aqua per orbem injecto agitur lapide. Diog. Laert. VII.

Ch. II. *merely accidental. But that, which they make by proper Organs, in consequence of some Sensation or inward Impulse, such Animal Sound is called a VOICE.*

[As Language therefore implies that Sound called HUMAN VOICE ; we may perceive that *to know the Nature and Powers of the Human Voice*, is in fact *to know THE MATTER or common Subject of Language.*

Now the Voice of Man, and it should seem of all other Animals, is formed by certain Organs between the Mouth and the Lungs, and which Organs maintain the intercourse between these two. The Lungs furnish Air, out of which the Voice is formed ; and the Mouth, when the Voice is formed, serves to publish it abroad.

WHAT these Vocal Organs precisely are, is not in all respects agreed by Philo-

Philosophers and Anatomists. Be this as it will, it is certain that the *mere primary and simple Voice is completely formed, before ever it reach the Mouth,* and can therefore (as well as Breathing) find a Passage thro' the Nose, when the Mouth is so far stopt, as to prevent the least utterance.

Now *pure and simple VOICE*, being thus produced, is (as before was observed) *transmitted to the Mouth*. HERE then, by means of certain *different Organs*, which do not change its primary Qualities, but only superadd others, it receives *the Form or Character of ARTICULATION*. For ARTICULATION is in fact nothing else, than *that Form or Character, acquired to simple Voice, by means of the Mouth and its several Organs, the Teeth, the Tongue, the Lips, &c.* The Voice is not by Articulation made more grave or acute, more loud or soft (which are its *primary Qualities*)

Ch. II. lities) but it acquires to these Characters certain *others additional*, which are perfectly adapted *to exist along with them.*^(b)

THE

(b) The several Organs above mentioned not only serve the purposes of *Speech*, but those very different ones likewise of *Mastication* and *Respiration*; so frugal's Nature in thus assigning them double duty, and so careful to maintain her character of *doing nothing in ruin*.

He, that would be informed, how much better the Parts here mentioned are framed for *Discourse* in *Man*, who is a *Discursive Animal*, than they are in other Animals, who are not so, may consult *Aristotle* in his *Treatise de Animal. Part. Lib. II. c. 17. Lib. III. c. 1. 3. De Animâ. L. II. c. 8. § 23, &c.*

And here by the way, if such Inquirer be of a Genius truly modern, he may possibly wonder how the Philosopher, considering (as it is modestly phrased) the Age in which he lived, should know so much, and reason so well. But if he have any taste or value for antient literature, he may with much juster cause wonder at the Vanity of his Contemporaries, who dream all Philosophy to be the Invention of their own Age, knowing nothing of those Antients still remaining for their perusal, tho' they are so ready on every occasion to give the preference to *themselves*.

The

THE *simplest* of these new Characters Ch. II.
are those acquired thro' the *mere Open-*
ings

The following account from *Ammonius* will shew whence the Notions in this chapter are taken, and what authority we have to distinguish VOICE from mere SOUND; and ARTICULATE VOICE from SIMPLE VOICE.

Καὶ ΤΟΦΟΣ μὲν ἐστὶ πλεονὴ ἀέρος αἰσθητὴ ἀκοῇ· ΦΩΝΗ δὲ, ψόφος ἐξ ἰμψυχῆς γινόμενος, ὅταν διὰ τῆς συστολῆς τῷ θώρακος ἐκθλιβόμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος ὁ εἰσπνευθεὶς ἀέρ προσπίπῃ ἀθρόως τῇ καλυμνίᾳ τραχείᾳ ἀσθητῇ, καὶ τῇ ὑπερώᾳ, ἥτοι τῷ γαστρεῖων, καὶ διὰ τῆς πλεονῆς ἀποτελῇ τινα ἤχου αἰσθητὸν, κατὰ τινα ὁρμὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· ὅπερ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰμπνευσταῖς παρὰ τοῖς μουσικοῖς καλυμνίων ὄργανων συμβαίνει, οἷσι αὐτῶν καὶ σφύγγων τῆς γλώττης, καὶ τῶν ὀδόντων, καὶ χειλέων πρὸς μὲν ΤΗΝ ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΝ ἀναγκαῖον ὄντων, πρὸς δὲ ΤΗΝ ἈΠΛΩΣ ΦΩΝΗΝ ὁ πάσις συμβαλλόμενος.—*Estque SONUS, ictus aeris qui auditu sentitur: Vox autem est sonus, quem animans edit, cum per thoracis compressionem aer attractus a pulmone, elisus simul lotus in arteriam, quam asperam vocant, et palatum, aut gurgulionem impingit, et ex ictu sonum quendam sensibilem pro animi quodam impetu perficit. Id quod in instrumentis quæ quia inflant, ideo ἰμπνευστὰ a musicis dicuntur, usu venit, ut in tibiis, ac fistulis contingit, cum lingua, dentes, labiaque ad loquelam necessaria sint, ad vocem vero simplicem non omnino conferant. Ammon. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 25. b. Vid. etiam Boerhaave Institut. Medic. Sect. 626. 630.*

It appears that the *Stoics* (contrary to the notion of

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the

Ch. II. *ings of the Mouth*, as these Openings differ in giving the Voice a Passage. It is the Variety of Configurations in these Openings only, which gives birth and origin to the several VOWELS ; and hence it is they derive their Name, by being thus *eminently Vocal*,^(c) and *easy to be sounded of themselves alone*.

THERE are *other articulate Forms*, which the Mouth makes not by mere Openings, but by *different Contacts of its different parts* ; such for instance, as it makes by the Junction of the two
Lips,

the *Peripetetics*) used the word ΦΩΝΗ to denote SOUND in general. They defined it therefore to be—Τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν αὐοῆς, which justifies the definition given by *Priscian*, in the Note preceding. ANIMAL SOUND they defined to be—Ἀέρ, ἐπὶ ὀργῆς περιληγμένης, *Air struck* (and so made audible) *by some animal impulse* ; and HUMAN OR RATIONAL SOUND they defined—Ἐναεθρος καὶ ἀπὸ διαδίας ἐκπεμπομένη, *Sound articulate and derived from the discursive faculty*. *Diog. Laert.* VII. 55.

(c) ΦΩΝΗΝΤΑ.

Lips, of the Tongue with the Teeth, Ch. II.
 of the Tongue with the Palate, and the
 like.

Now as all these several Contacts, unless some Opening of the Mouth either immediately precede, or immediately follow, would rather occasion Silence, than to produce a Voice; hence it is, that with some such Opening, either previous or subsequent, they are always connected. Hence also it is, that the *Articulations so produced* are called CONSONANT, because they sound not of themselves, and from their own powers, but *at all times in company with some auxiliary Vowel.*^(d)

THERE are other subordinate Distinctions of these primary Articulations, which to enumerate would be foreign to the design of this Treatise.

It is enough to observe, that they are

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all

(d) ΣΥΜΦΩΝΑ.

Ch. II.

all denoted by the common Name of ELEMENT,^(c) in as much as every Articulation of every other kind is from them derived, and into them resolved. Under their *smallest* Combination they produce a *Syllable*; Syllables properly combined produce a *Word*; Words properly combined produce a *Sentence*; and Sentences properly combined produce an *Oration* or *Discourse*.

AND

(c) The *Stoic* Definition of an ELEMENT is as follows—

Ἐστὶ δὲ στοιχεῖον, ἐξ οὗ πρῶτα γίνονται τὰ γινόμενα, καὶ εἰς ὃ ἴσχυς τοι ἀναλύεται. An ELEMENT is that, out of which, as their

first Principle, things generated are made, and into which, as their last remains, they are resolved. *Diog. Laert.*

VII. 176. What *Aristotle* says upon ELEMENTS with respect to the Subject here treated, is worth attending to

—Φωνῆς στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται ἡ φωνή, καὶ εἰς ἃ διαίρεται ἴσχυατὰ ἐκείνα δι' ἡμῶν εἰς ἄλλας φωνὰς ἰστέας τῷ ἴδει αὐτῶν.

The ELEMENTS OF ARTICULATE VOICE are those things, out of which the VOICE is compounded, and into which, as its last remains, it is divided: the Elements themselves being no farther divisible into other articulate Voices, differing in Species from them. *Metaph. V. c. 3.*

AND thus it is that to Principles *apparently* so trivial, ^(f) as about twenty plain elementary Sounds, we owe that variety of articulate Voices, which have

Y 3 been

Ch. II.

(U) The *Egyptians* paid divine Honours to the *Inventor of Letters*, and *Regulator of Language*, whom they called THEUTH. By the *Greeks* he was worshipped under the Name of HERMES, and represented commonly by a *Head alone without other Limbs*, standing upon a *quadrilateral Basis*. The Head itself was that of a *beautiful Youth*, having on it a *Petasis*, or *Bonnet*, adorned with two *Wings*.

There was a peculiar reference in this Figure to the 'ΕΡΜΗΣ ΛΟΓΙΟΣ, THE HERMES OF LANGUAGE OR DISCOURSE. He possessed no other part of the human figure but the HEAD, because *no other* was deemed *requisite to rational Communication*. Words at the same time, the medium of this Communication, being (as *Homer* well describes them) *ἑρμῆος ἑλπίδες*, *Winged Words*, were represented in their *Velocity* by the WINGS of his Bonnet.

Let us suppose such a HERMES, having the *Front of his Basis* (the usual place for Inscriptions) adorned with some old Alphabet, and having a *Veil flung across*, by which that Alphabet is partly covered. Let a YOUTH be seen *drawing off this Veil*; and a NYMPH, near the Youth, *transcribing what She there discovers*.

Such

Ch. II.

been sufficient to explain the Sentiments of so innumerable a Multitude, as all the present and past Generations of Men.

IT

Such a Design would easily indicate its Meaning. THE YOUTH we might imagine to be THE GENIUS OF MAN (*Naturæ Deus humana*, as Horace stiles him;) THE NYMPH to be MNHMOETNH, or MEMORY; as much as to insinuate that "MAN, for the Preservation of his Deeds and Inventions, was necessarily obliged to have recourse to LETTERS; and that MEMORY, being conscious of her own Insufficiency, was glad to avail herself of so valuable an Acquisition."

MR. STUART, well known for his accurate and elegant Edition of the *Antiquities of Athens*, has adorned this Work with a Frontispiece agreeable to the above Ideas, and that in a taste truly *Attic* and *Simple*, which no one possesses more eminently than himself.

As to HERMES, his History, Genealogy, Mythology, Figure, &c. Vid. *Platon. Phileb.* T. II. p. 18. *Edit. Serran.* *Diod. Sic.* L. I. *Horat. Od.* X. L. 1. *Hesiod. Theog.* V. 937. *cum Comment.* *Joan. Diaconi. Thucid.* VI. 27. *et Scholiast. in loc.* *Pighem apud Gronov. Thesaur.* T. IX. p. 1164.

For the value and importance of Principles, and the difficulty in attaining them, see *Aristot. de Sophist. Elench.* c. 34.

The

It appears from what has been said, Ch. II.
 that THE MATTER OF COMMON SUB-
 JECT OF LANGUAGE IS *that Species of*
Sounds called VOICES ARTICULATE.

WHAT remains to be examined in
 the following Chapter, is Language
 under its characteristic and peculiar
 FORM, that is to say, Language consi-
 dered, not with respect to *Sound*, but to
Meaning.

Y 4

CHAP.

The following Passage, taken from that able Mathe-
 matician *Tacquet*, will be found peculiarly pertinent to
 what has been said in this chapter concerning *Elementary*
Sounds, p. 324, 325.

*Mille miliones scriptorum mille annorum millionibus
 non scribent omnes 24 litterarum alphabeti permutationes,
 licet singuli quotidie absoluerent 40 paginas, quarum una-
 quæque contineret diversos ordines litterarum 24. Tacquet
 Arithmetica Theor. p. 381. Edit. Antverp. 1663.*

CHAP. III.

*Upon the Form, or peculiar Character of
Language.*

Ch. III.

WHEN to any articulate Voice there accedes *by compact* a Meaning or Signification, such Voice by such accession is then called A WORD; and many Words, possessing their Significations (as it were) *under the same Compact*,^(a) unite in constituting A PARTICULAR LANGUAGE.

It

(a) See before Note (c) p. 314. See also Vol. I. Treatise II. c. 1. Notes (a) and (c).

The following Quotation from *Anthonius* is remarkable—Καθάπερ ἐν τῷ μὲν κατὰ τόπον κινῆσθαι, φύσει, τὸ δὲ ἐκχρῆσθαι, δίδει κατὰ συνθήκην, καὶ τὸ μὲν ξύλον, φύσει, ἡ δὲ δύναμις, δίδει· ὅταν καὶ τὸ μὲν φωνῆν, φύσει, τὸ δὲ δι' ὀνομάτων ἢ ρημάτων σημαίνειν, δίδει—καὶ ὅμοιον τὴν μὲν φωνητικὴν δύναμιν, ὅργανον δὲ τῶν ψυχικῶν ἐν ἡμῖν δυνάμεων γνωστικῶν, ἡ δεξιότης, κατὰ φύσιν
ἔχει

It appears from hence, that A WORD Ch. III.
 may be defined a *Voice articulate, and*
significant by Compact—and that LAN-
 GUAGE may be defined a *System of such*
Voices, so significant.

It is from notions like these concern-
 ing Language and Words, that one may
 be

ἔχειν ὁ ἀνθρώπος^Θ παραπλησίως τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις τὸ δι' ἐνάμασιν
 ἢ ῥήμασιν, ἢ τοῖς ἐκ τούτων συγκειμένοις λόγοις χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὴν
 σημασίαν (ἐκείνι φύσει ὄντι, ἀλλὰ θίσει) ἰσχυρίζεται ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ
 λόγια ζῶα, διότι καὶ μόνον^Θ τῶν θητῶν αὐτοκινήτου μετέχει ψυχῆς,
 καὶ τέχνηκώς ἐνεργεῖν δυναμὴς, ἵνα καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ φύσει ἡ τέχνηκῃ
 αὐτῆς διακρίνηται δύναμις· διελύσι δὲ ταῦτα οἱ εἰς κάλλον^Θ συντι-
 θέμενοι λόγοι μετὰ μέτρων, ἢ ἀνευ μέτρων. In the same man-
 ner therefore, as local Motion is from Nature, but Danc-
 ing is something positive; and as Timber exists in Nature,
 but a Door is something positive; so is the power of pro-
 ducing a vocal Sound founded in Nature, but that of ex-
 plaining ourselves by Nouns, or Verbs, something positive.
 And hence it is, that as to the simple power of producing
 vocal Sound (which is as it were the Organ or Instrument
 to the Soul's faculties of Knowledge or Volition) as to this
 vocal power I say, Man seems to possess it from Nature,
 in like manner as irrational animals: but as to the em-
 ploying

will follow, that whoever has natural faculties to know the Original, will by help of the same faculties know also its Imitations. But it by no means follows, that he who knows any Being, should know for that reason its *Greek* or *Latin* Name. Ch. III.

THE Truth is, that every Medium through which we exhibit any thing to another's Contemplation, is either derived from *Natural Attributes*, and then it is an IMITATION; or else from *Accidents quite arbitrary*, and then it is a SYMBOL.^(b)

Now,

(b) Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ΟΜΟΙΩΜΑ τῷ ΣΥΜΒΟΛΟΥ, καθόσον τὸ μὲν ὁμοίωμα τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν τῷ πράγματι κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἀπεικονίζεσθαι βέλεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτὸ μεταπλάσσει· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι γεγραμμένον τῷ Σωκράτει ὁμοίωμα, ἢ μὴ καὶ τὸ φαλακρὸν, καὶ τὸ σικκὸν καὶ τὸ ἐξὺφθαλμον ἔχει τῷ Σωκράτει, ἐπὶ τ' αὖ αὐτὸ λέγεται εἶναι ὁμοίωμα· τὸ δὲ γὰρ σύμβολον, ἥτοι σημῖον, (ἀμφότερα γὰρ ὁ φιλόσοφος αὐτὸ νομίζει) τὸ ὅλον ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔχει, ἅτε καὶ ἐκ μόνης ὑφισταμένοι τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπινοίας οἶον, τῷ πότε δι' συμβάλλειν ἀλλήλους τὰς πειραματίας, δύναται σύμβολον εἶναι.

“ Symbols preferred, although Symbols Ch. III
 “ are only known by Habit or Institu-
 “ tion, while Imitations are recognized
 “ by a kind of natural Intuition ?”—

To this it may be answered, that if the Sentiments of the Mind, like the Features of the Face, were immediately visible to every beholder, the Art of Speech or Discourse would have been perfectly superfluous. But now, while our Minds lie enveloped and hid, and the Body (like a Veil) conceals every thing but itself, we are necessarily compelled, when we communicate our
 Thoughts,

the flat-nosed, and the Eyes projecting, cannot properly be called a Representation of him. But a SYMBOL or SIGN (for the Philosopher Aristotle uses both names) is wholly in our own power, as depending singly for its existence on our imagination. Thus for example, as to the time when two armies should engage, the Symbol or Sign may be the sounding of a Trumpet, the throwing of a Torch, (according to what Euripides says,

But when the flaming Torch was hurl'd, the sign

Of purple fight, as when the Trumpet sounds, &c.)

or else one may suppose the elevating of a Spear, the darting of a Weapon, and a thousand ways besides. Ammon. in Lib. de Interp. p. 17. b.

Figure and Colour, our Imitation would Ch. III.
 be necessarily thro' Figure and Colour
 also. Again, as far as they are charac-
 terized by Sounds, it would for the
 same reason be thro' the Medium of
 Sounds. The like may be said of all
 the other Senses, the Imitation still
 shifting along with the Objects imitated.
 We see then how *complicated* such Imitation would prove.

IF we set LANGUAGE therefore, as a
Symbol, in opposition to *such Imitation*;
 if we reflect on the Simplicity of the
 one, and the Multiplicity of the other;
 if we consider the Ease and Speed, with
 which Words are formed (an Ease which
 knows no trouble or fatigue; and a
 *Speed, which equals the Progress of
 our very Thoughts) if we oppose to this
 the difficulty and length of Imitations;
 if we remember that some Objects are
 capable of no Imitations at all, but that
 all Objects universally may be typified
 by Symbols; we may plainly perceive
 an

* *Ἐντα ὡς γὰρ ἴσμεν*—See before, p. 325.

Ch. III. an Answer to the Question here proposed, "Why, in the common intercourse of men with men, Imitations have been rejected, and Symbols preferred."

HENCE too we may perceive a Reason, *why there never was a Language, nor indeed can possibly be framed one, to express the Properties and real Essences of things, as a Mirrour exhibits their Figures and their Colours.* For if Language of itself imply nothing more, than *certain Species of Sounds with certain Motions concomitant*; if to some Beings Sound and Motion are no Attributes at all; if to many others, where Attributes, they are no way essential (such as the Murmurs and Wavings of a Tree during a storm) if this be true—it is impossible the Nature of such Beings should be expressed, or the least essential Property be any way imitated, while between *the Medium and themselves* there is nothing **CONNATURAL**(^e).

(^e) See Vol. I. Treatise II. c. 3. p. 70.

IT is true indeed, when *Primitives* Ch. III.
 were once established, it was easy to
 follow the Connection and Subordina-
 tion of Nature, in the just deduction
 of *Derivatives* and *Compounds*. Thus
 the Sounds, *Water*, and, *Fire*, being
 once annexed to those two Elements,
 it ~~was~~ certainly more natural to call
 Beings participating of the first, *Watry*,
 of the last, *Fiery*, than to commute the
 Terms, and call them by the reverse.—
 But why, and from what *natural Con-*
nections the Primitives themselves might
 not be commuted, it will be found, I
 believe, difficult to assign a Reason, as
 well in the instances before us, as in
 most others. We may here also see the
 Reason, why ALL LANGUAGE IS
 FOUNDED IN COMPACT, and not in
 Nature ; for so are all Symbols of which
 Words are a certain Species.

THE Question remains if WORDS are
 Symbols, then SYMBOLS OF WHAT?—

Z

If

Ch. III. If it be answered, of THINGS, the Question returns, OF WHAT THINGS?—If it be answered, *of the several Individuals of Sense, the various particular Beings, which exist around us*—to this, it is replied, may be raised certain Doubts. In the first place every Word will be in fact a *proper Name*. Now *if* all Words are proper Names, how came Lexicographers, whose express business is to explain Words, either wholly to omit proper Names, or at least to explain them, not from their own Art, but from History?

AGAIN, if all *Words* are *proper Names*, then in strictness no Word can belong to more than one Individual. But if so, then, as *Individuals* are *infinite*, to make a perfect Language, *Words must be infinite also*. But if infinite, then *incomprehensible*, and never to be attained by the wisest Men; whose labours in Language upon this Hypothesis would be as idle as that study of infinite written Symbols,

Symbols, which Missionaries (if they Ch. III.
may be credited) attribute to the *Chinese*.

AGAIN, *if all Words are proper Names*, or (which is the same) the Symbols of *Individuals*; it will follow, as *Individuals* are not only *infinite*, but ever *passing*, that the Language of those, who lived ages ago, will be as unknown *now*, as the very Voices of the Speakers. Nay the Language of every Province, of every Town, of every Cottage, must be every where different, and every where changing, since such is the Nature of *Individuals*, which it follows.

AGAIN, *if all Words are proper Names*, the Symbols of *Individuals*, it will follow that in Language there can be no *general Proposition*, because upon the Hypothesis *all Terms are particular*; nor any *Affirmative Proposition*, because *no one Individual in nature is another*. It remains, there can be no Propositions,

Ch. III. but *Particular Negatives*. But if so, then is Language incapable of communicating *General Affirmative Truths*—If so, then of communicating *Demonstration*—If so, then of communicating *Sciences*, which are so many Systems of Demonstrations—If so, then of communicating *Arts* which are the Theorems of Science applied practically—If so, we shall be little better for it either in Speculation or in Practice.^(e) And so much for this Hypothesis; let us now try another.

IF WORDS are not the Symbols of *external Particulars*, it follows of course, they must be THE SYMBOLS OF OUR IDEAS: For this is evident, if they are not

(e) The whole of *Euclid* (whose Elements may be called the basis of Mathematical Science) is founded upon *general Terms* and *general Propositions*, most of which are *affirmative*. So true are those Verses, however barbarous as to their stile,

*Syllogizari non est ex Particulari,
Neve Negativis, rectè concludere si vis.*

not Symbols of things *without*, they can Ch. III.
only be Symbols of something *within*.

HERE then the Question recurs, if SYMBOLS OF IDEAS, then of WHAT IDEAS?—OF SENSIBLE IDEAS.—Be it so, and what follows?—Every thing in fact, which has followed already from the supposition of their being the Symbols of *external Particulars*; and that from this plain and obvious reason, because the several *Ideas*, which *Particulars* imprint, must needs be as *infinite* and *mutable*, as they are themselves.

IF then Words are neither the Symbols of *external Particulars*, nor yet of *particular Ideas*, they can be SYMBOLS of nothing else, except of GENERAL IDEAS, because nothing else, except these, remains.—And what do we mean by GENERAL IDEAS?—We mean SUCH AS ARE COMMON TO MANY INDIVIDUALS; not only to Individuals which

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exist now, but which existed in ages past, and will exist in ages future ; such for example, as the Ideas belonging to the Words, *Man, Lion, Cedar*.—Admit it, and what follows?—It follows, that *if Words are the Symbols of such general Ideas*, Lexicographers may find employ, though they meddle not with *proper Names*.

It follows that *one Word* may be, not *homonymously*, but *truly and essentially common to many Particulars*, past present and future ; so that however these Particulars may be *infinite*, and *ever fleeting*, yet Language notwithstanding may be *definite* and *steady*. ' But if so, then attainable even by ordinary Capacities, without danger of incurring the *Chinese Absurdity*.*

AGAIN, it follows that the Language of those, who lived ages ago, as far as it

* See p. 338, 339.

it stands *for the same general Ideas*, may Ch. III.
be as intelligible *now*, as it was *then*.—

The like may be said of the same Language being accommodated to distant Regions, and even to distant Nations, amidst all the variety of *ever new* and *ever changing* Objects.

AGAIN, it follows that Language may be expressive of *general Truths*; and if so, then of Demonstration, and Sciences, and Arts; and if so, become subservient to purposes of every kind.^(c)

Now if it be true “that none of
“these things could be asserted of Lan-
“guage, were not Words the Symbols
“of *general Ideas*—and it be further
“true, that these things may be all
“undeniably asserted of Language”—
it will follow (and that necessarily) that
WORDS ARE THE SYMBOLS OF GENE-
RAL IDEAS.

Z 4

AND

^(c) See before Note (c).

III. AND yet perhaps even here may be an Objection. It may be urged, if Words are the Symbols of *general Ideas*, Language may answer well enough the purpose of Philosophers, who reason about *general* and *abstract* Subjects—but what becomes of the business of ordinary Life? Life we know is merged in a multitude of *Particulars*, where an Explanation by Language is as requisite, as in the highest Theorems. The Vulgar indeed want it to *no other* End. How then can this End in any respect be answered, if Language be expressive of nothing farther than *general Ideas*?

To this it may be answered, that *Arts* surely respect the business of ordinary Life; yet so far are *general Terms* from being an Obstacle here, that without them no Art can be *rationaly* explained. How for instance should the measuring Artist ascertain to the Reapers the price of their labours, had not he first through
general

general Terms learnt those general The- Ch. II
orems, that respect the doctrine and
practice of Mensuration ?

BUT suppose this not to satisfy a persevering Objector—suppose him to insist, that, admitting this to be true, *there were still a multitude of occasions for minute particularizing, of which it was not possible for mere Generals to be susceptible*—suppose, I say, such an Objection, what should we answer?—*That the Objection was just ; that it was necessary to the Perfection and Completion of LANGUAGE, that it should be expressive of PARTICULARS, as well as of GENERALS.* We must however add, that its *general Terms* are by far its most *excellent* and *essential* Part, since from these it derives “that comprehensive *Universality*, that just proportion “ of *Precision* and *Permanence*, without “ which it could not possibly be either “ learnt, or understood, or applied “ to the purposes of Reasoning and “ Science ;”

—that *particular* Terms have
Unity and *End*, and that there-
 fore too has been taken for a sup-
 pose these,

THE Method of expressing Particu-
 lars, is that of PROPER NAMES. This
 is the least artificial, because *proper*
Names being in every district arbitrarily
 applied, may be unknown to those, who
 know the Language perfectly well, and
 can hardly therefore with propriety be
 considered as parts of it. The other and
 more artificial Method is that of DEFINI-
 TIVES OR ARTICLES,^(g) whether we
 assume the *pronominal*, or those *more*
strictly so called. And here we cannot
 enough admire the exquisite *Art* of
 Language, which, *without wandering*
into infinitude, contrives how to denote
things infinite; that is to say in other
 words, which, by the small Tribe of
Definitives properly applied to general
Terms,

^(g) See before, p. 72, &c. 233, &c.

ms; knows how to employ these last, Ch. III,
 no' in number *finite*, to the accurate
 expression of *infinite* Particulars.

To explain what has been said by a single example. Let the general Term be MAN. I have occasion to apply this Term to the denoting of some Particular. Let it be required to express this Particular *as unknown*; I say, A Man—*known*; I say, THE Man—*indefinite*; ANY Man—*definite*; A CERTAIN Man—*present and near*; THIS Man—*present and distant*; THAT Man—*like to some other*; SUCH A Man—an *indefinite Multitude*; MANY Men—a *definite Multitude*; A THOUSAND Men—the *ones of a Multitude, taken throughout*; EVERY Man—the *same ones, taken with distinctions*; EACH Man—*taken in order*; FIRST Man, SECOND Man, &c.—the *whole Multitude of Particulars taken collectively*; ALL Men—the *Negation of this Multitude*; NO Man. But of this we have spoken already, when we inquired concerning Definitives.

THE

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THE SUM of all is, that WORDS ARE THE SYMBOLS OF IDEAS BOTH GENERAL AND PARTICULAR; YET OF THE GENERAL, PRIMARILY, ESSENTIALLY, AND IMMEDIATELY; OF THE PARTICULAR, ONLY SECONDARILY, ACCIDENTALLY, AND MEDIATELY.

SHOULD it be asked, "why has Language this *double Capacity*?"—May we not ask, by way of return, Is it not a kind of reciprocal Commerce, or *Intercourse of our Ideas*? Should it not therefore be framed, so as to express *the whole* of our Perception? Now can we call that Perception intire and whole, which implies either INTELECTION without *Sensation*, or SENSATION without *Intellection*? If not, how should Language explain *the whole* of our Perception, had it not Words to express the Objects, proper to each of the two Faculties?

To conclude—As in the preceding Chapter we considered Language with
a view

a view to its MATTER, so here we have Ch. III.
considered it with a view to its FORM.
Its MATTER is recognized, when it is
considered *as a Voice* ; its FORM, as it is
significant of our several Ideas ; so that
upon the whole it may be defined—A
SYSTEM OF ARTICULATE VOICES, THE
SYMBOLS OF OUR IDEAS, BUT OF THOSE
PRINCIPALLY, WHICH ARE GENERAL
OR UNIVERSAL.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning general or universal Ideas.

Ch. IV.

MUCH having been said in the preceding Chapter about GENERAL OR UNIVERSAL IDEAS, it may not perhaps be amiss to inquire, *by what process we come to perceive them, and what kind of Beings they are*; since the generality of men think so meanly of their existence, that they are commonly considered, as little better than Shadows. These Sentiments are not unusual even with the Philosopher now a days, and that from causes much the same with those, which influence the Vulgar.

THE VULGAR merged in *Sense* from their earliest Infancy, and never once dreaming any thing to be worthy of pursuit, but what either pampers their Appetite, or fills their Purse, imagine
nothing

nothing to be *real*, but what may be *tasted*, or *touched*. Ch. IV. THE PHILOSOPHER, as to these matters being of much the same Opinion, in Philosophy looks no higher, than to *experimental Amusements*, deeming nothing *Demonstration*, if it be not made *ocular*. Thus instead of ascending from *Sense* to *Intellect* (the natural progress of all true Learning) he hurries on the contrary into the midst of *Sense*, where he wanders at random without any end, and is lost in a Labyrinth of infinite Particulars.— Hence then the reason why the sublimer parts of *Science*, the Studies of MIND, INTELLECTION, and INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLES, are in a manner neglected; and, as if the Criterion of all Truth were an Alembic or an Air-pump, what cannot be proved by *Experiment*, is deemed no better than mere *Hypothesis*.

AND yet it is somewhat remarkable,
amid the prevalence of such Notions,
1 that

MAN'S FIRST PERCEPTIONS are Ch. IV.
 those of the SENSES, in as much as
 they commence from his earliest Infan-
 cy. These Perceptions, if not infinite,
 are at least *indefinite*, and more *fleeting*
 and *transient*, than the very Objects,
 which they exhibit, because they not
 only

SCIENCE, and is thence enabled to tell us, not only,
 WHAT is to be done, but WHY it is to be done ; for ~~Art~~
 is a composite of *Experience and Science*, Experience pro-
 viding it *Materials*, and Science giving them A FORM.

In the mean time, while EXPERIMENT is thus necessary
 to all PRACTICAL WISDOM, with respect to PURE and SPE-
 CULATIVE SCIENCE, as we have hinted already, it has not
 the least to do. For who ever heard of *Logic*, or *Geo-*
metry, or *Arithmetic* being proved *experimentally* ? It is
 indeed by the application of *these* that *Experiments* are
 rendered useful ; that they are assumed into Philosophy,
 and in some degree made a part of it, being otherwise no-
 thing better than puerile amusements. But that these
 Sciences themselves should depend upon the Subjects, on
 which they work, is, as if the Marble were to fashion
 the Chizzle, and not the Chizzle the Marble.

A a

may be seen from hence. We have an *Imagination* of things, that are gone and extinct; but no such things can be made objects of *Sensation*. We have an easy command over the Objects of our *Imagination*, and can call them forth in almost what manner we please; but our *Sensations* are necessary, when their Objects are present, nor can we controul them, but by removing either the Objects, or ourselves^(c).

A a 2

As

(c) Besides the distinguishing of SENSATION from IMAGINATION, there are two other Faculties of the Soul, which from their nearer alliance ought carefully to be distinguished from it, and these are MNHMH, and ANAMNHEIE, MEMORY, and RECOLLECTION.

When we view some *relict* of sensation reposed within us, *without thinking of its rise, or referring it to any sensible Object*, this is PHANSY or IMAGINATION.

When we view some such *relict*, and *refer it without to that sensible Object, which in time past was its cause and original*, this is MEMORY.

Lastly

pect to *Sense* and *Imagination*. SENSE Ch. IV.
 is its *receptive* Power; IMAGINATION,
 its *retentive*. Had it Sense without
 Imagination, it would not be as Wax,
 but as Water, where tho' all Impres-
 sions may be instantly made, yet as
 soon as made they are as instantly
 lost.

THUS then, from a view of the two
 Powers taken together, we may call
 Sense (if we please) *a kind of transient*
Imagination; and IMAGINATION on the
 contrary *a kind of permanent Sense*^(d).

A a 3

Now

What we have said may suffice for our present pur-
 pose. He that would learn more, may consult *Aristot.*
de Animâ, L. III. c. 3, 4. and his *Treatise de Mem. et*
Reminisc.

(d) Τί τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἡ φαντασία ὥςδε ἂν γνωρίσαιμεν· διὸ τοῖς ἐν ἡμῖν
 ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῶν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, διὸν τύπον (*lege τύπον*)
 τινὰ καὶ ἀναζωγράφημα ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ αἰσθητικῇ, ἐγκατάλειμμα τι
 τῆς ὑπὸ τῷ αἰσθητῷ γινομένης κινήσεως, ὃ καὶ μηκέτι τῷ αἰσθητῷ πα-
 ρόντος, ὑπομένει καὶ σώζεται, ὃν ὥσπερ ἐκάλει τις αὐτὸ, ὃ καὶ τῆς
 μνήμης ἡμῖν σωζόμενον αἴλιον γίνεται· τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐγκατάλειμμα,
 καὶ

Ch. IV.
 AFTER this manner, in the admirable Oeconomy of the Whole, are Natures subordinate made subservient to the higher. Were there *no Things external*, the Senses could not operate; were there *no Sensations*, the Imagination could not operate; and were there *no Imagination*, there could be *neither Reasoning* nor *Intellection*, such at least as they are found in *Man*, where they have their Intensions and Remissions in alternate succession, and are at first nothing better, than a mere CAPACITY or POWER. Whether every Intellect begins thus, may be perhaps a question; especially if there be any one of a nature *more divine*, to which "Intension and Remission and mere Capacity are unknown^(c)." But not to digress.

A a 4

IT

^(c) See p. 162. The *Life, Energy*, or Manner of MAN's Existence is not a little different from that of the DEITY. THE LIFE OF MAN has its Essence in MOTION.
 This

HERMES.

It is then on these *permanent* Phantasms that THE HUMAN MIND first works,

This is not only true with respect to that lower and subordinate Life, which he shares in common with Vegetables, and which can no longer subsist than while the Fluids circulate, but it is likewise true in that *Life*, which is peculiar to him as *Man*. Objects from without first move our faculties, and thence we move of ourselves either to *Practice* or *Contemplation*. But the LIFE or EXISTENCE of GOD (as far as we can conjecture upon so transcendent a Subject) is not only complete throughout Eternity, but complete in every Instant, and is for that reason IMMUTABLE and SUPERIOR TO ALL MOTION.

It is to this distinction that *Aristotle* alludes, when he tell us—Οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεως ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσιας καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν, ἢ ἐν κινήσει· μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν, διὰ ποικιλίας τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ αἰθερῶς ἐν μεταβάλλοις ὁ ποικίλος, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ διομένη μεταβολῆς· ἐν γὰρ ἀπλῇ, οὐδ' ἐπιεικῆς. For there is not only an *Energy* of MOTION, but of IMMOBILITY; and PLEASURE or FELICITY exists rather in REST than in MOTION; Change of all things being sweet (according to the Poet) from a principle of Pravity in those who believe so. For in the same manner

works, and by an Energy as spontaneous and familiar to its Nature, as the seeing of Colour is familiar to the Eye, it

Ch. IV.

ner as the bad man is one fickle and changeable, so is that Nature bad that requireth Variety, in as much as such Nature is neither simple nor even. Eth. Nicom. VII. 14. & Ethic. Eudem. VI. sub. fin.

It is to this UNALTERABLE NATURE OF THE DEITY that Boethius refers, when he says in those elegant verses,

—*Tempus ab Aeo*

Ire jubes STABILISQUE MANENS das cuncta moveri.

From this single principle of IMMOBILITY, may be derived some of the noblest of the *Divine Attributes*; such as that of IMPASSIVE, INCORRUPTIBLE, INCORPOREAL, &c. Vide *Aristot. Physic. VIII. Metaphys. XIV. c. 6, 7, 9, 10. Edit. Du Val.* See also Vol. I. of these Treatises, p. 262 to 266—also p. 295, where the Verses of Boethius are quoted at length.

It must be remembered however, that though we are not *Gods*, yet as *rational Beings* we have within us something *Divine*, and that the more we can become superior to our mutable, variable, and irrational part, and place our welfare in that Good, which is immutable,

per-

a kind of *superior* Objects ; a new Race Ch. IV.
 of Perceptions, more comprehensive
 than

What then perceives this CONSTITUTION or UNION ?
 —Can it be any of the Senses ?—No one of these, we know, can pass the limits of its own province. Were the Smell to perceive the union of the Odour and the Figure, it would not only be Smell, but it would be Sight also. It is the same in other instances. We must necessarily therefore recur to some HIGHER COLLECTIVE POWER, to give us a prospect of Nature, even in these her *subordinate Wholes*, much more in that *comprehensive Whole*, whose Sympathy is universal, and of which these smaller Wholes are all no more than Parts.

But no where is this *collecting*, and (if I may be allowed the expression) this *unifying* Power more conspicuous, than in the subjects of PURE TRUTH. By virtue of this power the Mind views *One general Idea*, in *many Individuals* ; *One Proposition* in *many general Ideas* ; *One Syllogism* in *many Propositions* ; till at length, by properly repeating and connecting Syllogism with Syllogism, it ascend into those bright and *steady regions* of SCIENCE.

*Quas neque concutiant venti, neque nubila nimbis
 Adspargunt, &c.*

Lucr.

Even

Ch. IV. *than those of Sense; a Race of Perceptions, each one of which may be found intire*

Even *negative* Truths and *negative* Conclusions cannot subsist, but by bringing Terms and Propositions together, so *necessary is this UNITING Power to every Species of KNOWLEDGE.* See p. 3. 250.

He that would better comprehend the distinction between SENSITIVE PERCEPTION, and INTELLECTIVE, may observe that, when a Truth is spoken, it is *heard* by our Ears, and *understood* by our Minds. That these two Acts are different, is plain, from the example of such, as *hear* the sounds, without *knowing* the language. But to shew their difference still stronger, let us suppose them to concur in the same Man, who shall both *hear* and *understand* the Truth proposed. Let the Truth be for example, *The Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles.* That this is ONE Truth, and not *two* or *many* Truths, I believe none will deny. Let me ask then, in what manner does this Truth become perceptible (if at all) to SENSATION?—The Answer is obvious; it is by successive portions of little and little at a Time. When the first Word is *present*, all the subsequent are *absent*; when the last Word is *present*, all the previous are *absent*; when any of the middle Words are *present*, then are there some *absent*, as well of one sort as the other. No more exists at
once,

intire and whole in the separate individuals of an infinite and fleeting Multitude,
without Ch. IV.

once than a single Syllable, and the Remainder as much *is not*, (to Sensation at least) as tho' it never had been, or never was to be. And so much for the perception of SENSE, than which we see nothing can be more *dissipated, fleeting, and detached*.—And is that of the Mind similar?—Admit it, and what follows?—it follows, that *one* Mind would no more recognize *one* Truth, by recognizing its Terms *successively* and *apart*, than *many* distant Minds would recognize it, were it distributed among them, a different part to each. The case is, every TRUTH is ONE, tho' its TERMS are MANY. It is in no respect true, *by parts at a time*, but it is true of necessity at *once* and *in an instant*.—What Powers therefore recognize this ONENESS or UNITY?—Where even does it reside, or what makes it?—Shall we answer with the *Stagirite*, τὸ δὲ ἐν ποιοῦν τῶτο ἰσχύον?—If this be allowed, it should seem, where SENSATION and INTELECTION appear to concur, that Sensation was of MANY, Intellection was of ONE; that Sensation was *temporary, divisible, and successive*; Intellection, *instantaneous, indivisible, and at once*.

If we consider the Radii of a Circle, we shall find at the Circumference that they are MANY; at the Center that they are ONE. Let us then suppose SENSE and MIND to view the same Radii, only let Sense view them
at

Ch. IV. *without departing from the unity and permanence of its own nature.*

AND

at the *Circumference* ; Mind at the *Center* ; and hence we may conceive, how these Powers differ, even where they jointly appear to operate in perception of the same object.

There is ANOTHER ACT OF THE MIND, the very reverse of that here mentioned ; an Act, by which it perceives not *one in many*, but MANY IN ONE. This is that *mental Separation*, of which we have given some account in the first Chapter of this Book ; that Resolution or Analysis which enables us to *investigate the Causes, and Principles, and Elements of things*. It is by Virtue of this, that we are enabled to abstract any particular Attribute, and make it *by itself* the Subject of philosophical Contemplation. Were it not for this, it would be difficult for *particular Sciences* to exist ; because otherwise they would be as much blended, as the several Attributes of sensible Substances. How, for example, could there be such a Science as *Optics*, were we necessitated to contemplate *Colour concentered with Figure*, two Attributes which the Eye can never view, but associated ? I mention not a multitude of other sensible qualities, some of which still present themselves, whenever we look on any coloured Body.

Those

AND thus we see the *Process by which* Ch. IV.
we arrive at GENERAL IDEAS; for the
 Per-

Those two noble Sciences, ARITHMETIC and GEOMETRY, would have no Basis to stand on, were it not for this *separative Power*. They are both conversant about QUANTITY; *Geometry* about CONTINUOUS Quantity, *Arithmetic* about DISCRETE. EXTENSION is essential to continuous Quantity, MONADS, or UNITS, to *Discrete*. By separating from the infinite Individuals, with which we are surrounded, those infinite Accidents, by which they are all *diversified*, we leave nothing but those SIMPLE and PERFECTLY SIMILAR UNITS, which being combined make NUMBER, and are the Subject of ARITHMETIC.—Again, by separating from *Body* every possible subordinate Accident, and leaving it nothing but its *triple Extension of Length, Breadth, and Thickness*, (of which were it to be deprived, it would be *Body* no longer) we arrive at that pure and unmixed MAGNITUDE, the contemplation of whose properties makes the Science of *Geometry*.

By the same *analytical* or *separate Power*, we investigate DEFINITIONS of all kinds, each one of which is a *developed Word*, as the same Word is an *enveloped Definition*.

To conclude—IN COMPOSITION AND DIVISION CONSISTS

dividuals, however of themselves un-
knowable, become objects of Know-
ledge,

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ἔγιν' ἡμᾶς τῆς ἀορισίας καὶ μεταβολῆς τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀπάγουσα
ἢ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τὰ καθόλου καὶ ἀμετάβλητα καταγίνεται
SCIENCE (ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ) has its name from bringing us (ΕΠΙ
ΣΤΑΣΙΝ) TO SOME STOP and BOUNDARY of things, taking
us away from the unbounded nature and mutability of Par-
ticulars; for it is conversant about Subjects, that are ge-
neral, and invariable. Niceph. Blem. Epit. Logic.
p. 21.

This Etymology given by *Blemmides*, and long be-
fore him adopted by the *Peripatetics*, came originally
from *Plato*, as may be seen in the following account of
it from his *Cratylus*. In this Dialogue *Socrates*, having
first (according to the *Heracleitean* Philosophy, which
Cratylus favoured) etymologized a multitude of Words
with a view to that *Flow* and *unceasing Mutation*, sup-
posed by *Heracitus* to run thro' all things, at length
changes his System, and begins to etymologize from
another, which supposed something in nature to be *per-
manent* and *fixed*. On this principle he thus proceeds
Σκοπῶμεν δὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναλαβόντες πρῶτον μὲν τὸτο τὸ ὄνομα
τὴν ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΝ, ὡς ἀμφιβάλλον ἐστὶ, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅμοιον σημαίνον
τι ὅτι ΙΣΤΗΣΙΝ ἡμῶν ΕΠΙ τοῖς πρῶτοις τὴν ψυχὴν, ἣ ὅτι
συμπεριφίεσται. Let us consider, then (says he) some of
the very Words already examined; and in the first place,

B b

the

lar be said to be known, when by assert- Ch. IV.
ing it to be a *Man*, or an *Animal*, or the
B b 2 like,

The *English Word*, UNDERSTANDING, means not so properly *Knowledge*, as that *Faculty of the Soul*, where Knowledge resides. Why may we not then imagine, that the framers of this Word intended to represent it as a kind of firm *Basis*, on which the fair Structure of Sciences was to rest, and which was supposed to STAND UNDER them, as their immoveable Support.

Whatever may be said of these Etymologies; whether they are true or false, they at least prove their Authors to have considered SCIENCE and UNDERSTANDING, not as *fleeting* powers of Perception, like *Sense*, but rather as *steady*, *permanent*, and *durable* COMPREHENSIONS.— But if so, we must somewhere or other find for them certain *steady*, *permanent*, and *durable* OBJECTS; since if PERCEPTION OF ANY KIND BE DIFFERENT FROM THE THING PERCEIVED, (whether it perceive straight as crooked, or crooked as straight; the moving as fixed, or the fixed as moving) SUCH PERCEPTION MUST OF NECESSITY BE ERRONEOUS AND FALSE. The following passage from a *Greek Platonic* (whom we shall quote again hereafter) seems on the present occasion not without its weight—Εἰ ἵςτὶ γνῶσις ἀκριβεστέρα τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἢν ἂν κ' γινώσκῃ ἀληθεστέρα τῶν αἰσθητῶν. *If there be a KNOWLEDGE more accurate*

Ch. IV. like, we refer it to some such *comprehensive, or general Idea.*

Now it is of these COMPREHENSIVE and PERMANENT IDEAS, THE GENUINE PERCEPTIONS OF PURE MIND, that Words of all Languages, however different, are the SYMBOLS. And hence it is, that *as the PERCEPTIONS include, so do these their SYMBOLS express,*

accurate than SENSATION there must be certain OBJECTS of such knowledge MORE TRUE THAN OBJECTS OF SENSE.

The following then are Questions worth considering, —*What* these Objects are? —*Where* they reside? — And *how* they are to be discovered? — Not by *experimental Philosophy* it is plain; for that meddles with nothing, but what is tangible, corporeal, and mutable — nor even by the more refined and rational speculation of *Mathematics*; for this, at its very commencement, takes such Objects for granted. We can only add, that *if they reside in our own MINDS*, (and who, that has never looked there, can affirm they do not?) then will the advice of the Satirist be no ways improper,

— NEC TE QUÆSIVERIS EXTRA.

Pers.

press, not this or that set of Particulars Ch. IV.
only, but all indifferently, as they happen
to occur. Were therefore the Inhabi-
 tants of *Salisbury* to be transferred to
York, tho' new particular objects would
 appear on every side, they would still
 no more want a new Language to ex-
 plain themselves, than they would want
 new Minds to comprehend what they
 beheld. All indeed, that they would
 want, would be the *local proper Names*;
 which Names, as we have said alrea-
 dy*, are hardly a part of Language,
 but must equally be learnt both by
 learned and unlearned, as often as they
 change the place of their abode.

It is upon the same principles we
 may perceive the reason, why the dead
 Languages (as we call them) are *now*
 intelligible; and why the Language of
modern England is able to describe

B b 3

antient

* Sup. p. 345, 346.

Ch. IV. *antient Rome*; and that of *antient Rome* to describe *modern England*^(h). But of these matters we have spoken before.

§ 2. AND now having viewed the *Process, by which we acquire general Ideas*, let us begin anew from other Principles, and try to discover (if we can prove so fortunate) *whence it is that these Ideas originally come*. If we can succeed here, we may discern perhaps, *what kind of Beings they are*, for this at present appears somewhat obscure.

LET

(h) As far as *Human Nature*, and the *primary Genera* both of *Substance* and *Accident* are the same in all places, and have been so thro' all ages : so far *all Languages* share one common IDENTITY. As far as *peculiar species of Substance* occur in different regions; and much more, as far as the *positive Institutions of religious and civil Politics* are every where different ; so far *each Language* has its peculiar DIVERSITY. To the Causes of *Diversity* here mentioned, may be added the *distinguishing Character and Genius of every Nation*, concerning which we shall speak hereafter.

LET us suppose any man to look for Ch. IV.
the first time upon *some Work of Art*,
as for example upon a Clock; and
having sufficiently viewed it, at length
to depart. Would he not retain, when
absent, an Idea of what he had seen?—
And what is it, *to retain such Idea?*—
It is to have a FORM INTERNAL corres-
pondent to THE EXTERNAL; only with
this difference, that the Internal Form is
devoid of the Matter; the External is
united with it, being seen in the metal,
the wood, and the like.

Now if we suppose this Spectator to
view *many such Machines*, and not sim-
ply to view, but to consider every part
of them, so as to comprehend how these
parts all operate to one End, he might
be then said to possess a kind of IN-
TELLIGIBLE FORM, by which he would
not only understand, and know the
Clocks, which he had seen *already*, but
every Work also of like Sort, which he
might see *hereafter*.—Should it be

more become subsequent, than Cause can Ch. IV.
to Effect.

THUS then, with respect to Works of ART, we may perceive, if we attend, A TRIPLE ORDER OF FORMS; *one* Order, *intelligible* and *previous* to these Works; a *second* Order, *sensible* and *concomitant*; and a *third* again, *intelligible* and *subsequent*. After the first of these Orders the Maker may be said to *work*; thro' the second, the Works themselves *exist*, and are what they are; and in the third they become *recognized*, as *mere Objects of Contemplation*. To make these Forms by different Names more easy to be understood; *the first* may be called THE MAKER'S FORM; *the second*, that of THE SUBJECT; and the *third*, that of THE CONTEMPLATOR.

LET us pass from hence to Works of NATURE. Let us imagine ourselves viewing some diversified Prospect; "a
" Plain, for example, spacious and fer-
" tile;

THUS therefore in NATURE, as well Ch. IV.
 as in ART, THERE ARE INTELLIGI-
 BLE FORMS, WHICH TO THE SENSIBLE
 ARE SUBSEQUENT. Hence then we
 see the meaning of that noted School
 Axiom, *Nil est in INTELLECTU quod*
non prius fuit in SENSU; an Axiom,
 which we must own to be so far allow-
 able, as it respects the Ideas of a mere
Contemplator.

BUT to proceed somewhat farther—
 Are *natural* Productions made BY
 CHANCE, OR BY DESIGN?—Let us ad-
 mit by *Design*, not to lengthen our in-
 quiry. They are certainly* more ex-
 quisite than *any* Works of ART, and
 yet *these* we cannot bring ourselves to
 suppose made by *Chance*.—Admit it,
 and what follows?—*We must of necessity*
admit a MIND also, because DESIGN
implies MIND, wherever it is to be found.
 Allowing therefore this, what do we
 mean

* *Arist. de Part. Animal.* L. I. c. 1.

seen in natural Substances, which are Ch. IV.
 but their *Copies* or *Pictures*. That they
 are *mental* is plain, as they are of the *Es-*
sence of MIND, and consequently no
 Objects to any of the *Senses*, nor there-
 fore circumscribed either by *Time* or
Place.

HERE then, on this System, we have
 plenty of FORMS INTELLIGIBLE,
 WHICH ARE TRULY PREVIOUS TO ALL
 FORMS SENSIBLE. Here too we see
 that NATURE is not defective in her
 TRIPLE ORDER, having (like Art) her
 FORMS PREVIOUS, HER CONCOMI-
 TANT, and HER SUBSEQUENT⁽ⁱ⁾.

THAT

⁽ⁱ⁾ *Simplicius*, in his commentary upon the Predica-
 ments, calls the *first* Order of these intelligible Forms,
 τὰ πρὸ τῆς μεθεξίως, *those previous to Participation*, and
 at other times, ἡ ἐξεγερμένη κοινότης, *the transcendent Uni-*
versality or *Sameness*; the *second* Order he calls τὰ ἐν
 μεθεξί, *those which exist in Participation*, that is, those
 merged in Matter; and at other times, he calls them

Ch. IV.

THAT the previous may be justly so called is plain, because they are essentially

ἡ καταταγμένη κοινότης, the subordinate Universality or Sameness; lastly, of the third Order he says, that they have no independent existence of their own, but that—*ἡμεῖς ἀφελόντες αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἐννοίαις, καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἐπισήσαμεν*, we ourselves abstracting them in our own Imaginations, have given them by such abstraction an existence as of themselves. *Simp. in Prædic. p. 17.* In another place he says, in a language somewhat mysterious, yet still conformable to the same doctrine—*Μήποτε ἐν τρίτῳ ληπτόν τὸ κοινόν, τὸ μὲν ἐξηγημένον τῶν καθ' ἑκάστα, καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς κοινότητος, κατὰ τὴν μίαν ἑαυτὰ φύσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς διαφορότητος κατὰ τὴν πολυειδῆ πρὸς ἅληψιν—*διότερον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ κοινόν, τὸ ἀπὸ κοινῆς αἰτίας τοῖς διαφοροῖς εἶδουσιν ἐνδιδόμενον, καὶ ἐνυπάρχον αὐτοῖς—*τρίτον δὲ, τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις διανοίαις ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως ὑφιστάμενον, ὥστερογενὲς ὄν—*Perhaps therefore we must admit a TRIPLE ORDER OF WHAT IS UNIVERSAL AND THE SAME; that of the first Order, transcendent and superior to Particulars, which thro' its uniform nature is the cause of that Sameness existing in them, as thro' its multiform pre-conception it is the cause of their Diversity—that of the second Order, what is infused from the first universal Cause into the various Species of Beings, and which has its existence in those several Species—that of the third Order, what subsists by abstraction in our own Understandings, being of subsequent origin to the other two. *Ibid. p. 21.*

To

tially prior to all things else. The whole Ch. IV.
 VISIBLE WORLD exhibits nothing
 more

To *Simplicius* we shall add the two following Quotations from *Anthonius* and *Nicephorus Blemmides*, which we have ventured to transcribe, without regard to their uncommon length; as they so fully establish the Doctrine here advanced, and the works of these authors are not easy to be procured.

Ἐποείσθω τοῖνυν δακτύλιός τις ἐκλύπωμα ἔχων, εἰ τύχοι, Ἀχιλλεύς, καὶ κηρία πολλὰ παρακείμενα· ὁ δὲ δακτύλιος σφραγίζεται τῶν κηρίων πάντας ὑπερὶ δις τις εἰσελθὼν καὶ διασάμει· τὰ κηρία, ἐπισήσας ὅτι πάντα ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰσιν ἐκλύπωμα, ἔχεται παρ' αὐτῷ τὸ ἐκλύπωμα τῇ διανοίᾳ. Ἡ τοῖνυν σφραγίς ἡ ἐν τῷ δακτυλίῳ λέγεται ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ εἶναι· ἡ δὲ ἐν τοῖς κηρίοις, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· ἡ δὲ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῷ ἀπομαξαμένῳ, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, καὶ ὑπεροχῆς. Τάτο ὅν ἐποείσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν γινῶν καὶ ἰδῶν· ὁ γὰρ Δημιουργὸς, ποιῶν πάντα, ἔχει παρ' ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντων παραδείγματα· οἷον, ποιῶν ἄνθρωπον, ἔχει τὸ εἶδος παρ' ἑαυτῷ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, πρὸς ὃ ἀφορῶν, πάντας ποιῶν. Ἐπὶ δὲ τις ἐνσταίη λέγων, ὡς ἔκ εισὶ παρὰ τῷ Δημιουργῷ τὰ εἶδη, ἀκρίτως ταῦτα, ὡς ὁ Δημιουργὸς δημιουργεῖ, ἡ ἰδὼς τὰ ὑπ' αὐτῷ δημιουργήματα, ἡ ἔκ ἰδῶς. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μὴ ἰδὼς, ἔκ ἐν δημιουργήσει. Τίς γὰρ, μέλλων ποιήσῃ τὸ, ἀγοῦν ὁ μέλλει ποιῆν; ἢ γὰρ, ὡς ἡ

φύσις.

these it attains even a Semblance of Ch. IV.
Immortality, ~

rius genitum dicitur. Idem in generibus et formis intelligendum censeo; etenim ille optimus procreator mundi Deus, omnium rerum formas, atque exempla habet apud se: ut si hominem efficere velit, in hominis formam, quam habet, intueatur, et ad illius exemplum ceteros faciat omnes. At si quis restiterit, dicatque rerum formas apud Creatorem non esse: quæso ut diligenter attendat: Opifex, quæ facit, vel cognoscit, vel ignorat: sed is, qui nescit, nunquam quicquam faciet: quis enim id facere aggreditur, quod facere ignorat? Neque enim facultate quiddam rationis experte aliquid aget, prout agit natura (ex quo conficitur, ut natura etiam agat, etsi quæ faciat non advertat.) Si vero ratione quadam aliquid facit, quodcumque ab eo factum est omnino cognovit. Si igitur Deus non pejore ratione, quam homo, facit quid, quæ fecit cognovit: si cognovit quæ fecit, in ipso rerum formas esse perspicuum est. Formæ autem in opifice sunt perinde ac in annulo sigillum, hæcque forma ANTE MULTA, et avulsa a materiâ dicitur. Atqui hominis species in unoquoque homine est, quemadmodum etiam sigilla in ceris; et IN MULTIS, nec avulsa a materiâ dicitur. At cum singulos homines animo conspiciamus, et eandem in unoquoque formam atque effigiem videmus, illa effigies in mente nostrâ insidens POST MULTA, et posterius genita dicitur: veluti in illo quoque dicebamus, qui multa sigilla in cerâ uno et eodem annulo impressa conspexerat. Ammon. in Porphy. Introduct. p. 29. b.

Atyolia

ages to be SPECIFICALLY ONE, amid Ch. IV.
C c 2 those

χον· αἱ δὲ σὺν τοῖς ἐμφύχοις ἐθίλει τις ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ τὰ αἴψυχα, τὸ σῶμα σύμπαν κατόψεται· συνδραμυσὼν δὲ τοῖς ἐξημένοις τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἐσιῶν, τὸ πρῶτον γένεσθαι φανίται καὶ γενικώτατον καὶ ἄτω μὲν EN TOIS ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ ὑπέστηκε τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ γένη. Καταλαβὼν δὲ τις ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν, τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἵππων αὐτὴν τὴν ἱππότητα, καὶ ἄτω τὸν καθόλου ἀνθρώπον, καὶ τὸν καθόλου ἵππον ἐπινοήσας· καὶ τὸ καθόλου ζῶον ἐκ τῶν καθέκαστα τῷ λόγῳ συναγαγὼν καὶ τὸ καθόλου αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐμφύχον, καὶ τὸ καθόλου σῶμα, καὶ τὴν καθολικωτάτην ἐσῖαν ἐξ ἀπάντων συλλογισάμενος, ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ διανοίᾳ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη αὐλῶς ὑπέστησεν EPI TOIS ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, τῶντις, μετὰ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὑψηλογενῶς. Genera verò et Species dicuntur esse ANTE MULTA, IN MULTIS, POST MULTA. Ut puta, intelligatur sigillum, quamlibet figuram habens, ex quo multæ ceræ ejusdem figuræ sint participes, et in medium aliquis has proferat, nequaquam præviso sigillo. Cum autem vidisset eas ceras in quibus figura exprimitur, et animadvertisset omnes eandem figuram participare, et quæ videbantur multæ, ratione in unum coegisset, hoc in mente teneat. Nempe sigillum dicitur esse species ANTE MULTA; illa vero in ceris, IN MULTIS; quæ vero ab iis desumitur, et in mente immaterialiter subsistit, POST MULTA. Sic igitur et Genera et Species ANTE MULTA in Creatore sunt, secundum rationes efficientes. In Deo enim rerum effectrices

MAY we be allowed then to credit Ch. IV.
 those speculative Men, who tell us, “it
 C c 3 “ is

*Ergo ipsas quamvis angusti terminus ævi
 Excipiat ; (neque enim plus septima ducitur ætas)
 AT GENUS IMMORTALE MANET—G. IV.*

The same *Immortality*, that is, the *Immortality of the Kind*, may be seen in all *perishable* substances, whether animal or inanimate ; for tho' *individuals* perish, the *several Kinds* still remain. And hence, if we take *TIME*, as denoting the *system of things temporary*, we may collect the meaning of that passage in the *Timæus*, where the philosopher describe *TIME* to be—*μινοντ' αἰών* *iv ivi κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἔχον αἰώνιον ἰκόνα.* *Æternitatis in uno permanentis Imaginem quandam, certis numerorum articulis progredientem.* Plat. V. III. p. 37. Edit. Serran.

We have subjoined the following extract from *Boethius*, to serve as a commentary on this description of *TIME*.—*ÆTERNITAS igitur est, interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta possessio.*† *Quod ex collatione temporalium clarius liquet. Nam quidquid vivit in TEMPORE, id præsens à præteritis in futura procedit : nihilque est in tempore ita constitutum, quod totum vitæ suæ spatium pariter possit amplecti ; sed crastinum quidem nondum apprehendit, hesternum vero jam perdidit. In hodiernâ quoque vita non amplius vivitis, quam in illo mobili transitorioque momento.*
Quod

“fulness of his universal Intellection?” Ch. IV.

—If so, it will be proper that we invert the Axiom before mentioned. We must now say—*Nil est in SENSU, quod non prius fuit in INTELLECTU.* For tho’ the contrary may be true with respect to Knowledge *merely human*, yet never can it be true with respect to

C c 4

Know-

enim Deus conditis rebus antiquior videri debet temporis quantitate, sed simplicis potius proprietate naturæ. HUNG ENIM VITÆ IMMOBILIS PRÆSENTARIUM STATUM, INFINITUS ILLE TEMPORALIUM RERUM MOTUS IMITATUR; cumque cum effingere, atque æquare non possit, ex immobilitate deficit in motum; ex simplicitate præsentiae decrescit in infinitam futuri ac præteriti quantitatem; et, cum totam pariter vitæ suæ plenitudinem nequeat possidere, hoc ipso, quod aliquo modo nunquam esse desinit, illud, quod implere atque exprimere non potest, aliquatenus videtur æmulari, alligans se ad qualemcunque præsentiam hujus exigui volucrisque momenti: quæ, quoniam MANENTIS ILLIUS PRÆSENTIÆ QUANDAM GESTAT IMAGINEM, quibuscumque contigerit, id præstat, ut ESSE videantur. Quoniam vero manere non potuit, infinitum Temporis iter arripuit; eoque modo factum est, ut CONTINUARET VITAM EUNDO, cujus plenitudinem complecti non valuit PERMANENDO. Itaque, &c. De Consolat. Philosoph. L. V.

and awakened its dormant Powers, it Ch. IV.
could at best have been nothing more,
than a sort of dead Capacity ; for IN-
NATE IDEAS it could not possibly have
any.

AT another time we hear of *Bodies* so exceedingly fine, that their very *Exility* makes them susceptible of *sensation* and *knowledge* ; as if they shrunk into *Intellect* by their exquisite subtlety, which rendered them too delicate to be Bodies any longer. It is to this notion we owe many curious inventions, such as *subtle Æther*, *animal Spirits*, *nervous Ducts*, *Vibrations*, and the like ; Terms, which MODERN PHILOSOPHY, upon parting with *occult Qualities*, has found expedient to provide itself, to supply their place.

BUT the *intellectual* Scheme, which never forgets Deity, postpones every thing *corporeal* to the *primary mental Cause*.

In short **ALL MINDS**, that are, are **Ch.IV.**
SIMILAR and CONGENIAL; and so
 too .

Principles or Causes of the more excellent ; and though we admit the common interpretations, and allow SENSE to be a Principle of SCIENCE, we must, however, call it a Principle, not as if it was the efficient Cause, but as it rouses our Soul to the Recollection of general Ideas—According to the same way of thinking is it said in the Timæus, that through the Sight and Hearing we acquire to ourselves Philosophy, because we pass from Objects of SENSE to REMINISCENCE or RECOLLECTION.

And in another passage he observes—'Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πάμμορφον ἀγαλμά ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ, πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἔχουσα λόγους, ἐπιθιζομένη ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀναμιμνήσκται ὧν ἴδον ἔχει λόγους, καὶ τότε προσάλλεται. For in as much as the SOUL, by containing the Principles of all beings, is a sort of OMNIFORM REPRESENTATION or EXEMPLAR ; when it is roused by objects of Sense, it recollects those Principles, which it contains within, and brings them forth.

Georgius Gemistus, otherwise called Pletho, writes upon the same subject in the following manner. Τὴν ψυχὴν φασὶν οἱ τὰ ἴδια τιθέμενοι ἀναλαμβάνουσιν ἰσχυρὴν ἐπιστήμην τὴν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς λόγους, ἀκριβέστερον αὐτὸς ἔχοντας καὶ τελειότερον ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἰσχυρί, ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἔχουσι. Τὸ δὲ ἐν τελειότερον τούτῳ καὶ ἀκριβέστερον ἐκ αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἰσχυρί τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅγε μὴ ἴσιν ἐν αὐτοῖς. Οὐδ' αὖ μὴδαμὲν ἄλλοθι ὅν αὐτὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς διανοεῖσθαι.

(what is more important) between Man and God. ch. IV.

FOR

here speaks, mean not only those relative Proportions of *Equality* and *Inequality*, which exist in Quantity, (such as double, sesquialter, &c.) but in a larger sense, they may be extended to mathematical *Lines*, *Angles*, *Figures*, &c. of all which *Λόγος*, or *Proportions*, tho' we possess in the *Mind* the most clear and precise Ideas, yet it may be justly questioned, whether any one of them ever existed in the *sensible* world.

To these two authors we may add *Boethius*, who, after having enumerated many acts of the MIND or INTELLECT, wholly distinct from *Sensation*, and independent of it, at length concludes,

*Hæc est efficiens magis,
Longè caussa potentior,
Quam quæ materiæ modo
Impressas patitur notas.
Præcedit, tamen excitans,
Ac vires animi movens,
Vivo in corpore passio.
Cum vel lux oculos ferit,
Vel vox auribus instrepat;
Tum MENTIS VIGOR excitus,
QUAS INTUS SPECIES TENET,
Ad motus simileis vocans,
Notis applicat exteris,
INTORSUMQUE RECONDITIS
FORMIS miscet imagines.*

De Consolat. Philosoph. L. V.

Ch. IV. For what is Conversation between Man and Man?—It is a mutual intercourse of *Speaking* and *Hearing*.—To the Speaker, it is *to teach*; to the Hearer, it is *to learn*.—To the Speaker, it is *to descend* from *Ideas* to *Words*; to the Hearer, it is *to ascend* from *Words* to *Ideas*.—If the Hearer, in this ascent, can arrive at *no* Ideas, then is he said *not to understand*; if he ascend to Ideas dissimilar and heterogeneous, then is he said *to misunderstand*.—What then is requisite, that he may be said *to understand*?—That he should ascend to certain Ideas, treasured up *within himself*, correspondent and similar to those *within the Speaker*. The same may be said of a *Writer* and a *Reader*; as when any one reads to-day or to-morrow, 'or here or in *Italy*, what *Euclid* wrote in *Greece* two thousand years ago.

Now is it not marvellous, there should be *so exact an Identity of our Ideas*, if they were only generated from *sensible Objects*.

Objects, infinite in number, ever changing, distant in Time, distant in Place, and no one Particular the same with any other? Ch. IV.

AGAIN, do we allow it possible for GOD to signify his *will* to Men; or for MEN to signify their *wants* to GOD?—In both these cases there must be an *Identity of Ideas*, or else nothing is done either one way or the other. Whence then do these COMMON IDENTIC IDEAS come?—Those of *Men*, it seems, come all from *Sensation*. And whence come *God's Ideas*?—Not surely from *Sensation* too; for this we can hardly venture to affirm, without giving to *Body* that notable *Precedence of being prior to the Intellection of even God himself*.—Let them then be *original*; let them be *connate*, and *essential to the divine Mind*.—If this be true, is it not a fortunate Event, that *Ideas of corporeal rise, and others of mental, (things derived from subjects*

from BODY, which we cannot discover Ch. IV.
 to have any Ideas at all? ⁽¹⁾—An Examination of this kind, pursued with accuracy and temper, is the most probable method of solving these doubts. It is thus we shall be enabled with more assurance to decide, whether we are to admit the Doctrine of *the Epicurean Poet*,

CORPOREA NATURA *animum constare,*
animamque ;

or trust *the Mantuan Bard*, when he sings in divine numbers,

Igneus est ollis vigor, et CÆLESTIS
 ORIGO
Seminibus.——

BUT

(1) ΝΟΥΝ ΔΙ' ὧν ΣΩΜΑ γινᾶται πως γὰρ αὖ τὰ ΑΝΟΗΤΑ ΝΟΥΝ γινῆσθαι ; No BODY produces MIND : for how should THINGS DEVOID OF MIND produce MIND ? *Sallust de Diis et Mundo*, c. 8.

CHAP. V.

Subordination of Intelligence—Difference of Ideas, both in particular Men, and in whole Nations—Different Genius of different Languages—Character of the English, the Oriental, the Latin, and the Greek Languages—Superlative Excellence of the Last—Conclusion.

ORIGINAL TRUTH ^(a), having the Ch. V.
 most intimate connection with the *su-*
D d 2*preme*

(a) Those Philosophers, whose Ideas of *Being* and *Knowledge* are derived from *Body* and *Sensation*, have a short method to explain the Nature of *Truth*. It is a *factitious* thing, made by every man for himself; which comes and goes, just as it is remembered and forgot; which in the order of things makes its appearance *the last* of any, being not only subsequent to *sensible Objects*, but even to our *Sensations* of them. According to this Hypothesis, there are many *Truths*, which have been, and are no longer; others, that will be, and have not

only particular Percipients. Among *these* therefore we must look for ignorance and error, and for that *Subordination of Intelligence*, which is their natural consequence.

Ch. V.

WE have daily experience in the Works of ART, that a *partial Knowledge* will suffice for *Contemplation*, tho' we know not enough, to profess ourselves Artists. Much more is this true, with respect to NATURE; and well for man-

D d 3

kind

man Soul in the light of a Crucible, where Truths are produced by a kind of logical Chemistry. They may consist (for aught we know) of *natural* materials, but are as much *creatures of our own*, as a Bolus or Elixir.

If Milton by his URANIA intended to represent TRUTH, he certainly referred her to a much more ancient, as well as a far more noble origin.

—————Heav'nly born!

*Before the hills appear'd, or fountains flow'd,
Thou with eternal Wisdom didst converse,
Wisdom thy Sister; and with her didst play
In presence of th' almighty Father, pleas'd*

With thy celestial Song.—— P. I.. VII.

See Proverbs VIII. 22, &c. Jeremiah X. 10. Marc.
Antonin. IX. 1.

and that of VIRTUE appear to co-incide, it being the business of both to *examine our Ideas, and to amend them by the Standard of Nature and of Truth* ^(b).

Ch. V.

IN this important Work, we shall be led to observe, how Nations, like single Men, have their *peculiar* Ideas; how these *peculiar* Ideas become THE GENIUS OF THEIR LANGUAGE, since the *Symbol* must of course correspond to its *Archetype* ^(c); how the *wisest* Nations

D d 4

tions

^(b) HOW useful to ETHIC SCIENCE, and indeed to KNOWLEDGE in general, a GRAMMATICAL DISQUISITION into the *Etymology* and *Meaning* of WORDS was esteemed by the chief and ablest Philosophers, may be seen by consulting *Plato* in his *Cratylus*; *Xenoph. Mem.* IV. 5, 6. *Arrian. Epict.* I. 17. II. 10. *Marc. Anton.* III. 11. V. 8. X. 8.

^(c) ΗΘΥΣ ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡ ἵσ' τ' ἀνθρώπων ΛΟΓΟΣ. *Stob. Capiuntur Signa haud levia, sed observatu digna (quod fortasse quispiam non putarit) de ingeniis et moribus populorum et nationum ex linguis ipsorum. Bacon. de Augm. Scient.* VI. 1. *Vid. etiam. Quintil. L. XI. p. 675. Edit. Capperon. Diog. L. I. p. 58. et Menag. Com. Tusc. Disp. V. 16.*

sate the defect, that what we want in *Elegance*, we gain in *Copiousness*, in which last respect few Languages will be found superior to our own. Ch. V.

LET us pass from ourselves to the NATIONS OF THE EAST. The ^(d) Eastern World, from the earliest days, has been at all times the Seat of enormous Monarchy. On its natives fair Liberty never shed its genial influence. If at any time civil Discords arose among them (and arise there did innumerable) the contest was never about *the Form of their Government*; for this was an object, of which the Combatants had no conception;) it was all from the poor motive of, *who should be their MASTER*, whether

(d) Διὰ γὰρ τὸ δουλικώτεροι εἶναι τὰ ἥθη οἱ μὲν Βαρβάρων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην, ὑπομύνουσι τὴν δισποτικὴν ἀρχὴν, ὅδιν δυσχεραίνοντες. *For the Barbarians by being more slavish in their Manners than the Greeks, and those of Asia than those of Europe, submit to despotic Government without murmuring or discontent.* Arist. Polit. III. 4.

nerated into the *Tumid* and *Bombast*. Ch. V.

The Greeks too of Asia became infected by their neighbours, who were often at times not only their neighbours, but their masters ; and hence that *Luxuriance* of the *Asiatic Stile*, unknown to the chaste eloquence and purity of *Athens*. But of the *Greeks* we forbear to speak now, as we shall speak of them more fully, when we have first considered the Nature or Genius of the *Romans*.

AND what sort of People may we pronounce the ROMANS?—A Nation engaged in wars and commotions, some foreign, some domestic, which for seven hundred years wholly engrossed their thoughts. Hence therefore their LANGUAGE became, *like their Ideas*, copious in all Terms expressive of things *political*, and well adapted to the purposes both of *History* and *popular Eloquence*.—But what was their *Philosophy*?—As a Nation, it was none, if we may credit their ablest Writers. And hence the Unfitness of their Language to this

gil seems to have judged the most truly of his Countrymen, when admitting their inferiority in the more elegant Arts he concludes at last with his usual majesty,

Ch. V.

Tu

*Nec me animi fallit, GRAIORUM obscura reperta
Difficile inlustrare LATINIS versibus esse,
(Multa novis rebus præsertim quom sit agendum,)
Propter EGESTATEM LINGUÆ et RERUM NOVITATEM :
Sed tua me virtus tamen, et sperata voluptas
Suavis amicitia quemvis perferre laborem R
Suadet———* Lucr. I. 137.

In the same age, Varro, among his numerous works, wrote some in the way of *Philosophy* ; as did the Patriot BRUTUS, a Treatise concerning *Virtue*, much applauded by Cicero ; but these Works are now lost.

Soon after the writers above mentioned came HORACE, some of whose satires and epistles may be justly ranked amongst the most valuable pieces of *Latin Philosophy*, whether we consider the purity of their Style, or the great Address with which they treat the Subject.

After Horace, tho' with as long an interval as from the days of Augustus, to those of Nero, came the Satirist PERSIUS, the friend and disciple of the Stoic Cornutus ; to whose precepts as he did honour by his virtuous Life,

FROM considering *the Romans*, let us Ch. V.
 pass to THE GREEKS. THE GRECIAN
 COMMONWEALTHS, while they main-
 tained

Honorius and *Theodosius*) but from his near resemblance, in the character of a Writer. His works, like the other's, are miscellaneous; filled with Mythology and antient Literature, some Philosophy being intermixed. His Commentary upon the *Somnium Scipionis* of *Cicero* may be considered as wholly of the *philosophical* kind.

In the same age with *Aulus Gellius*, flourished *APULEIUS* of *Madaura* in *Africa*, a *Platonic* Writer, whose Matter in general far exceeds his perplexed and affected Stile, too conformable to the false Rhetoric of the Age when he lived.

Of the same Country, but of a later Age, and a harsher Stile, was *MARTIANUS CAPELLA*, if indeed he deserve not the name rather of a *Philologist*, than of a *Philosopher*.

After *Capella*, we may rank *CHALCIDIUS* the *Platonic*, tho' both his Age, and Country, and Religion are doubtful. His manner of writing is rather more agreeable than that of the two preceding, nor does he appear to be their inferior in the knowledge of Philosophy, his work being a laudable Commentary upon the *Timæus* of *Plato*.

The

They were the politest, the bravest, and the wisest of men. In the short space of little more than a Century, they became such Statesmen, Warriors, Orators, Historians, Physicians, Poets, Critics, Painters, Sculptors, Architects, and (last of all) Philosophers, that one can hardly help considering THAT GOLDEN PERIOD, as a Providential Event in honour of human Nature, to shew to what perfection the Species might ascend^(g).

Now

(g) If we except *Homer*, *Hesiod*, and the *Lyric* Poets, we hear of few *Grecian* Writers before the expedition of *Xerxes*. After that Monarch had been defeated, and the dread of the *Persian* power was at an end, the EFFULGENCE OF GRECIAN GENIUS (if I may use the expression) broke forth, and shone till the time of *Alexander the Macedonian*, after whom it disappeared, and never rose again. This is that *Golden Period* spoken of above. I do not mean that *Greece* had not many writers of great merit subsequent to that period, and especially of the philosophic kind; but the *Great*, the *Striking*, the *Sublime* (call it as you please) attained at that time to a height, to which it never could ascend in any after age.

E c

The

and universal Genius. Where Matter Ch. V.
 so abounded, Words followed of course, }
E e 2 and

ponnesian War, which together with other wars, its immediate consequence, broke the confederacy of their Commonwealths; wasted their strength; made them jealous of each other; and thus paved a way for the contemptible kingdom of *Macedon* to enslave them all, and ascend in a few years to universal Monarchy.

A like luxuriance of prosperity sowed discord among the *Romans*; raised those unhappy contests between the *Senate* and the *Gracchi*; between *Sylla* and *Marius*; between *Pompey* and *Cæsar*; till at length, after the last struggle for Liberty by those brave Patriots *Brutus* and *Cassius* at *Philippi*, and the subsequent defeat of *Anthony* at *Actium*, the *Romans* became subject to the dominion of a FELLOW-CITIZEN,

It must indeed be confessed, that after *Alexander* and *Octavius* had established their Monarchies, there were many bright Geniuses, who were eminent under their Government. *Aristotle* maintained a friendship and epistolary correspondence with *Alexander*. In the time of the same Monarch lived *Theophrastus*, and the Cynic *Diogenes*. Then also *Demosthenes* and *Æschines* spoke their two celebrated Orations. So likewise in the time of *Octavius*, *Virgil* wrote his *Æneid*, and with *Horace*,
Varius,

Mimnermus or *Sappho*; for the rural lays of a *Theocritus* or *Bion*; and for the sublime Conceptions of a *Sophocles* or *Homer*. The same in Prose. Here *Iso-*
crates was enabled to display his Art, in all the accuracy of Periods, and the nice counterpoise of Diction. Here *Demosthenes* found materials for that nervous Composition, that manly force of unaffected Eloquence, which rushed, like a torrent, too impetuous to be withstood.

Ch. V.

WHO were more different in exhibiting their *Philosophy*, than *Xenophon*, *Plato*, and his disciple, *Aristotle*? Different, I say, in their character of *Composition*; for as to their *Philosophy itself*, it was in reality *the same*. *Aristotle*, strict, methodic, and orderly; subtle in Thought; sparing in Ornament; with little address to the Passions or Imagination; but exhibiting the whole with such a pregnant brevity, that in every sentence

Works with Tales and Fables, and the mystic Theology of antient times. *Xenophon*, the Pattern of perfect simplicity; every where smooth, harmonious, and pure; declining the figurative, the marvellous, and the mystic; ascending but rarely into the Sublime; nor then so much trusting to the colours of stile, as to the intrinsic dignity of the Sentiment itself.

THE Language in the mean time, in which *He* and *Plato* wrote, appears to suit so accurately with the Stile of both, that when we read either of the two, we cannot help thinking, that it is he alone, who has hit its character, and that it could not have appeared so elegant in any other manner.

AND thus is THE GREEK TONGUE,
*from its propriety and universality, made
for all that is great, and all that is beau-*
tiful,

pleasure, and more rarely still, any solid Ch. V.
improvement.

To be *competently* skilled in antient learning, is by no means a work of such insuperable pains. The very progress itself is attended with delight, and resembles a Journey through some pleasant Country, where every mile we advance, new charms arise. It is certainly as easy to be a Scholar, as a Gamester, or many other Characters equally illiberal and low. The same application, the same quantity of habit will fit us for one, as completely as for the other. And as to those who tell us, with an air of seeming wisdom, that *it is Men, and not Books*, we must study to become knowing; this I have always remarked, from repeated Experience, to be the common consolation and language of Dunces. They shelter their ignorance under a few bright Examples

AND so much at present as to GE- Ch. V.
RAL IDEAS; *how we acquire them;*
hence they are derived; what is their
Nature; and what their connection with
Language. So much likewise as to the
Subject of this Treatise, UNIVERSAL
GRAMMAR.

END OF THE THIRD BOOK.

AD-

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Notes are either Translations of former Notes, or Additions to them. The additional are chiefly Extracts from Greek Manuscripts, which (as the Author has said already concerning others of the same kind) are valuable both for their Rarity, and for their intrinsic Merit.

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

PAG. 95.—TO STOP, &c.] The Quotation from *Proclus* in the Note may be thus rendered—THAT THING IS AT REST, *which* FOR A TIME PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT IS IN THE SAME PLACE, *both itself and its Parts.*

P. 105. In the Note, for *γινόμενοι* read *γινόμενον*, and render the passage thus—*For by this faculty* (namely the faculty of Sense) *we neither know the Future, nor the Past, but the Present only.*

P. 106. NOTE (d).] The passage of *Philoponus*, here referred to, but by mistake omitted, has respect to the notion of beings *corporeal* and *sensible*, which were said to be *nearly approaching to Non-Entities*. The Author explains this, among other reasons, by the following—Πῶς δὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔσι γιγνιῶνται; Πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπειδὴ ἵσταται τὸ παρὲς εἶναι καὶ τὸ μέλλον, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ὄντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡφάνισται καὶ ἔκ τε ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ ἐστὶ· συμπαραβίβει δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τὰ φύσικα πάντα, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτῶν παρακολούθημά ἐστι ὁ χρόνος. *How therefore is it that they approach nearly to Non-Entities? In the first place, because* HERE (where they exist) *exists* THE PAST and THE FUTURE, *and these are* NON-ENTITIES; *for the one is vanished, and is no more, the other is not as yet. Now all natural Substances pass away along with* TIME, *or rather it is upon their Motion that* TIME *is an Attendant.*

P. 119.

P. 204.—Note (c)—*There are in the number of things many, which have a most known EXISTENCE, but a most unknown ESSENCE; such for example as Motion, Place, and more than either of them, Time. The EXISTENCE of such of these is known and indisputable, but what their ESSENCE is, or Nature, is among the most difficult things to discern. The Soul also is in the same Class: that it is something, is most evident; but what it is, is a matter not so easy to learn. Alex. Aphrod. p. 142.*

P. 340—LANGUAGE—INCAPABLE OF COMMUNICATING DEMONSTRATION.] See Three Treatises, or Vol. I. p. 220, and the additional note to the words, *The Source of infinite Truths, &c.*

P. 368—in the Note—*yet so held the Philosopher of Malmesbury, and the Author of the Essay, &c.*]

*Philoponus, from the Philosophy of Plato and Pythagoras, seems to have far excelled these Moderns in his account of WISDOM or PHILOSOPHY, and its Attributes, or essential Characters.—*Ἰδιον γὰρ φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔχειν διαφορὰν δαῖξαι τὴν κοινότητα, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔχειν κοινότητα δαῖξαι τίνι διαφέρουσιν· ἡ γὰρ δυσχερὲς τὸ δαῖξαι φάτης (*lege φάτης*) καὶ περιγεγεῆς κοινότητα (παντὶ γὰρ περὶ), ἀλλ' ἡ (*lege ὅπου*) τὸ διάφοροι τούτων ἐπιτεῖν· ὅδ' αὖτε καὶ ἴππου διαφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τί κοινὸν ἔχουσιν. IT IS THE PROPER BUSINESS OF PHILOSOPHY TO SHEW IN MANY THINGS, WHICH HAVE DIFFERENCE, WHAT IS THEIR COMMON CHARACTER; and IN MANY THINGS, WHICH HAVE A COMMON CHARACTER, THRO' WHAT IT IS THEY DIFFER. *It is indeed no difficult matter*

F f

If therefore we are to relate concisely the Cause, why THE HYPOTHESIS OF IDEAS pleased them (namely Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, &c.) we must begin by observing that all the various visible objects around us, the heavenly as well as the sublunary, are either from CHANCE, or according to a CAUSE. FROM CHANCE IS IMPOSSIBLE; for then the more excellent things (such as Mind, and Reason, and Cause, and the Effects of Cause) will be among those things that come last, and so the ENDINGS of things will be more excellent than their BEGINNINGS. To which too may be added what Aristotle says; that ESSENTIAL CAUSES OUGHT TO BE PRIOR TO ACCIDENTAL, in as much as EVERY ACCIDENTAL CAUSE IS A DEVIATION FROM THEM; so that whatever is the effect of such essential Cause [as is indeed every work of Art and human Ingenuity] must needs be prior to that which is the Effect of Chance, even though we were to refer to Chance the most divine of visible objects [the heavens themselves].

The Philosopher, having thus proved a *definite Cause* of the World in opposition to *Chance*, proceeds to shew that from the Unity and concurrent Order of things this Cause must be ONE. After which he goes on as follows.—

—'Εἰ μὲν ὅν ἄλογον τὸτο, ἄτοπον· ἔσαι γὰρ τι πάλιν τῶν ὑστέρων τῆς τῆς αἰτίας κρείττον, τὸ κατὰ λόγον καὶ γινώσκων ποιῶν, ἔσω τῷ Παντὸς ὄν, καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ μέρει, ὃ ἔστιν ἀπ' αἰτίας ἀλόγου τοῦτο. 'Εἰ δὲ λόγον ἔχον, καὶ αὐτὸ γινώσκον, οἶδεν ἑαυτὸ δῆπου τῶν πάντων αἰτίαι εἶναι, ἢ τὸτο ἀγνοῶν, ἀγνοήσῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν. 'Εἰ δὲ ἰδὼν, ὅτι κατ' ἐσῆαι ἔστι τῷ παντὶ αἰτίαι, τὸ δὲ ἀρισμίνως εἰ-

those mundane Reasons and Forms, out of which the Universe is composed, and that the Universe is in it, as in a Cause, distinct from and without the Matter.

P. 380—AGREEABLE TO WHICH IDEAS THESE WORKS ARE FASHIONED, &c.] It is upon these Principles that Nicomachus in his *Arithmetic*, p. 7, calls the Supreme Being an Artist—*ἐν τῇ τῷ τεχνίτῃ Θεῷ διανοίᾳ*, in *Dei artificis mente*. Where Philoponus, in his *manuscript Comment*, observes as follows—*τεχνίτην φησὶ τὸν Θεόν, ὡς πάντων τὰς πρώτας αἰτίας καὶ τὰς λόγους αὐτῶν ἔχοντα*. He calls God an ARTIST, as possessing within himself the first Causes of all things, and their Reasons or Proportions. Soon after speaking of those Sketches, after which Painters work and finish their Pictures, he subjoins—*ὥσπερ ἂν ἡμεῖς, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα σκιαγραφήματα βλέπομεν, ποιῶμεν τοῦτι τι, ἔτω καὶ ὁ δημιουργὸς, πρὸς ἑκάστη ἀποβλέπων, τὰ τῆδε πάντα κεκόσμηκεν· ἀλλ' ἴσμεν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν τῆδε σκιαγραφήματα ἀτελῆ εἰσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ λόγοι ἀρχιτέκνοι καὶ παντέλειοι εἰσιν*. As therefore we, looking upon such Sketches as these, make such and such particular things, so also the Creator, looking at those Sketches of his; hath formed and adorned with beauty all things here below. We must remember, however, that the Sketches here are imperfect; but that the others, those REASONS or Proportions, which exist in God, are ARCHETYPAL and ALL-PERFECT.

It is according to this Philosophy, that Milton represents God, after he had created this visible World, contemplating

reasoning you may perceive to be true in all things whatever, which operate merely by existing. It follows therefore, THAT THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE, operating after this manner, IS THAT PRIMARILY, WHICH THE WORLD IS SECONDARILY. If therefore the WORLD be the plenitude of FORMS of all Sorts, these FORMS MUST ALSO BE PRIMARILY IN THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD, for it was the same Cause, which constituted the Sun, and the Moon, and Man, and Horse, and in general all the Forms existing in the Universe. These therefore exist primarily in the Cause of the Universe; another Sun besides the apparent, another Man, and so with respect to every Form else. The FORMS therefore, PREVIOUS to the sensible and external Forms, and which according to this reasoning are their ACTIVE and EFFICIENT CAUSES, are to be found PRE-EXISTING IN THAT ONE AND COMMON CAUSE OF ALL THE UNIVERSE. Procli Com. MS. in Plat. Parmenid. L. 3.

We have quoted the above passages for the same reason as the former; for the sake of those, who may have a curiosity to see a sample of this *antient* Philosophy, which (as some have held) may be traced up from *Plato* and *Socrates* to *Parmenides*, *Pythagoras*, and *Orpheus* himself.

If the Phrase, *to operate merely by existing*, should appear questionable, it must be explained upon a supposition, that in the *Supreme Being* no Attributes are secondary, intermittent, or adventitious, but all original, *ever perfect and essential*. See p. 162, 359.

The Verses of *Orpheus* on this subject may be found in the tract *De Mundo*, ascribed to *Aristotle*, p. 23. Edit. *Sylburg*.

Ζεὺς ἄρσεν γένετο, Ζεὺς κ. τ. λ.

P. 391.—WHERE ALL THINGS LIE INVELOPED, &c.]

—ὅσα περὶ εἰς ΤΑ ΠΟΛΛΑ κατὰ δὴ τινὰ μερισμὸν, τσαῦτα καὶ ΤΟ ΕΝ ἐκείνῳ περὶ τοῦ μερισμοῦ κατὰ τὸ πάντῃ ἁμερίῃ· ὃ γὰρ εἶναι, ὡς ἰσχυρίζονται, καθάπερ ὁ Σπινύσιππος ἰδοῦσι λέγειν ἅλλ' ΕΝ ΩΣ ΠΑΝΤΑ. *As numerous as is the MULTITUDE OF INDIVIDUALS by Partition, so numerous also is that PRINCIPLE OF UNITY by universal Impartibility. For it is not ONE, as a MINIMUM is one (according to what Spencippus seemed to say,) but it is ONE, as being ALL THINGS. Damascius περὶ Ἀρχῶν, MS.*

P. 408—THE WISEST NATIONS—THE MOST COPIOUS LANGUAGES.] It is well observed by *Muretus*—*Nul- li unquam, qui res ignorarent, nomina, quibus eas expri- merent, quæsierunt.* Var. Lect. VI. 1.

P. 411—BUT WHAT WAS THEIR PHILOSOPHY?] The same *Muretus* has the following passage upon the ROMAN TASTE FOR PHILOSOPHY.—*Beati autem illi, et opulenti, et omnium gentium victores ROMANI, in petendis honoribus, et in prensandis civibus, et in exteris nationibus terbo componendis, re compilandis occupati, philosophandi curam servis aut libertis suis, et Græculis esurientibus re- linquebant. Ipsi, quod ab avaritia, quod ab ambitione,*
quod

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